{ "id": 8550854, "name": "LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUG LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually, and wife, JOY LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually and husband, SHERRILL SMITH v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor; LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUGLAS LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Guardian for ROBERT LOFTON; and TRUSTEES OF OHIO HIGHWAY DRIVERS' WELFARE FUND; LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUGLAS LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually; SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Guardian for ROBERT LOFTON; and UNIVERSITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA", "name_abbreviation": "Lofton v. Lofton", "decision_date": "1975-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 7519DC234", "first_page": "203", "last_page": "210", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "26 N.C. App. 203" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "134 N.Y. S. 2d 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Misc. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc.", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 S.E. 2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165040 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E. 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269719 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/149/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560994 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0047-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 649, "char_count": 17254, "ocr_confidence": 0.564, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.3747516532118655e-08, "percentile": 0.3369138509619673 }, "sha256": "38978c4b9cf8c1c70e2df00d39f60e00eb8d2be7e7a66c3b55cd1376f4412796", "simhash": "1:d3a06441e0745f77", "word_count": 2905 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:59:13.418266+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Parker and Vaughn concur." ], "parties": [ "LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUG LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually, and wife, JOY LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually and husband, SHERRILL SMITH v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUGLAS LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Guardian for ROBERT LOFTON; and TRUSTEES OF OHIO HIGHWAY DRIVERS\u2019 WELFARE FUND LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUGLAS LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually; SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Guardian for ROBERT LOFTON; and UNIVERSITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRITT, Judge.\nThe trial court held that Robert was barred from inheriting any property from, or receiving any benefits accruing because of the death of, his parents, by reason of (1) the provisions of G.S. Ch. 31A and (2) the common law of our State. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to an affirmance of the judgment if either (1) or (2) applies.\nThe recent case of Quick v. Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E. 2d 563 (1975), provides considerable guidance for us in the disposition of this appeal. In that case the court either established or reiterated the following principles of law:\n1. A person who has been convicted of involuntary manslaughter of another has not been convicted of a \u201cwillful\u201d killing within the meaning of G.S. 3lA-3(3)a and thus is not a \u201cslayer\u201d who is barred by G.S. Ch. 31A from receiving the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of the deceased.\n2. The provisions of G.S. Ch. 31A do not completely supplant the common law principle prevailing in North Carolina that a person should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong. G.S. 31A-15 preserves the common law, both substantively and procedurally, as to all acts not specifically provided for in Ch. 31A.\n3. In a civil action to determine the right of a beneficiary who has caused the death of an insured to receive the proceeds of a policy of insurance on his life, the record of the beneficiary\u2019s conviction of a \u201cwilful and unlawful killing\u201d is admissible to establish the disqualification of the beneficiary to receive the proceeds under Ch. 31A; however, when the wrongdoer is not disqualified by Ch. 31A from receiving the insurance proceeds, and the common law must be relied on for such disqualification, the record of a criminal conviction of the wrongdoer for a crime not amounting to a \u201cwilful and unlawful killing,\u201d such as a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, is not admissible, and it is necessary to prove at the trial the factual circumstances relating to the killing from which the court can determine the issue.\n4. Evidence not objected to that a defendant beneficiary had been convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of the insured is sufficient to support the court\u2019s conclusion that defendant is disqualified under the common law from receiving the proceeds of the insurance policy.\nFirst, we consider whether Robert is barred by G.S. Ch. 31A from sharing in any of the property or benefits involved in these actions. To be barred by the statutes, he must be a \u201cslayer\u201d \u00e1s defined by G.S. 31A-3(3). Under this section there are four subsections and subsections b, c and d clearly are inapplicable. G.S. 31A-3(3)a defines a slayer as \u201cAny person who by a court of competent jurisdiction shall have been convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact of the wilful and unlawful killing of another person; . \u201d The question then arises as to whether Robert has ever been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction as a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of his parents? Our research impels a negative answer.\nG.S. 31A-3(3)a envisions a conviction of unlawful homicide. In this State, any unlawful homicide is or may be punishable by imprisonment in the State\u2019s prison, hence, it is a felony. G.S. 14-1, 14-17, 14-18. Article I, \u00a7 24, of our State Constitution provides: \u201cNo person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court. The General Assembly may, however, provide for other means of trial for misdemeanors, with the right of appeal for trial de novo.\u201d\nIn Smith v. Thomas, 149 N.C. 100, 101, 62 S.E. 772 (1908), Justice Walker, writing for the court, declared that the word convicted means, in law, \u201c . . . [T]he ascertainment of the defendant\u2019s guilt by some known legal mode, whether by confession in open court or by the verdict of a jury or, under our Constitution and statute, by the judgment of a justice of the peace, where a jury trial is waived, provided the justice has final jurisdiction of the offense....\u201d\nWe hold that the finding made by District Court Judge Hammond that \u201cthis child (Robert) did wilfully and with malice aforethought murder his mother and father\u201d did not constitute a conviction as envisioned by G.S. 31A-3(3)a, therefore, the \u201cbarring\u201d provisions of Ch. 31A do not apply.\nWe now consider whether Robert is barred by the common law from sharing in any of the property or benefits involved in-these actions.\nIn Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E. 2d 845 (1948), decided prior to the enactment of G.S. Ch. 31A in 1961, the question was presented as to whether a 16-year-old boy who allegedly murdered his parents was barred from inheriting a share of their property. The court, in an opinion by Justice (later Chief Justice) Devin, said (pp. 161-2) :\nIt is a basic principle of law and equity that no man shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, or acquire property as the result of his own crime. (Citations.)\nTrue, we have no statute in North Carolina which in express terms destroys the right of inheritance under the canons of descent, or bars the devolution of title as heir to one who has murdered the ancestor from whom derived, but the rule seems to have been established in this jurisdiction that in such case equity will impress upon the legal title so acquired a constructive trust in favor of those next entitled and will exclude the murderer from all beneficial interest in the lands descending to him from his victim. . . .\nWe hold that the principle stated in Gamer, upon a proper establishment of facts, would apply to the case at hand. That brings us to the final question of whether the court, as was true in Quick, had before it sufficient established facts to support its conclusion that Robert was disqualified under common law from sharing in the property and benefits involved in these actions.\nIn the original answers filed, Robert\u2019s guardian ad litem admitted that Robert had unlawfully and willfully shot and killed his parents. However, prior to trial the guardian ad litem was permitted to delete those admissions and plead instead allegations to the effect \u201c . . . that the defendant Robert Lofton admits that he willfully shot and killed his father and mother but he denies that his acts in so doing were unlawful for the purposes of determining the outcome of these three actions. . . . \u201d The record contains a stipulation that at trial the evidence included a review by the court of the juvenile proceeding conducted by Judge Hammond but due to the confidential nature of the material contained in the record of the proceeding, counsel for plaintiffs and defendants consider it necessary to stipulate in this record only the juvenile order. The order entered by Judge Hammond contained a finding, as fully set forth above, that Robert \u201cdid wilfully and with malice aforethought murder his mother and father.\u201d\nNo case from this jurisdiction has been cited, and our research fails to disclose one, that provides an explicit answer to the question with which we now labor. Plaintiffs do cite the New York case of In re Sengillo\u2019s Estate, 206 Misc. 761, 134 N.Y. S. 2d 800 (1954).\nConsidering the fact that the trial court had before it a judicial admission that Robert had willfully shot and killed his parents, and also had before it, by stipulation, the order of Judge Hammond in which he made a determination that Robert \u201cdid wilfully and with malice aforethought murder\u201d his parents, we hold that the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Robert was disqualified to share in the property and benefits involved in these actions was sufficiently supported. Quick v. Ins. Co., supra.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Parker and Vaughn concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRITT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Carlton, Rhodes and Thurston, by Richard F. Thurston, for 'plaintiff appellees.", "Kluttz and Hamlin, by Richard R. Reamer, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUG LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually, and wife, JOY LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually and husband, SHERRILL SMITH v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUGLAS LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Guardian for ROBERT LOFTON; and TRUSTEES OF OHIO HIGHWAY DRIVERS\u2019 WELFARE FUND LARRY LOFTON, Administrator of the Estate of DOUGLAS LOFTON; LARRY LOFTON, Individually; SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of BETTIE LOFTON; and SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Individually v. ROBERT LOFTON, A Minor, SANDRA LOFTON SMITH, Guardian for ROBERT LOFTON; and UNIVERSITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA\nNo. 7519DC234\n(Filed 18 June 1975)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 35 \u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 right to life insurance proceeds\nA person who has been convicted of involuntary manslaughter of another has not been convicted of a \u201cwilful\u201d killing within the meaning of G.S. 31A-3(3)a and thus is not a \u201cslayer\u201d who is barred by G.S. Ch. 31A from receiving the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of deceased.\n2. Descent and Distribution \u00a7 6; Insurance \u00a7 35 \u2014 acts barring property rights \u2014 G.S. Chapter 31A\nThe provisions of G.S, Ch. 31A do not completely supplant the common law principle prevailing in N. C. that a person should not be allowed to profit by his own wrong; G.S. 31A-15 preserves the common law, both substantively and procedurally, as to all acts not specifically provided for in Ch. 31A.\n3. Insurance \u00a7 35\u2014 killing of insured \u2014 right to life insurance proceeds \u2014 admissibility of criminal conviction\nIn a civil action to determine the right of a beneficiary who has caused the death of an insured to receive the proceeds of a policy of insurance on his life, the record of the beneficiary\u2019s conviction of a \u201cwilful and unlawful killing\u201d is admissible to establish the disqualification of the beneficiary to receive the proceeds under Ch. 31 A; however, when the wrongdoer is not disqualified by Ch. 31A from receiving the insurance proceeds, and the common law must he relied on for such disqualification, the record of a criminal conviction of the wrongdoer for a crime not amounting to a \u201cwilful and .unlawful killing,\u201d such as a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, is not admissible, and it is necessary to prove at the trial the factual circumstances relating to the killing from which the court can determine the issue.\n4. Insurance \u00a7 35 \u2014 killing of insured \u2014 right to insurance proceeds \u2014 disqualification under common law\nEvidence not objected to that a defendant beneficiary had been convicted of the involuntary manslaughter of the insured is sufficient to support the court's conclusion that defendant is disqualified under the common law from receiving the proceeds of the insurance policy.\n5. Descent and Distribution \u00a7 6 \u2014 murder of parents by child \u2014 child not convicted and hence not a \u201cslayer\u201d\nA minor child was not convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of killing his parents and was not a slayer as defined by G.S. 31A-3(3)a and therefore barred from sharing in any of the property or benefits resulting from the death of his parents where the minor Was adjudged a delinquent child in a juvenile, proceeding upon the finding of the district court that the \u201cchild did wilfully and with malice aforethought murder his mother and father.\u201d\n6. Descent and Distribution \u00a7 6 \u2014 murder of parents by child \u2014 disqualification under common law from inheriting\nIn an action to have minor defendant barred from inheriting or receiving any property or benefits on account of the death of his parents, the trial court had before it sufficient established facts to support its conclusion that defendant was disqualified under common law from inheriting where the court had before it a judicial admission that defendant had wilfully shot and killed his parents, and also had before it, by stipulation, the order of a district court judge in a juvenile proceeding in which the judge made a determination that defendant did wilfully and with malice aforethought murder his parents.\nAppeal by defendant Robert Lofton from Montgomery, Judge. Judgment entered 20 December 1974 in District Court, Rowan County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 May 1975.\nThese are three civil actions seeking to have defendant Robert Lofton (Robert), a minor, barred from inheriting or receiving any property or benefits on account of the death of his parents. The actions were instituted by the personal representatives and certain other children of the deceased parents who allege that Robert, who was not quite 14 years of age at the time, unlawfully shot and killed his parents.\n\u25a0 All surviving children of the decedents are parties to the actions. The actions involve title to real estate which was held by decedents as tenants by the entirety, title to a mobile home and other personalty, and certain insurance and other benefits payable by reason of the death of decedents.\nOn motion of Robert\u2019s guardian ad litem and attorney, the three actions were consolidated for trial and heard without a jury. The court made extensive findings of fact including the following (summarized) which are pertinent to the questions presented by this appeal:\n(1) Prior to and up until 23 December 1973 Robert lived with his father and mother in a mobile home which was situated near Rockwell in Rowan County.\n(2) On 23 December 1973, Robert, then 13 years and 9 months of age, willfully, unlawfully and wrongfully shot and killed his father and his mother. (Exception noted to this finding.)\n(3) In a juvenile proceeding held in district court on 11 February 1974 Robert was adjudged a \u201cdelinquent child,\u201d as a result of allegations and proof offered to the court to establish the aforesaid wrongful acts with regard to the death of Robert\u2019s parents; that Robert was committed to a Youthful Offender Facility, as provided by law, at Swannanoa, N. C., and he is still in the custody of the State of North Carolina as a \u201cdelinquent child.\u201d\n(4) In said juvenile proceeding, Judge Hammond made the following entry:\nUpon hearing oral evidence the Court finds the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt: That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1973, this child did willfully [sic] and with malice aforethought murder his mother and father. That he is a delinquent child as alleged in the petition.\nIt is now therefore ordered that he be committed to the custody of the North Carolina Board of Youth Development for an indeterminate period in accordance with the statutes. It is recommended to the Department that it take a close look at the facts of the case and the reports which are contained in the file and that it retain him at Swannanoa Center for extensive evaluation before making any other placement. . . .\n(5) Robert\u2019s parents died simultaneously.\nThe court made numerous conclusions of law which include the following:\n1. That in each of the three civil actions the defendant Robert Lofton is a \u201cslayer\u201d as defined in G.S. 31A-3, having admitted in open Court that he did on or about the 23rd day of December, 1973,\nException No. 9.\nwillfully and with malice and aforethought, murder his father and mother, Douglas Lofton and Bettie Lofton; that as a \u201cslayer\u201d under the provisions of G.S. 31A-3 the. said Robert Lofton is subject to the forfeiture provisions of Chapter 31A-11 of the General Statutes relative to insurance benefits and is subject to the forfeiture provisions of Chapter 31A-4 of the General Statutes relative to the. forfeiture of real and personal property; that G.S. 31A-15 sets forth the intention and purpose of the North Carolina General Assembly in adopting this statute entitled \u201cActs Barring Property Rights,\u201d and the General Assembly directed that the chapter should be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrongdoing.\n2. That it is a long standing position of the State of North Carolina, regardless of statute, that no person should be entitled to profit from his own wrongdoing, and where by virtue of rules of law property, either real or personal, would come to one who has been guilty of killing his predecessor in title, it is held by the North Carolina Courts that the wrongdoer would only hold bare legal title to the share of property, real or personal, that would come from the wrongdoer\u2019s victims to him and so under the common law of this state, if it were determined that G.S. 31A would not apply, still Robert Lofton would be only the constructive trustee of any title to property which he received from his mother or his father\nException No. 10\nand as the constructive trustee he would hold title to the property for the benefit of Larry Lofton and Sandra Lofton Smith in the manner and form as hereinafter set forth.\nThe court further concluded as a matter of law that Robert was barred from receiving any property left by, or benefits payable by reason of the death of, his parents and adjudged that the property and benefits accrue to the other heirs of law of the decedents.\nRobert appealed.\nCarlton, Rhodes and Thurston, by Richard F. Thurston, for 'plaintiff appellees.\nKluttz and Hamlin, by Richard R. Reamer, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0203-01", "first_page_order": 231, "last_page_order": 238 }