{
  "id": 8553248,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER CALDWELL",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Caldwell",
  "decision_date": "1975-11-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 7525SC493",
  "first_page": "323",
  "last_page": "327",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "199 S.E. 2d 286",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0
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      "cite": "19 N.C. App. 516",
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      "cite": "53 S.E. 2d 663",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1949,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "230 N.C. 523",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "year": 1949,
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    {
      "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 384",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1972,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
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    {
      "cite": "280 N.C. 435",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8572439
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      "year": 1972,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "citations omitted"
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      "case_paths": [
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:36.927205+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Morris and Arnold concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER CALDWELL"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nDefendant\u2019s first and second assignments of error are as follows:\n1. \u201cThe Court below erred by overruling defendant\u2019s motions to quash the warrant and the bill of indictment, for the reason that defendant\u2019s constitutional rights had been violated as to his arrest, his identification, and as to being informed as to his rights.\u201d\n2. \u201cThe Judge erred by overruling defendant\u2019s motions to quash the warrant and the bill of indictment for the reason that neither contains allegations sufficient to charge defendant with the crime of first degree rape, nor sufficient to charge defendant with the crime of second degree rape, nor to distinguish as to which crime he is charged with.\u201d\nA motion to quash lies only for a defect appearing on the face of the warrant or indictment and \u201cdoes not lie unless it appears from an inspection of the warrant or indictment that no crime is charged ... or that the warrant or indictment is otherwise so defective that it will not support a judgment.\u201d State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E. 2d 384 (1972) (citations omitted). In ruling on a motion to quash, the court is not permitted to consider extraneous evidence. State v. Bass, supra; State v. Cochran, 230 N.C. 523, 53 S.E. 2d 663 (1949) ; State v. Jeffries, 19 N.C. App. 516, 199 S.E. 2d 286 (1973). The allegations in the bill of indictment in the present case are in all respects sufficient to charge the defendant with second degree rape under G.S. 14-21 (b). These assignments of error are overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s third and fifth assignments of error are as follows:\n8. \u201cHis Honor Erred in his ruling on the voir dire when he admitted into evidence the testimony as to the identification of defendant and refused to suppress other evidence after it had been shown that defendant had been denied his constitutional rights; and for the reason that the evidence brought out on the voir dire does not support his findings of fact, which, therefore, do not support his conclusions of law and his order.\u201d\n5. \u201cCourt below erred by admitting evidence of identification of defendant as person who committed the crime, which identification was tainted by violations of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights and by improper presentations of defendant to state\u2019s witness.\u201d\nThe third assignment of error purports to be based on an exception to the trial judge\u2019s conclusion that Mrs. Gragg\u2019s in-court identification of the defendant as the man who raped her was based solely on what she observed on the afternoon of 5 June 1973 and was not tainted by any illegal out of court identification procedure. The fifth assignment of error purports to be based on six exceptions to Mrs. Gragg\u2019s testimony after the voir dire identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.\nThe conclusion challenged by assignment of error 3 is clearly supported by findings of fact made by the trial judge following a voir dire hearing conducted for the specific purpose of determining the admissibility of the witness\u2019 in-court identification. Moreover, there is plenary competent evidence in the record to support the findings of fact. Obviously, the testimony challenged by assignment of error 5 was admissible. These assignments of error have no merit.\nAssignments of error 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13, all relate to the admission and exclusion of testimony. We have carefully examined each of the seventeen exceptions upon which these assignments of error are based and find no error in any of the rulings challenged thereby.\nAssignments of error 10 and 11 challenge the trial judge\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motions for judgment as of nonsuit, motion to set aside the verdict, and objections to the entry of the judgment. Suffice it to say, the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to require the submission of the case to the jury on the charge set out in the bill of indictment and to support the verdict, which supports the judgment entered.\nAssignment of error 12 is as follows:\n\u201cCourt below erred by failing to declare a mistrial by reason of the solicitor\u2019s prejudicial questions before the jury.\u201d\nThis assignment of error is based on exceptions to two questions asked the defendant on cross-examination. Defendant\u2019s objection to the first question was sustained, and the court instructed the jury not to consider it. Defendant\u2019s objection to the second question was overruled. We are of the opinion that both rulings were correct. No motion for mistrial was made. Defendr ant has failed to demonstrate any error.\nAssignments of error 14, 15, 16 and 17 relate to the court\u2019s instructions to the jury. We have examined each exception upon which these assignments are based and find and hold that the trial judge fairly, correctly, and adequately instructed the jury in compliance with G.S. 1-180. Defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudicial error in the charge.\nThe defendant had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Morris and Arnold concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Joan H. Byers for the State.",
      "Fate J. Beal for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROGER CALDWELL\nNo. 7525SC493\n(Filed 5 November 1975)\n1. Indictment and Warrant \u00a7 14; Rape \u00a7 3 \u2014 indictment \u2014 motion to quash\nA motion to quash lies only for a defect appearing on the face of the warrant or indictment and does not lie unless it appears from an inspection of the warrant or indictment that no crime is charged or that the warrant or indictment is otherwise so defective that it will not support a judgment; the allegations in the bill of indictment in this case are in all respects sufficient to charge the defendant with second degree rape under G.S. 14-21 (b).\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 66 \u2014 in-court identification of defendant \u2014 observation at crime scene as basis\nEvidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that a rape victim\u2019s in-court identification of the defendant as the man who raped her was based solely on what she observed on the afternoon of the rape and was not tainted by any illegal out-of-court identification procedure.\nAppeal by defendant from Ferrell, Judge. Judgment entered 23 January 1975 in the Superior Court, Burke County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 September 1975.\nCriminal prosecution on a bill of indictment, proper in form, charging the defendant, Roger Caldwell, with the second degree rape of Anita Gragg. Upon the defendant\u2019s plea of not guilty, the State offered evidence tending to show the following:\nOn 5 June 1974 at about 3:15 p.m., Mrs. Anita Gragg, a white woman, was coming out of her trailer in the Chesterfield Community in Burke County when she was approached by the defendant, a black man, who inquired if she knew where one Dwayne McClain lived. Mrs. Gragg at the time was scantily dressed in a two-piece bathing suit and was wearing a robe. She had been sun bathing. The defendant asked her if he could have a drink of water and Mrs. Gragg told the defendant she would get it for him. As she went into the trailer, the defendant forced his way in through the door which Mrs. Gragg was trying to close. The defendant put his hand over her mouth to silence her screams. He pushed her onto the floor, removed her clothing, undressed himself, and forced her to commit the act of fellatio. Afterwards, the defendant \u201cdrug me (Mrs. Gragg) into the bedroom, and that is where he raped me.\u201d Mrs. Gragg described in detail the manner in which defendant committed the crime charged in the bill of indictment.\nAfter the act of sexual intercourse, Mrs. Gragg asked the defendant if he still wanted the water and when he said he did, Mrs. Gragg got up from the bed. She testified:\n\u201cI got up and I got my baby that was lying in the bed in the living room and I picked her up and he saw me get her. I was trying to get out of the door and he caught me just as I got to the door and I started screaming again and about dropped my baby. He took my baby away from me and told me to get him water.\u201d\nWhen Mrs. Gragg told defendant her husband would be home soon, the defendant left. She went immediately to her sister\u2019s trailer and told her what had happened. Mrs. Gragg described scratches and bruises which the defendant had put on her body and her sister, mother-in-law, and an officer testified that they saw scratches and bruises on her body.\nThe defendant testified that Mrs. Gragg invited him into her home and encouraged him to make love to her and that they did have sexual intercourse by mutual consent. Three witnesses testified as to defendant\u2019s good character and reputation.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty as charged and from a judgment imposing a prison sentence of 16 to 20 years, the defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Joan H. Byers for the State.\nFate J. Beal for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0323-01",
  "first_page_order": 351,
  "last_page_order": 355
}