{ "id": 8546853, "name": "LUDIE TAYLOR, Employee, Plaintiff v. ALBAIN SHIRT COMPANY, INC., Employer; AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE CO., Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Taylor v. Albain Shirt Co.", "decision_date": "1975-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 758IC377", "first_page": "61", "last_page": "65", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "28 N.C. App. 61" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "24 S.E. 2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8632327 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8618878 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560912 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 S.E. 2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574679 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 506, "char_count": 9781, "ocr_confidence": 0.536, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.7101288381634576e-07, "percentile": 0.8292585783958834 }, "sha256": "beb7512763978ae4c0ab9d32b609837aa14e9f3959c63ef9e89160aa925bccfc", "simhash": "1:2765a84fa5bac11e", "word_count": 1679 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:46.500479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "LUDIE TAYLOR, Employee, Plaintiff v. ALBAIN SHIRT COMPANY, INC., Employer; AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE CO., Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nFor an injury to be compensable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, it must be \u201cby accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) G.S. 97-2(6). \u201cThe two italicized phrases are not synonymous; they \u2018involve two ideas and impose a double condition, both of which must be satisfied in order to bring a case within the Act.\u2019 \u201d Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 238, 188 S.E. 2d 350, 353 (1972). \u201cThe words \u2018in the course of\u2019 as used in the statute, refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred, while \u2018out of\u2019 relates to its origin or cause.\u201d Bell v. Dewey Brothers, Inc., 286 N.C. 280, 282, 72 S.E. 2d 680, 682 (1952).\nHere, the accident occurred at a time after plaintiff had completed her regular work shift, had \u201cclocked out\u201d on the time clock provided by her employer for that purpose, and had left her employer\u2019s premises for the day. It occurred at a place which was not on her employer\u2019s premises and over which it had no control. Thus, the accident did not arise \u201cin the course of\u201d her employment. Cases such as Maurer v. Salem, Co., 266 N.C. 381, 146 S.E. 2d 432 (1966) and Davis v. Manufacturing Co., 249 N.C. 543, 107 S.E. 2d 102 (1959), holding to be com-pensable injuries received by accident occurring on an employer-provided parking lot, are not here controlling. Here, the accident occurred on a public street which plaintiff was attempting to cross while on her way to a private parking lot which was neither owned, controlled, nor in any manner provided by her employer.\nWe find the decision in Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co., 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E. 2d 751 (1943) dispositive of the present case. There, the employee was killed when he was struck by a car while attempting to walk across a public highway to report for work at his duty station located immediately across the highway on his employer\u2019s premises. In holding the death to be non-compensable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, the opinion of the Court written by Barnhill, J. (later C. J.) pointed out that the facts that employees of defendant constituted the great majority of those who used the highway and that the operator of the car which struck the deceased was also an employee of defendant did not justify the conclusion that the public highway was a part of the defendant employer\u2019s premises. The opinion goes on to state (p. 729) :\n\u201cThe hazard created by traffic on the highway under the circumstances of this case cannot fairly be traced to the employment. It cannot be said that it was, at the time and place and under the circumstances disclosed, a natural incident of the work. It was not created by the employer. It did not arise out of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment. It was neither an ordinary nor an extraordinary risk directly or indirectly connected with the services of the employee. On the contrary, any other person undertaking to cross a public highway under the same or similar circumstances would be subjected to the identical hazard encountered by him.\nIt is conceded that if deceased had been injured 100 yards down the road the injury would not be compensable. That he was instead within 30 or 40 feet of his destination does not alter the purpose of his going or warrant a different conclusion.\u201d\nWe conclude that in the present case plaintiff has failed to show a compensable claim under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, and the order of the Industrial Commission denying the claim is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Brock & Foy by Donald P. Brock for plaintiff appellant.", "Hedrick, McKnight, Parham, Helms, Kellam & Feerick by Philip R. Hedrick and Edward L. Eatman, Jr. for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUDIE TAYLOR, Employee, Plaintiff v. ALBAIN SHIRT COMPANY, INC., Employer; AMERICAN MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE CO., Carrier, Defendants\nNo. 758IC377\n(Filed 17 December 1975)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 62\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 injury while crossing street \u2014 accident not in course of employment\nPlaintiff\u2019s accident did not arise \u201cin the course of\u201d her employment where plaintiff had clocked out at the end of her shift and was struck by an automobile as she attempted to cross a public street in front of her employer\u2019s factory while on her way to a private parking lot which was neither owned, controlled, nor in any manner provided by her employer, notwithstanding employees of defendant constituted a great majority of persons using the street at the time of the accident and the driver of the car which struck plaintiff had just picked up one of defendant\u2019s employees.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order of North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 20 February 1975. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 September 1975.\nThis is a proceeding under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, G.S. Ch. 97. Plaintiff employee was injured on 5 January 1978 when she was struck by an automobile as she was crossing the street in front of defendant employer\u2019s factory. Plaintiff had just clocked out at the end of her shift and was on her way to her car, which was parked in a private parking lot across the street from the factory.\nDefendant\u2019s factory is located on the east side of North East Street in Kinston, the front wall of the factory being built on the property line separating the defendant\u2019s property from the right-of-way owned by the city. In front of the factory there is a dirt sidewalk running along the east side of the asphalt paved street between the front wall of the factory and the concrete curb on the east side of the street. The distance between the front door of the factory and the concrete curb is approximately 20 feet. The employer owns no interest in the dirt sidewalk or in the street.\nDefendant employer employs between 425 and 465 employees. It maintains a parking lot for its employees on the east side of the street immediately north of the factory building. Employees using this factory-owned parking lot can walk between the lot and the factory along the dirt sidewalk on the east side of the street without having to cross a street. There exists a privately-owned parking lot directly across the street from the factory. As of 5 January 1973 approximately 20 employees, including plaintiff, parked on this lot and paid one dollar per week for that privilege. The remainder of the employees who drove to work parked in the factory-owned lot or on a street near the factory.\nOn Friday, 5 January 1973, the work shift for all employees ended at 4:00 p.m. At that time plaintiff, with other employees, proceeded to the time clock, punched out, and exited through the front door. She walked across the 20-foot wide dirt sidewalk and stepped off the curb onto the paved street between two parked cars. Both of these cars were parked heading north on the east side of the street parallel and adjacent to the curb. The drivers of these cars were waiting to pick up other employees who were leaving the factory at the same time as the plaintiff. Immediately before plaintiff reached the street, the employee who was being picked up by the northern-most parked car, located to plaintiff\u2019s right, had gotten into that car. The driver of that car, intending to drive away, mistakenly placed that car in reverse. Just as plaintiff walked between the two parked cars, the car on her right moved suddenly backward, crushing plaintiff between the rear of that car and the front of the car on her left, severely injuring plaintiff. At the time plaintiff was injured, other employees were still leaving the factory, and the street was crowded with cars driven by employees or by persons who had come to pick up employees.\nThe Deputy Commissioner hearing plaintiff\u2019s claim made findings of fact and concluded that \u201c[t]he injury by accident, given the facts and circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of the employment notwithstanding the fact that claimant was beyond the official time and space limitations of the employment because the risk of street injury was increased by discharging 425 to 465 employees at approximately the same time and because said risk followed claimant into the street thereby temporarily, for a short period of time and distance, extending the time and space limitations of the employment.\u201d Based on his conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment, the Deputy Commissioner held plaintiff\u2019s claim to be compensable.\nOn appeal, the Full Commission vacated the hearing Deputy\u2019s findings to the effect that \u201cthe practice of releasing 425 to 465 employees at the same time at the end of a working day, given the facts and circumstances of this case, extended the zone of danger and environment of the employment onto the public street in front of the factory during an undisclosed period of time prior to and after termination of the formal working day.\u201d In place of the vacated findings, the Full Commission made the following findings of fact:\n\u201c15. At the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury she had finished her work for the day, had left the premises of her employer, had \u2018clocked out\u2019 and was free to go wherever she chose. She had reached a point where her employer had no control over her movements or the property on which she was located.\n16. Plaintiff was on her way from her place of work to a privately-owned parking lot, not controlled, maintained or furnished by her employer, at the time of her accident.\n17. Plaintiff\u2019s injury did not arise out of or occur in the course of her employment. The risk of her injury was a risk shared equally by all members of the traveling public in her community, she being on a public street, and it is, therefore, not traceable to her employment.\u201d\nFrom the order of the Full Commission denying her claim, plaintiff appealed.\nBrock & Foy by Donald P. Brock for plaintiff appellant.\nHedrick, McKnight, Parham, Helms, Kellam & Feerick by Philip R. Hedrick and Edward L. Eatman, Jr. for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0061-01", "first_page_order": 89, "last_page_order": 93 }