{
  "id": 8552677,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY MICHAEL SATTERFIELD",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Satterfield",
  "decision_date": "1975-10-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 759SC372",
  "first_page": "270",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:36.927205+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Vaughn and Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY MICHAEL SATTERFIELD"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nDefendant first contends that the court erroneously overruled his objection to alleged hearsay testimony relating to the presence' of a car near the prosecuting witness\u2019 house. There is no question but that the testimony was hearsay and initially considered admissible by the trial court. However, once the. trial court ascertained the inadmissiblility of the testimony, it properly excluded the testimony and sufficiently advised the jury to disabuse from their minds all reference to the hearsay testimony. As our Court has previously stated:\n\u2022 \u201c \u2018Where evidence is improperly admitted, but the court later withdraws the evidence and categorically instructs th\u00e9 jury not to consider it, it will be presumed that the jury followed the instruction of the court, and the admission of the evidence will not ordinarily be held prejudicial.' \u201d State v. Fields, 10 N.C. App. 105, 107, 177 S.E. 2d 724 (1970). Also see 3 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, \u00a7 169.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to strike purported double, nonrespon-sive hearsay. Again, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s contention. The defendant, while cross-examining an alleged confederate in the crime charged, asked: \u201cThey [the police] told you they knew Mike Satterfield was involved in this?\u201d The witness, responding to this line of inquiry, stated that the police \u201ctold [him] who told them he [Mike Satterfield] was in the car.\u201d Defendant invited this particular response and he \u201c . . . may not complain of the admission of testimony brought out by his counsel in the cross-examination of a witness for the state . ...\u201d 3 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, \u00a7 173.\nNotwithstanding the application of the invited error rule, we find no prejudice in allowing this testimony, because the actual declarant, a police officer, was available for cross-examination, and in fact, took the stand and testified to the very matters at issue. Wiere the declarant is available for cross-examination, the traditional hearsay considerations of veracity, perception, motive, deportment and accuracy are satisfied and there is no reason to invoke the hearsay rule. 1 Stansbury, N. C. Evidence, \u00a7 139 (Brandis Rev. 1973).\nDefendant next argues that the court, while explaining to the jury the corroborative purpose of proposed testimony, should have defined the concept of \u201ccorroboration\u201d in \u201claymen\u2019s terms.\u201d\nIn State v. Hardee, 6 N.C. App. 147, 150, 169 S.E. 2d 533 (1969), in speaking to the identical question, we said:\n\u201cDefendant\u2019s assignment of error No. 7 is addressed to the failure of the court to define \u2018corroborative\u2019 evidence in its instructions to the jury at the time the testimony was admitted. Defendant cites no authority for his position, nor does the record indicate that he requested the court to define the term. Failure to define the term is not ground for exception. State v. Lee, 248 N.C. 327, 103 S.E. 2d 295. Defendant\u2019s mere assertion that the jury probably did not know the meaning of the word is clearly insufficient to show prejudicial error.\u201d\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, defendant asserts that the court failed to include his requested definition of \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt\u201d as meaning satisfaction to a \u201cmoral certainty.\u201d Again, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s argument. Upon examination of the court\u2019s instruction, we find that the actual instruction tendered by the court reaches the substance of defendant\u2019s request. Moreover, as our Supreme Court has held, \u201cwhen instructions are prayed as to \u2018presumption of innocence\u2019 and to enlarge on \u2018reasonable doubt\u2019 it is in the sound discretion of the court below to grant the prayer.\u201d State v. Herring, 201 N.C. 543, 551, 160 S.E. 891 (1931). In the instant case, no showing of abuse of discretion has been shown.\nWe have examined the defendant\u2019s other assignments of error and find them also to be without merit.\nWe note that the judgment of the court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for \u201cthe term of not less than five (5) years nor more than seven (7) years\u201d as a \u201cCommitted Youthful Offender.\u201d G.S. 148-49.4 provides, in pertinent part, \u201cAt the time of commitment the court shall fix a maximum term not to exceed the limit otherwise prescribed by law for the offense of which the person is convicted.\u201d The imposition of a minimum and maximum sentence could conceivably be inconsistent with the provisions of G.S. 148-49.8 (Release of Youthful Offenders). The case must be remanded for the imposition of a sentence in compliance with the provisions of Article 3A, Chapter 148, General Statutes of North Carolina.\nJudgment vacated and cause remanded.\nJudges Vaughn and Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MORRIS, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney David S. Crump., for the State.",
      "Ramsey, Jackson, Hubbard & Galloway', by Mark Galloway., for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY MICHAEL SATTERFIELD\nNo. 759SC372\n(Filed 15 October 1975)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 96\u2014 hearsay testimony withdrawn \u2014 no p'ejudice\n' Defendant was not prejudiced where the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony but subsequently excluded the testimony and sufficiently advised the jury to disabuse from their minds all reference to the hearsay testimony.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 173\u2014 invited error\nDefendant may not complain of the admission of testimony brought out by his counsel in the cross-examination of a witness for the State.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 73\u2014 availability of declarant \u2014 hearsay rule not invoked\nWhere the declarant is available for cross-examination, the traditional hearsay considerations of veracity, perception, motive, deportment and accuracy are satisfied and there is no reason to invoke the hearsay rule.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 113\u2014 failure to define corroboration \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in failing to define the term \u201ccorroboration.\u201d\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 119\u2014 requested instruction given in substance\nThe trial court did not err in failing to include defendant\u2019s requested - definition of \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt\u201d as meaning satisfaction to a \u201cmoral certainty\u201d where the actual instruction tendered by the court reached the substance of defendant\u2019s request.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 139\u2014 sentence of maximum and minimum terms \u2014 improper for youthful offender\nImposition of a minimum and maximum sentence as a Committed Youthful Offender could be inconsistent with G.S. 148-49.8, and the case is therefore remanded for the imposition of a sentence in compliance with the provisions of Article 3A, Chapter 148 of the N. C. General Statutes.\nAppeal by defendant from Judge Giles R. Clark. Judgment entered 12 March 1975 in Superior Court, Person County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 August 1975.\nDefendant was indicted for felonious breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny. Upon a plea of not guilty, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. From judgment sentencing him to five to seven years imprisonment as a committed youthful offender, defendant appealed.\nAdditional facts necessary for decision are set forth in the opinion.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney David S. Crump., for the State.\nRamsey, Jackson, Hubbard & Galloway', by Mark Galloway., for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0270-01",
  "first_page_order": 298,
  "last_page_order": 301
}