{ "id": 8555309, "name": "WILLIAM OSCAR BLOUNT, Administrator of the Estate of PEARLIE MAE BLOUNT v. EDDIE HOWARD TYNDALL and DEWEY BROS., INC. and WILLIAM O. BLOUNT v. EDDIE HOWARD TYNDALL AND DEWEY BROS., INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Blount v. Tyndall", "decision_date": "1975-05-07", "docket_number": "No. 753SC92", "first_page": "559", "last_page": "563", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "25 N.C. App. 559" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552071 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 S.E. 2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610883 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0604-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 405, "char_count": 9188, "ocr_confidence": 0.546, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7531010495206477 }, "sha256": "91934cff6e0844f9229d49f510d0d246ee285b8d37757d61f269e92bc7e18c85", "simhash": "1:3c3abf8234f2d97a", "word_count": 1483 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:30:12.075015+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Parker and Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "WILLIAM OSCAR BLOUNT, Administrator of the Estate of PEARLIE MAE BLOUNT v. EDDIE HOWARD TYNDALL and DEWEY BROS., INC. and WILLIAM O. BLOUNT v. EDDIE HOWARD TYNDALL AND DEWEY BROS., INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BROCK, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiffs assign as error that the instructions to the jury by the trial court were so ambiguous and confusing that they caused the jury to return verdicts which plaintiffs contend are inconsistent. Specifically plaintiffs except to the following language reported to have been used by the trial court in its instructions:\n\u201cIn each action the defendant has filed what is called a counterclaim, and it is also suing the plaintiff in each action for a sum of money which he contends is for damage by reason of the truck of Dewey Bros., Inc., which Dewey Bros., Inc., contends in the accident which was caused by the negligence of Pearlie Mae Blount.\u201d\nThe foregoing was stated at the beginning of the trial court\u2019s instructions. Obviously it is awkward and probably inaccurately reported, but in view of the remaining instructions, we cannot see how this language could have confused or misled the jury in any way. It is clear from the inquiries and statements by the jurors that they understood that each side was trying to recover damages from the other side on the ground of negligence in causing the collision. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPlaintiffs assign as error that the trial court instructed the jury that a vehicle approaching an intersection has the duty to yield the right of way to a vehicle already in the intersection. Plaintiffs argue that this principle of law has no application to an intersection in which traffic is controlled by electrically operated stop lights. Plaintiff in each complaint alleged:\n\u201cC. He failed to yield the right-of-way of (sic) another motor vehicle already within an intersection in violation of the motor vehicle laws of the State of North Carolina in such cases made and provided.\u201d\nAlso, in pretrial stipulations plaintiffs stipulated:\n\u201ch. Plaintiff in each case contends that defendants were negligent in that:\n\u201c3. The driver-agent of Dewey Bros., Inc. failed to yield the right-of-way to another vehicle who (sic) was already entering the intersection, in violation of motor vehicle laws of the State of North Carolina.\u201d\nPlaintiffs now complain that the trial judge instructed the jury in accordance with their allegations and stipulated contentions. If the instruction constituted error, clearly it was invited and encouraged error. Plaintiffs should not now be heard to complain. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPlaintiffs argue that the verdict in the wrongful death case and the verdict in the property damage case are inconsistent with each other and should not have been accepted by the trial judge. Plaintiffs argue that this inconsistency requires a new trial of each action.\nWhen each verdict is considered separately, each is clearly free from ambiguity and each is sufficient to support entry of judgment denying recovery to both plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiffs\u2019 argument is based upon the fact that in the wrongful death action the jury found defendant negligent and plaintiff\u2019s intestate contributorily negligent, while in the property damage action it found defendant not negligent and the plaintiff\u2019s intestate not negligent. Admittedly the wording that the jury used in the two verdicts is inconsistent, but it is clear that the consequences of each verdict are precisely the same: neither party is entitled to recovery from the other. The case of Cody v. England, 216 N.C. 604, 5 S.E. 2d 833 (1939), is relied upon by plaintiffs. In our view Cody is inapplicable. There the court was speaking of a verdict in one case, not separate verdicts in two cases. Additionally, in Cody the verdict did not clearly dispose of the controversy and for that reason was found to be contradictory, ambiguous, and uncertain. In the present cases there is no , contradiction, ambiguity, or uncertainty in either verdict. Each is sufficient to support a judgment. The words used by the jury, although inconsistent as between' the two verdicts, accomplish exactly the same result in each case. The verdicts support the judgments entered. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe note that the verdict in the property damage action contains within itself what appears to be an ambiguity with respect to the issues submitted upon defendants\u2019 defense and counterclaim. As noted above, in the property damage action the jury answered that defendants were not negligent. However, upon defendants\u2019 defense of contributory negligence, the jury answered that plaintiff\u2019s intestate was contributorily negligent. Upon defendants\u2019 counterclaim for damages, the jury answered that plaintiff\u2019s intestate was not negligent. Plaintiffs, properly, do not contend that plaintiffs were prejudiced by such an ambiguity. This might be cause for defendants to complain, but they have not appealed.\nPlaintiffs assign as error the refusal of the trial judge to set aside the verdicts as being against the weight of the evidence. Such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. His ruling thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Young, 14 N.C. App. 631, 188 S.E. 2d 671 (1972) ; 7 Strong, N. C. Index 2d Trial \u00a7 51 (1968).\nIn our opinion plaintiffs had fair trials, free from prejudicial error.\nJudges Parker and Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BROCK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James, Hite, Cavendish & Blount, by Robert D. Rouse III, for the \u201cplaintiffs.", "Gaylord & Singleton, by Danny D. McNally, for the defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM OSCAR BLOUNT, Administrator of the Estate of PEARLIE MAE BLOUNT v. EDDIE HOWARD TYNDALL and DEWEY BROS., INC. and WILLIAM O. BLOUNT v. EDDIE HOWARD TYNDALL AND DEWEY BROS., INC.\nNo. 753SC92\n(Filed 7 May 1975)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 90\u2014 instructions on counterclaim \u2014 no confusion of jury\nIn an action for wrongful death and damages to an automobile, the trial court\u2019s awkward instruction concerning defendant\u2019s counterclaim did not confuse and mislead the jury in any way where it was clear from the jurors\u2019 inquiries and statements that they understood that each side was trying to recover damages from the other side on the ground of negligence in causing the collision.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 90 \u2014 instruction on duty to yield right of way at intersection\u2014 no error\nPlaintiff\u2019s assignment of error to the trial court\u2019s instruction that a vehicle approaching an intersection has the duty to yield the right of way to a vehicle already in the intersection is without merit, since that instruction was in accordance with plaintiff\u2019s allegations and stipulated contentions.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 91; Trial \u00a7 42 \u2014 wrongful death \u2014 damage to automobile\u2014 no inconsistent verdicts\nWhere an action for wrongful death was consolidated with an action for damages to an automobile and both parties were the same in each action, the jury\u2019s verdict in the wrongful death action that defendant was negligent and plaintiff\u2019s intestate was contributorily negligent was not inconsistent with its verdict in the damages action that neither defendant nor plaintiff\u2019s intestate was negligent, though the wording itself was inconsistent, since the consequences of each verdict were precisely the same.\n4. Trial \u00a7 51 \u2014 verdict contrary to weight of evidence \u2014 motion to set aside\nA motion to set aside the verdict as being against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Webb, Judge. Judgments entered 11 September 1974 in Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 April 1975.\nThese two actions were consolidated for trial in the Superior Court. In one action the plaintiff, as administrator of his wife\u2019s estate, seeks recovery of damages for her wrongful death. In the other action the plaintiff, individually, seeks recovery of damages to his automobile, which was driven by his wife. Both actions arise out of a collision between plaintiff\u2019s automobile and defendant\u2019s truck on 21 November 1972, at the intersection of N. C. Highway No. 11 and N. C. Highway No. 102 in Pitt County.\nThe evidence tends to show that plaintiff\u2019s intestate drove plaintiff\u2019s automobile in an easterly direction on Highway No. 102 and approached its intersection with Highway No. 11. Defendant driver drove the corporate defendant\u2019s truck in a northerly direction on Highway No. 11 and approached its intersection with Highway No. 102. Traffic at the intersection of the highways was controlled by electrically operated red and green traffic signals.\nThe parties stipulated that plaintiff\u2019s intestate died as a result of injuries received in the accident. They also stipulated the amount of property damages to each of the vehicles involved in the collision.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show that plaintiff\u2019s intestate entered the intersection at a time when the electric signal was green for traffic on Highway No. 102. Defendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant driver entered the intersection at a time when the electric signal was green for traffic on Highway No. 11.\nIn each case the jury answered the issues to the effect that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants were entitled to recover damages. Plaintiff in each case appealed.\nJames, Hite, Cavendish & Blount, by Robert D. Rouse III, for the \u201cplaintiffs.\nGaylord & Singleton, by Danny D. McNally, for the defendants." }, "file_name": "0559-01", "first_page_order": 587, "last_page_order": 591 }