{ "id": 8546977, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JIMMY LEE STOKESBERRY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stokesberry", "decision_date": "1975-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 753SC630", "first_page": "96", "last_page": "100", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "28 N.C. App. 96" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "150 S.E. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561200 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603127 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 S.E. 2d 904", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611588 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554673 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E. 2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626398 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627743 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614187 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558391 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575701 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.E. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219561 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573959 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0121-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 533, "char_count": 9483, "ocr_confidence": 0.563, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1481187092446014e-07, "percentile": 0.5807122345742937 }, "sha256": "f11acb45f7a8ab6b3815a4da80c9724b03736bf9e27e1b2d6ea22ed1858f9446", "simhash": "1:81e134714e1d94f6", "word_count": 1583 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:46.500479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Britt and Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JIMMY LEE STOKESBERRY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the submission of the ease to the jury and the trial judge\u2019s failure to grant his motion for directed verdict.\n\u201cOne of the well recognized rules concerning sufficiency of evidence to withstand motion for nonsuit or motion for a directed verdict is that when the motion questions the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the question for the court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.\u201d State v. Spencer, 281 N.C. 121, 187 S.E. 2d 779, citing State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 98 S.E. 2d 431.\nUpon motion to nonsuit, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, and non-suit should be denied where there is sufficient evidence, direct, circumstantial, or both, from which the jury could find that the offense charged has been committed and that defendant committed it. State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509, 160 S.E. 2d 469.\nIn this case the testimony of Smith and others places the stolen goods in the unexplained possession of defendant so soon after the burglary and larceny as to permit the jury to infer that defendant was the thief who took the guns after his felonious breaking and entering of the premises and was sufficient to take the case to the jury.\nThe defendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s failure to adequately and sufficiently define \u201creasonable doubt.\u201d Here the trial court defined reasonable doubt as follows:\n\u201cA reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen, is a doubt based on reason and common sense arising out of some or all of the evidence or lack or insufficiency of the evidence as the case may be. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt means that you must be fully satisfied or entirely convinced or satisfied to a moral certainty of the defendant\u2019s guilt. As one of our appellate Courts said in an opinion recently, one of the best definitions of reasonable doubt is the words reasonable doubt themselves.\u201d\nThe instruction given is substantially in accord with the definition of reasonable doubt approved by the Supreme Court. See State v. Mabery, 283 N.C. 254, 195 S.E. 2d 304; State v. Bright, 237 N.C. 475, 75 S.E. 2d 407; State v. Bryant, 236 N.C. 745, 73 S.E. 2d 791; State v. Wood, 235 N.C. 636, 70 S.E. 2d 665.\nDefendant next contends that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by his inadequate statement of the definitions, rule and applications of circumstantial evidence.\nThat portion of the charge objected to reads as follows:\n\u201cNow, there is no eyewitness testimony that the defendant in this case committed either one of the offenses which are charged in the bill of indictment. The State relies in part upon what is known as circumstantial evidence. The State contends that the circumstances and evidence taken together establish the guilt of the defendant. Now, circumstantial evidence is recognized and accepted as proof in a court of law, however, you must find this defendant not guilty unless all of the circumstances considered together exclude every reasonable possibility of innocence and point conclusively to the guilt of the defendant. Furthermore, before any circumstance upon which the State relies may be considered by you as tending to prove the defendant\u2019s guilt, the State must prove that particular circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s instruction is almost identical to the instruction approved in State v. Bauguess, 10 N.C. App. 524, 179 S.E. 2d 5.\nThe applicable rule, with respect to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to carry a case to the jury has been adequately recorded by Branch, J., citing Higgins, J., as follows:\n\u201c \u2018We are advertent to the intimation in some of the decisions involving circumstantial evidence that to withstand a motion for nonsuit the circumstances must be inconsistent with innocence and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. We think the correct rule is given in S. v. Simmons, 240 N.C. 780, 83 S.E. 2d 904, quoting from S. v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 154 S.E. 730: \u2018If there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury.\u2019 The above is another way of saying there must be substantial evidence of all material elements to the offense to withstand the motion to dismiss. It is immaterial whether the substantial evidence is circumstantial or direct, or both. To hold that the court must grant a motion to dismiss unless, in the opinion of the court, the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence would in effect constitute the presiding judge the trier of facts. Substantial evidence of guilt is required before the court can send the case to the jury. Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is required before the jury can convict. What is substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. What that evidence proves or fails to prove is a question of fact for the jury. (Citing cases).\u2019\u201d State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258, 150 S.E. 2d 428.\nDefendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nFor his last two assignments of error, the defendant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error by inadequately charging the jury as to the meaning and definition of the \u201cdoctrine of recent possession\u201d and of alibi evidence. Defendant\u2019s argument, however, seems to be directed to what he contends is the insufficiency of the evidence. At any rate, the instructions given were in substantial compliance with what has, heretofore, been held to be correct by the appellate courts of this State.\nDefendant received a fair and impartial trial, free from prejudicial error.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Britt and Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "VAUGHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Alfred N. Salley, for the State.", "Richard Powell, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JIMMY LEE STOKESBERRY\nNo. 753SC630\n(Filed 17 December 1975)\n1. Larceny \u00a7 7 \u2014 possession of recently stolen property \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for breaking and entering and larceny, testimony which placed the stolen guns in the unexplained possession of defendant so soon after the breaking and entering and larceny as to permit the jury to infer that defendant was the thief who took the guns after his felonious breaking and entering of the premises was sufficient to take the case to the jury.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 112 \u2014 reasonable doubt \u2014 circumstantial evidence'\u2014 instructions proper\nThe trial court\u2019s instructions as to reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence were proper.\nAppeal by defendant from Smith, Judge. Judgment entered 22 April 1975 in Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 1975.\nDefendant was charged in a bill of indictment with the crimes of felonious breaking and entering and felonious larceny. The State offered evidence which tended to show that on or about Sunday, 15 December 1974, Glenn Bowing, Jr., of Ayden, North Carolina, returned home from church to find a window pried open and approximately twenty-three guns missing from his collection. He had given no one permission to enter his home or remove his firearms and did not know the defendant.\nOn a subsequent Sunday morning just before Christmas 1974, defendant went to the home of Eobert Smith to see if he might be interested in the purchase of some guns. An exchange was negotiated and sometime thereafter, Smith was observed by a Pitt County Deputy Sheriff attempting to sell one of the weapons. The firearm was seized by the deputy and when he inquired as to where Smith had gotten the guns (a total of 3), Smith told him they came from the defendant, Jimmy Lee Stokesberry.\nThe State offered further evidence that defendant had also sold two guns to Rusty Willard. Bowing identified the weapons recovered from both Smith and Willard as being owned by him and being among those stolen from his home on the above referred to date.\nDefendant was thereafter arrested and his mobile home searched. No property belonging to Bowing was found.\nDefendant testified that on 15 December 1974, accompanied by his mother and his girl friend, he visited a prison unit in Maury,. North Carolina. Upon his return, he had dinner at his mother\u2019s house and did not get back to his trailer until about eleven o\u2019clock, at which time he went to bed.\nDefendant further testified that he and Smith had \u201ca few misunderstood words\u201d resulting from his purchase of a rifle from Smith the third week in November and that he had never been to Smith\u2019s home nor the Bowing residence.\nDefendant\u2019s mother and girl friend gave testimony corroborating that of the defendant, placing him in their presence on 15 December 1974 from about 8:30 a.m. until nearly 11:00 p.m. Pictures were taken of defendant in Maury on this day and the date 15 December 1974 was written on the back of the pictures by defendant\u2019s girl friend.\nThe defendant offered further evidence tending to show that he had never exchanged or sold any guns to Willard, but they had talked about the sale of some guns. He denied that he had ever seen the guns that were introduced in evidence as the stolen weapons.\nFrom the jury\u2019s verdict of guilty as charged on both counts, and imposition of consecutive prison sentences, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Alfred N. Salley, for the State.\nRichard Powell, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0096-01", "first_page_order": 124, "last_page_order": 128 }