{
  "id": 8551586,
  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF JULIA A. BENTON",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Benton",
  "decision_date": "1975-06-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 7512DC273",
  "first_page": "294",
  "last_page": "297",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "26 N.C. App. 294"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1957,
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      "cite": "247 N.C. 286",
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "25 N.C. App. 666",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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        8556075
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      "year": 1975,
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    {
      "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 409",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "25 N.C. App. 442",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8554406
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      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:59:13.418266+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Martin and Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF JULIA A. BENTON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nWhile it is clear from the record that the commitment period of sixty days has expired, this appeal is not moot. In re Carter, 25 N.C. App. 442, 213 S.E. 2d 409 (1975), and In re Mostella, 25 N.C. App. 666, 215 S.E. 2d 790 (1975).\nDefendant contends and the State concedes that the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of Dr. Pellegrini, the examining psychiatrist. We agree. Dr. Pellegrini was a witness for purposes of the proceeding. See Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E. 2d 860 (1957). G.S. 122-58.7 (e) provides that \u201c[c]erti-fied copies of reports and findings of qualified physicians and medical records of the mental health facility are admissible in evidence, but the respondent\u2019s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses shall not be denied.\u201d The statute could hardly be more explicit in preserving respondent\u2019s right of confrontation.\n\u25a0 The order appealed from states, \u201cThat the court finds as fact that the testimony of the petitioner and corroborating witnesses clearly shows that the mental instability of the respondent which evidence is the basis for the court\u2019s order for further treatment; that the affidavit of the doctor in their [sic] diagnosis supported the evidence of the petitioner. However, the basis for the court\u2019s findings relied on the petitioner [sic] and other witnesses\u2019 testimony rather than the affidavits signed by the doctors.\u201d\nNotwithstanding the judge\u2019s statement to the contrary, it is obvious that Dr. Pellegrini\u2019s affidavit forms the basis of the order. It further states, \u201cThat the respondent was examined by \u00e1 qualified physician on the 18th day of February, 1975, at the VA Hospital at Salisbury, North Carolina; that his recommendation is that she is mentally ill or inebriate. That his further recommendation or diagnosis is that Miss Benton is dangerous to herself only in that her illness negates her ability to meet her personal needs. . . . That the Court agrees and concurs with that recommendation.\u201d No evidence, except for the affidavit, was adduced to show that the respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others.\nFrom a reading of the involuntary commitment statutes we do not infer that an order of commitment may issue only when supported by competent medical evidence. G.S. 122-58.7 (i), however, does require that there be \u201cclear, cogent and convincing evidence\u201d to support the finding of two facts: first, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and, second, that the respondent is imminently dangerous to himself or others. See In re Carter, supra. Aside from the affidavit there is no evidence in this case to support any finding of \u201cimminently dangerous\u201d as required by the statute.\nThe record shows that the affidavit of Dr. Pellegrini forms the basis of the order of commitment. Since respondent was not afforded the right, guaranteed by statute, to cross-examine all witnesses, and since the evidence was not sufficient to support findings required by statute, the order is\nReversed.\nJudges Martin and Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ARNOLD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Parks H. Icenhour, for the State.",
      "Mary Ann Tally, Assistant Public Defender, Twelfth Judicial District, for respondent appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF JULIA A. BENTON\nNo. 7512DC273\n(Filed 18 June 1975)\n. 1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 9\u2014 commitment to mental health care facility \u2014 commitment period expired \u2014 appeal not moot\nThough a commitment period of sixty days to a mental health care facility expired before respondent\u2019s appeal was heard in the Court of Appeals, her appeal from the order committing her was not moot.\n2. Insane Persons \u00a7 1 \u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 admission of affidavit of psychiatrist \u2014 right to cross-examine- abridged\nIn a proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental health care facility, the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the affidavit of the examining psychiatrist since he was not present at trial and respondent was thereby denied her right to cross-examine the witness. G.S. 122-58.7 (e).\n3. Insane Persons \u00a7 1\u2014 imminent danger to self \u2014 insufficiency of evidence\nIn \u00e1 proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental health care facility, evidence was insufficient to support findings required by the involuntary commitment statutes that respondent was mentally ill or inebriate and was imminently da-ngerous to herself or others where such evidence consisted of an incompetent affidavit of a psychiatrist that respondent was mentally ill or inebriate and that she was \u201cdangerous to herself only in th\u00e1t her illness negates her ability to meet her personal needs,\u201d testimony by respondent\u2019s parents that she kept them awake at night, talked to the television set, and complained of radioactive materials entering the house and of people poisoning her food, and testimony by respondent herself denying her parents\u2019 statements and stating that she had training in chemistry and botany and knowledge of physics and electronics.\nAppeal by respondent from Guy, Judge. Order entered 24 February 1975 in District Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 May 1975.\nPetitioner, R. B. Benton, instituted this proceeding for the involuntary commitment of his daughter Julia. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that further proceedings would deny her rights of confrontation, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and G.S. 122-58.1 and -58.7 (e), in that Dr. Pellegrini, whose affidavit would be offered in evidence by petitioner, was not present for cross-examination. The court denied the motion and respondent was arraigned.\nThe affidavit of M. L. Pellegrini, M.D., was admitted into evidence over respondent\u2019s objection. In it Dr. Pellegrini stated:\n\u201cMiss Benton has disassociative thought patterns, grandiose ideations, florid paranoid delusions, and shows marked impairment of her reasoning abilities. The patient is in the manic phase of her illness and exhibits pressure of speech and flight of ideas. She is presently disorganized and somewhat confused. . . . Miss Benton is dangerous to herself only in that her illness negates her ability to meet her basic personal needs.\u201d\nRespondent\u2019s parents testified that she kept them awake at night, talked to the television set, and complained of radioactive materials entering the house and of people poisoning her food.\nIn her own behalf, Julia Benton testified that she often stays awake at night but does nothing to disturb others. She denied accusing people of poisoning her food and claimed to have training in chemistry and botany and knowledge of physics and electronics. She testified that she preferred not to take medication and had severed her relationship with the Veterans Administration Hospital in Fayetteville. There was no other evidence presented.\nThe court found that \u201crespondent has disassociation thought process patterns and grandiose ideations, florid paranoid delusions and shows impairment in her reasoning ability.\u201d The court further agreed with Dr. Pellegrini that respondent \u201cis dangerous to herself only in that her illness negates her ability to meet her personal needs.\u201d From an order committing her to an appropriate treatment facility for a period of sixty days, respondent appealed to this Court.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Parks H. Icenhour, for the State.\nMary Ann Tally, Assistant Public Defender, Twelfth Judicial District, for respondent appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0294-01",
  "first_page_order": 322,
  "last_page_order": 325
}