{
  "id": 8551150,
  "name": "HEPSIE H. PRICE v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Price v. J. C. Penney Co.",
  "decision_date": "1975-06-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 758SC54",
  "first_page": "249",
  "last_page": "253",
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    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "26 N.C. App. 249"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "175 S.E. 126",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1934,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "206 N.C. 734",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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        8632719
      ],
      "year": 1934,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/nc/206/0734-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:59:13.418266+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Arnold concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "HEPSIE H. PRICE v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nTo escape the bar of the statute of limitations, an action for libel or slander must be commenced within one year from the time the action accrues, G.S. 1-54(3), and the action accrues at the date of the publication of the defamatory words, regardless of the fact that plaintiff may discover the identity of the author only at a later date. Gordon v. Fredle, 206 N.C. 734, 175 S.E. 126 (1934).\nPlaintiff\u2019s original complaint filed 15 August 1973 does not allege any slanderous statement made within one year before it was filed. Her proposed amended complaint filed 8 July 1974 does not allege any slanderous statement made within one year before it was filed. Therefore, any claim for relief which plaintiff has alleged or attempted to allege based upon libel or slander is barred by the statute of limitations unless the claim which plaintiff seeks to assert as her second claim for relief in her proposed amended complaint can properly be held to relate back to the date of the filing of her original complaint.\nG-.S. 1A-1, Rule 15 (c) provides:.\n\u201cRelation back of amendments. \u2014 A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claim in the original pleading was interposed, unless -the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.\u201d\nHere, the original complaint does not give notice of any \u201ctransactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences\u201d taking place after 8 August 1972. The allegation in the original complaint that \u201cdefendant later ratified all actions of the store manager,\u201d clearly refers to the actions of the store manager on and prior to 8 August 1972, since these were the only actions on his part which were in any way mentioned in the original complaint. Certainly, the broad statement that \u201cdefendant later ratified\u201d the store manager\u2019s actions in discharging plaintiff on 8 August 1972 does not give notice of any transaction or occurrence involving a subsequent slander or libel of plaintiff.\nAlthough Rule 15 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is not identical with the Federal Rule 15, the two are sufficiently similar that authorities discussing the Federal Rule are here pertinent. Speaking of the Federal Rule, the authors of 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, had this comment in \u00a7 1497, pp. 489-490: \u201cWhen plaintiff attempts to allege an entirely different transaction by amendment, as, for example, the separate publication of a libelous statement . . . the new claim will be subject to the defense of statute of limitations.\u201d The same authority, at \u00a7 1474, p. 384, states: \u201c[Whenever a party seeks to add an entirely new claim for relief under Rule 15(a), it will be subject to the applicable statute of limitations and may not be allowed if it is time barred.\u201d\nIn the second claim for relief set forth in plaintiff\u2019s proposed amended complaint, she has set forth an entirely new claim as to which the allegations in her original complaint give no notice. The new claim asserted in the amended complaint was barred at the time it was filed. The court correctly denied her leave to file the amendment, and the order appealed from is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Arnold concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PARKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Dees, Dees, Smith, Powell & Jarrett by Tommy W. Jarrett for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Harris, Poe, Cheshire & Leager by W. C. Harris, Jr. for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "HEPSIE H. PRICE v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC.\nNo. 758SC54\n(Filed 18 June 1975)\n1. Libel and Slander \u00a7 12 \u2014 one year statute of limitations \u2014 accrual from publication date\nTo escape the bar of the statute of limitations, an action for libel or slander must be commenced within one year from the time the action accrues, and the action accrues at the date of the publication of the defamatory words, regardless of the fact that plaintiff may discover the identity of the author only at a later date. G.S. 1-54(3).\n2. Libel and Slander \u00a7 12; Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 15 \u2014 ^ failure t\u00f3 plead slander \u2014 amended complaint \u2014 no relation back \u2014 statute of limitations\nPlaintiff\u2019s claims for relief based on libel or slander were barred by the statute of limitations where plaintiff did not allege any slanderous statement made within one year before she filed her original complaint or her proposed amended complaint, nor did plaintiff\u2019s claim for relief based on slander in her proposed amended complaint relate back to the date of the filing of her original complaint and thus save her action from the bar of the statute of limitations where the original complaint gave no notice of the transactions to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading which set forth an entirely new claim. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 15(c).\nAppeal by plaintiff from Rouse, Judge. Order entered 28 October 1974 in Superior Court, WAYNE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 March 1975.\nPlaintiff commenced this action on 15 August 1973 to recover actual and punitive damages for her alleged wrongful discharge. In her complaint filed on that date she alleged: From 1957 until 1972 she was employed in defendant\u2019s store in Golds-boro. On 8 August 1972 she was called into the manager\u2019s office and informed that \u201cobservers\u201d reported on 7 August 1972 she had failed to \u201cring up\u201d the purchase of a $3.12 item, that according to these \u201cobservers\u201d plaintiff placed the $3.12 in the cash register and closed it but did not ring up the sale. Plaintiff was informed that the manager had checked the register at the end of the day, that it \u201ccame out even,\u201d and he \u201cwanted to know where the $3.12 was.\u201d Plaintiff denied any knowledge of the $3.12 item and denied having failed to ring up the sale, but despite her protestations of innocence, plaintiff\u2019s employment was wrongfully terminated without just cause. Because of the wrongful discharge plaintiff suffered damages because of lost benefits from defendant\u2019s pension and profit-sharing plan and because of severe emotional and mental distress. She prayed for recovery of $5,000.00 for each of these two elements of damages and for an additional $10,000.00 as punitive damages.\nDefendant filed answer in which it denied that plaintiff\u2019s discharge was wrongful, alleged that she had been discharged for violation of established sales procedure rules, and alleged that in October 1972 it made final and complete settlement with plaintiff of her credits in the savings and profit-sharing plan.\n,. , . . On & July 1974 plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to amend her complaint. In this motion it is stated:\n\u201cAt the time of the filing of this action, the plaintiff did not know the identity of the \u2018observers\u2019 who allegedly reported her for violating sales procedures of the defendant. Subsequent to that time, she has learned through discovery that these \u2018observers\u2019 were actually paid employees .of the defendant and she now believes she has a claim against the defendant for slander. In addition, the plaintiff .feels she has a claim for relief against the defendant for intentional infliction of severe emotional harm as set forth in her Third Claim for Relief.\u201d\n' . Attached to the motion was a copy of the proposed amended complaint which plaintiff sought leave to file. In this, three claims for relief are stated. The first states a claim to recover $5,000.00 damages for lost pension and profit-sharing benefits resulting from the alleged wrongful discharge and is based upon substantially the same allegations as are contained in plaintiff\u2019s original complaint. The third claim for relief states a claim to recover $5,000.00 compensatory and $10,000.00 punitive damages for severe emotional distress caused plaintiff by her wrongful discharge.\nIn the second claim for relief set forth in the proposed amended complaint, plaintiff alleged\u2019 that the two \u201cobservers\u201d who reported on 7 August 1972 that plaintiff failed to \u201cring up\u201d the $8.12 purchase item were in fact hired employees of the defendant whose primary duties consist of spying upon other employees, that the statements of the two \u201cobservers\u201d were false, malicious, and slanderous per se, and that as a consequence of the unlawful slander of plaintiff by the agents of defendant, her employment was wrongfully terminated. Plaintiff further alleged that subsequent to her discharge she petitioned defendant to have her name cleared and to be reinstated, but the defendant through its agents republished the slanderous statement and \u201cthe agents of the defendant, on more than one occasion after her dismissal, until and including October 12, 1972, communicated and republished the slander through written and spoken words.\u201d\nDefendant opposed plaintiff\u2019s motion to amend her complaint, in its response alleging that the second claim for relief is an action for libel and slander and is.barred by the statute of limitations. ,\nThe court entered an order allowing plaintiff\u2019s motion insofar as plaintiff\u2019s motion seeks leave to file an amended complaint containing the allegations of the proposed first and /third claims for relief. The court ruled, however, that it was without discretion to allow plaintiff to file an amended complaint containing the allegations of the second claim for relief \u201cfor the reason that the applicable Statute of Limitations has expired and that the proposed amendment would not relate back to exempt any allegation contained within the Second Claim for Relief from being barred by the Statute of Limitations.\u201d\nFrom that portion of the order which denied her leave to file an amended complaint containing the allegations of the second claim for relief, plaintiff appealed.\nDees, Dees, Smith, Powell & Jarrett by Tommy W. Jarrett for plaintiff appellant.\nHarris, Poe, Cheshire & Leager by W. C. Harris, Jr. for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0249-01",
  "first_page_order": 277,
  "last_page_order": 281
}