{ "id": 8549965, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STANTON STRICKLAND, ANNIE RUTH STRICKLAND, DOUG McMILLAN, HATTIE MAE McMILLAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Strickland", "decision_date": "1975-09-17", "docket_number": "No. 7516SC367", "first_page": "40", "last_page": "45", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "27 N.C. App. 40" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "28 S.E. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617146 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563853 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E. 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657309 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/175/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567865 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S.E. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622848 ], "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 S.E. 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270715 ], "year": 1908, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/149/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559163 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0517-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 575, "char_count": 11154, "ocr_confidence": 0.593, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.398914757826158e-07, "percentile": 0.7986915453371992 }, "sha256": "b0521d1696a459eef0379ac252d9a3b1ac7b1d163a954ca9505d46ef294dcffd", "simhash": "1:7fceea507e66b3dc", "word_count": 1782 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:36.927205+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STANTON STRICKLAND, ANNIE RUTH STRICKLAND, DOUG McMILLAN, HATTIE MAE McMILLAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nThe State assigns as error the trial court\u2019s allowance of defendants\u2019 motion to quash the warrants upon the grounds that the statute under which they were charged is unconstitutionally vague. We find the statute constitutional and reverse the order allowing the motion to quash.\nThe statute involved in this case is G.S. 14-288.4, which in pertinent part reads :\n\u201c(a) Disorderly conduct is a public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who:\n* * * *\n\u201c (4) Refuses to vacate any building or facility of any public or private educational institution in obedience to:\n\u201ca. An order of the Chief Administrative officer of the institution, or his authorized representative ;\n* * * *\n\u201c(b) Any person who willfully engages in disorderly conduct is guilty of a misdemeanor. ...\u201d\n\u201cPublic disturbance\u201d is defined in pertinent part in G.S. 14-288.1(8) as: \u201cAny annoying, disturbing, or alarming act or condition exceeding the bonds of social toleration normal for the time and place in question which occurs in a public place or which occurs in, affects persons in, or is likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access.\u201d\nDefendants first contend that G.S. 14-288.4 (a) (4) a, setting out certain elements of \u201cdisorderly conduct,\u201d is interdependent with G.S. 14-288.1(8), defining \u201cpublic disturbance,\u201d and that when both provisions are read together, the average citizen is not given adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and therefore the statutes are void for vagueness. Assuming, but without deciding, that the language defining \u201cpublic disturbance,\u201d in G.S. 14-288.1(8) is overbroad and vague, the question is presented whether G.S. 14-288.4 (a) (4) a is thereby also rendered unconstitutionally vague. We hold that it is not.\n\u201cIt is settled law that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty. \u2018A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.\u2019 [Citations omitted.] Even so, impossible standards of statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met.\u201d In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 531, 169 S.E. 2d 879, 888 (1969).\nThe statute, G.S. 14-288.4(a), initially defines \u201cdisorderly conduct\u201d in general terms as \u201ca public disturbance\u201d and then sets forth in subsequent subsections specific examples of conduct which is prohibited as disorderly conduct. \u201cIt is a rule of construction, that when words of general import are used, and immediately following and relating to the same subject words of a particular or restricted import are found, the latter shall operate to limit and restrict the former.\u201d Nance v. R. R., 149 N.C. 366, 371, 63 S.E. 116, 118 (1908) ; accord, In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E. 2d 544 (1941). In order to ascertain what actions are violative of the statute as constituting \u201cdisorderly conduct,\u201d one must look, not to the general definition of \u201cpublic disturbance,\u201d but to the specific examples of prohibited conduct as set forth in the subsections of the statute itself. Such interpretation of this statute follows the admonition contained in the opinion of our Supreme Court in Milk Commission v. Food Stores, 270 N.C. 323, 331, 154 S.E. 2d 548, 555 (1967) that \u201c [t] o construe the statute otherwise would raise a serious question as to its constitutionality and it is well settled that a statute, will not be construed so as to raise such question if a different construction, which will avoid the question of constitutionality; is reasonable.\u201d\nAgain assuming arguendo that the defintion of \u201cpublic disturbance\u201d as contained in 14-288.1(8) is unconstitutionally vague, it does not necessarily follow that the inclusion of these words in G.S. 14-288.4 (a) (4) a, renders the latter statute also unconstitutional. When a statute can be given effect as if the invalid portion had never been included, it will be given such effect if it is apparent that the legislative body, had it known of the invalidity of the one portion, would have enacted the remainder alone. Commissioners v. Boring, 175 N.C. 105, 95 S.E. 43 (1918). That such a deletion of any unconstitutional material in the statutes now before us was intended by the Legislature is made manifest in Sec. 3 of Chap. 668, 1971 Session Laws (enacted when G.S. 14-288.4 was rewritten in 1971) which provides that \u201c[i]f any word, clause, sentence, paragraph, section, or other part of this act shall be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof.\u201d (Emphasis added.) If one totally ignores the words \u201cpublic disturbance,\u201d reference to the succeeding specific subsections in G.S. 14-288.4 (a) more than adequately gives notice as to what constitutes the \u201cdisorderly conduct\u201d which the statute makes a misdemeanor. Even a casual reading of G.S. 14-288.4 (a) (4) a, considered independently of G.S. 14-288.1(8), makes it clear as to exactly what specific disorderly conduct is prohibited by the statute; that is, a violation occurs when a person (1) intentionally refuses to vacate, (2) any building or facility, (3) of any public or private educational institution, (4) after having been ordered to do so by the chief administrative office of the institution or his authorized representative. The warrants in this case clearly and expressly charge that defendants engaged in exactly such conduct.\nThe above statutory construction is supported by the opinion of our Supreme Court in State v. Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 192 S.E. 2d 569 (1972). In that case, the Court, while ruling certain subsections of G.S. 14-288.4 (a) as then enacted to be unconstitutionally vague, specifically upheld other subsections. The subsections which the Court sustained, like the subsection now before us, spelled out specific examples of \u201cdisorderly conduct\u201d following the general phrase \u201cpublic disturbance.\u201d Assuming the Supreme Court would find 14-288.1 (8) to be unconstitutionally vague, its holding in State v. Summrell, supra, could not have been possible had the Court considered the definition in 14-288.1(8) to be an essential part of 14-288.4(a).\nDefendants additionally contend that even if the statute, G.S. 14-288.4(a), is not found to be vague and overbroad, it is nevertheless unconstitutional because no restraint is imposed upon the chief administrative officer of an educational institution or his authorized representative when exercising authority to order a person to vacate a building or facility of the institution. We find this contention without merit. The statute, G.S.-' 14-288.4 (a) (4) a, comes into operation only when the order to vacate is given by a responsible school official, the chief administrative officer or his authorized representative. \u201cSchools to be effective and fulfill the purposes for which they are intended must be operated in an orderly manner.\u201d Coggins v. Board of Education, 223 N.C. 763, 767, 28 S.E. 2d 527, 530 (1944). The legislative branch of the government may delegate \u201cthe power to make such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary or expedient, and when so delegated it is peculiarly within the province of the administrative officers of the local unit to determine what things are detrimental to the successful management, good order, and discipline of the schools in their charge and the rules required to produce those conditions,\u201d Coggins v. Board of Education, supra. We hold in this case that the validity of G.S. 14-288.4 (a) (4) a does not depend upon the enactment by the Legislature of detailed guidelines for the guidance of the specified school officials in the exercise of their responsibility to control the use of the buildings and facilities under their care.\nThe order allowing defendants\u2019 motion to quash is\nReversed.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Alan S. Hirsch for the State.", "Moses & Diehl by Philip A. Diehl for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. STANTON STRICKLAND, ANNIE RUTH STRICKLAND, DOUG McMILLAN, HATTIE MAE McMILLAN\nNo. 7516SC367\n(Filed 17 September 1975)\n1. Disorderly Conduct \u00a7 1\u2014 refusal to vacate educational institution building \u2014 constitutionality of statute\nG.S. 14-288.4(a) (4) a makes it clear that a violation of the statute occurs when a person intentionally refuses to vacate any building or facility of any public or private educational institution after having been ordered to do so by the chief administrative officer of the institution or his authorized representative, and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.\n2. Disorderly Conduct'\u00a7 1; Schools \u00a7 1\u2014 order to vacate educational institution building \u2014 power of official to make\nThe validity of G.S. 14-288.4(a) (4) a making it a misdemeanor to refuse to vacate an educational. institution building after having been ordered to do so by the chief administrative officer of the institution or his representative does not depend upon the enactment by the Legislature of detailed guidelines for the guidance of the, specified school officials in the exercise of their responsibility to ' control the use of the buildings and facilities under their care. .\nAppeal by the State from Godwin, Judge. Order entered 3 April 1975 in Superior Court, Robeson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 September 1975.\nDefendants were tried in the District Court of Robeson County on warrants charging a violation of G.S. 14-288.4 (a) (4), in that said defendants \u201cdid unlawfully, wilfully,-and feloniously refuse to vacate a building or facility of a public Educational Institution, to wit: the building occupied by the Robeson County Board of Education, a body politic, and used to carry on the administrative business of said Board of Education, in obedience to an order of S. C. Stell, the authorized representative of Young Allen, Supt. of Robeson County Board of Educar tion and Chief Administrative Officer of the aforesaid Robeson County Board of Education.\u201d From the imposition of active prison sentences, defendants appealed to the Superior Court.\nUpon call of these cases before the Superior Court defendants moved to quash the warrants on the grounds (1) \u201c[t]hat the warrants failed to charge a crime, in that the warrants failed to allege a public disturbance intentionally caused by the defendants,\u201d and (2) \u201c[t]hat the statute 14-288.4(a) (4) is unconstitutional in that the language contained therein is vague and overbroad.\u201d The motion to quash was allowed by the court upon the finding \u201cthat language used by the North Carolina General Assembly in defining a \u2018public disturbance,\u2019 as set forth in General Statute 14-288.1 (8) is unconstitutionally vague.\u201d\nFrom the order allowing defendants\u2019 motion to quash, the State of North Carolina appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Alan S. Hirsch for the State.\nMoses & Diehl by Philip A. Diehl for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0040-01", "first_page_order": 68, "last_page_order": 73 }