{
  "id": 8548455,
  "name": "LOIS G. LEA and FRANK D. CUMMINGS v. GARLAND (GARFIELD) WALTER DUDLEY and wife LOYCE GEORGIA DUDLEY, J. LEON DUDLEY and wife MARGARET WATERFIELD DUDLEY, O. A. DUDLEY and wife DOWE DUDLEY",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lea v. Dudley",
  "decision_date": "1976-01-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 751SC663",
  "first_page": "281",
  "last_page": "286",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "28 N.C. App. 281"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "202 S.E. 2d 799",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "20 N.C. App. 702",
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      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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    {
      "cite": "173 S.E. 2d 281",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "276 N.C. 487",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8561836
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/276/0487-01"
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    {
      "cite": "71 S.E. 2d 57",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "235 N.C. 749",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8626868
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/235/0749-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:46.500479+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Martin and Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "LOIS G. LEA and FRANK D. CUMMINGS v. GARLAND (GARFIELD) WALTER DUDLEY and wife LOYCE GEORGIA DUDLEY, J. LEON DUDLEY and wife MARGARET WATERFIELD DUDLEY, O. A. DUDLEY and wife DOWE DUDLEY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nPlaintiffs contend that the evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient to allow the jury to consider defendants\u2019 claim of title by adverse possession and urges, therefore, that it was error to deny their motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The thrust of plaintiffs\u2019 argument appears to be that there was no evidence that defendants\u2019 possession was hostile so as to rebut the presumption that it was subordinate to owner\u2019s legal title. We disagree. The evidence was conflicting. Plaintiffs offered evidence tending to show that L. L. Dudley took possession as an agent or employee of the corporation and that his possession was permissive. Defendants\u2019 evidence was to the contrary. Conflicts in the evidence and in the inferences arising thereon were for the jury under appropriate instructions from the court. Chambers v. Chambers, 235 N.C. 749, 71 S.E. 2d 57. We have reviewed the judge\u2019s charge and find that he fully and accurately declared and explained the law arising on the evidence given in the case. Among other things, the court correctly charged the jury that if defendants\u2019 predecessor entered into possession with the permission of the owner that possession would not be adverse until he disclaimed such arrangement in such manner as to put the owner on notice that he was no longer using the land by permission, but was claiming it as absolute owner. Board of Education v. Lamm, 276 N.C. 487, 173 S.E. 2d 281.\nPlaintiffs contend that it was error to admit the notice of sheriff\u2019s levy and certificate of tax sale. We cannot sustain the contention. The parties stipulated that the documents were genuine and, if relevant and material, could be received without further identification or proof. The documents were relevant to show the hostile interest with which L. L. Dudley possessed the land and the notoriety of that possession.\nPlaintiffs also contend that it was error to admit evidence of declarations of L. L. Dudley to the effect that he had bought the land and that it \u201cbelonged to him.\u201d At the time Dudley is reported to have made the declarations he was in possession of the land and they were, therefore, admissible to show that he claimed to possess as the real owner.\nOne of the witnesses for defendants testified that L. L. Dudley \u201csigned an easement\u201d across the property and this is the subject of another of plaintiffs\u2019 exceptions. We see no error prejudicial to plaintiffs. It was stipulated that the document was genuine and it was introduced into evidence.\nWe. have carefully considered all of the assignments of error brought forward by plaintiffs. The case was well tried by able counsel before a fair and impartial judge. We find no error that would justify this Court in disturbing the solemn verdict of the jury.\nNo error.\nJudges Martin and Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "VAUGHN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "J. Kenyon Wilson, Jr., for plaintiff appellants.",
      "Leroy, Wells, Shaw, Hornthal, Riley & Shearin, P.A., by Dewey W. Wells and Norman W. Shearin, Jr., for defendant appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LOIS G. LEA and FRANK D. CUMMINGS v. GARLAND (GARFIELD) WALTER DUDLEY and wife LOYCE GEORGIA DUDLEY, J. LEON DUDLEY and wife MARGARET WATERFIELD DUDLEY, O. A. DUDLEY and wife DOWE DUDLEY\nNo. 751SC663\n(Filed 7 January 1976)\n1. Adverse Possession \u00a7 25 \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe evidence was sufficient for submission of an issue of title by adverse possession to the jury where the evidence was conflicting as to whether defendants\u2019 predecessor took possession as an agent or employee of a corporation and his possession was thus permissive.\n2. Adverse Possession \u00a7 25.1 \u2014 instructions \u2014 possession with owner\u2019s permission\nThe trial court properly charged the jury that if defendants\u2019 predecessor entered into possession of land with. permission of the owner, his possession would not be adverse until he disclaimed such arrangement in such manner as to put the owner on notice that he was no longer using the land by permission but was claiming it as absolute owner.\n3. Adverse Possession \u00a7 24 \u2014 certificate of tax sale to possessor\nNotice of a sheriff\u2019s levy and a certificate of tax sale of land to defendants\u2019 predecessor was relevant to show the hostile interest with which defendants\u2019 predecessor possessed the land and the notoriety of that possession.\n4. Adverse Possession \u00a7 24 \u2014 declarations of ownership by possessor\nEvidence of declarations by defendants\u2019 predecessor that he had bought the land in question and that it \u201cbelonged to him\u201d was competent to show that defendants\u2019 predecessor claimed to possess the land as the real owner.\n5. Adverse Possession \u00a7 24\u2014 grant of easement by possessor\nThe court did not err in permitting a witness to testify that defendants\u2019 predecessor \u201csigned an easement\u201d across the property in question.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from Rouse, Judge. Judgment entered 7 March 1975 in Superior Court, Currituck County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November 1975.\nThis is an action by plaintiffs to remove a cloud from plaintiffs\u2019 alleged title to particularly described lands in northeastern Currituck County.\nDefendants answered and alleged that they were the sole owners of the property and that they and their predecessors in title had possessed the lands under known and visable lines and boundaries, adversely to all other persons for more than 20 years next preceding the commencement of the action.\nPlaintiffs introduced a 1914 deed conveying the property to Deals Island Ducking Club, Inc., a Virginia corporation. It was stipulated that upon recordation of that deed, the corporation had title to the property by a connected chain of title back to the State. The club stopped filing- annual corporate reports in 1919. Fees were paid until 1929. The corporate charter was revoked in 1931 for failure to pay corporate franchise taxes. Plaintiffs acquired all of the stock in the corporation. On 20 July 1970 a court appointed receiver for the corporation conveyed the property to plaintiffs. (See Lea, v. Dudley, 20 N.C. App. 702, 202 S.E. 2d 799.)\nPlaintiffs introduced two deeds to the property that were executed in 1964. One was from defendants to W. L. Cogswell and the other was a deed from Cogswell to defendants. Plaintiffs contend that these deeds were a cloud on their title.\nDefendants\u2019 evidence tends to show the following:\nThe property in question is mostly marsh land. Defendants\u2019 father, L. L. Dudley, the alleged predecessor in title owned land north of the property in question where he lived and operated a hunting and fishing lodge or clubhouse. In 1914, he had helped a former owner in the sale of the land to the corporation. In the early twenties stockholders of the corporation and their guests would stay in L. L. Dudley\u2019s clubhouse during the hunting season. L. L. Dudley furnished their room and board on a daily or weekly basis. There were no buildings on the property in dispute. In about 1925, some of the stockholders in the corporation attempted to move an old Coast Guard station onto the property but soon abandoned that project. L. L. Dudley erected duck blinds on the property and these were used by some of the stockholders or guests. The stockholders and guests of the corporation did not visit or make other use of the property after 1929. In 1930, L. L. Dudley erected a two-story house on the property from material salvaged from the old Coast Guard station. The house was used by guides and other employees of Dudley. He also rented the house to others. The last tenant was W. L. Cogswell who lived there about 15 years until his death in 1968. Dudley built roads over the property and barred access to those he did not want on the property. Dudley erected a number of concrete duck blinds and placed posted signs on the property. The duck blinds were licensed in his name. He fenced part of the property and raised cattle, goats and sheep. He used all of the land commercially. During hunting season he employed guides to take hunting parties out on the property. He advertised his hunting facilities in a magazine and distributed advertising folders. He dynamited a ditch about 200 yards long across part of the property. After the hunting seasons he trapped muskrats and other animals for commercial purposes. Each year-he burned over the marshy areas of the property to make it more desirable for hunting. Hunting on the land was allowed only by permission from L. L. Dudley. Dudley used the land for about the only purpose that the nature of the property would permit.\nOn 1 July 1929, Dudley purchased the tax lien on the property at a tax sale in 1929. Dudley and his successors paid the taxes on the property up to the time this action was started. The property was listed on the' tax records as \u201cDeals Island Club, L. L. Dudley, Agent\u201d until 1965 when it was changed to \u201cDudley, Garland Walters, et al.\u201d L. L. Dudley\u2019s son testified, \u201cMy father was never an employee of anyone ... he was never an employee or agent of anyone. He was not a caretaker for anyone. . . .\u201d\nOn 23 April 1952, L. L. Dudley as \u201cowner\u201d conveyed a right-of-way easement across the land to Virginia Electric and Power Company.\nAfter L. L. Dudley died in 1958 his sons stayed in possession of the property and continued essentially the same use of the property. The sons subsequently leased the land to others.\nThe deed from defendants to Cogswell and from Cogswell back to defendants was executed upon the advice of a Virginia attorney \u201cwho has been disbarred\u201d so that it could be entered in the record.\nTo show the notoriety of L. L. Dudley\u2019s possession, defendants produced several witnesses who testified that it was generally reputed that L. L. Dudley owned the land. Around 1930, Dudley told his friends that he owned the land and had bought \u2022it at a tax sale.\nPlaintiffs then offered evidence in rebuttal tending to show that from the time the corporation bought the property until about 1919, L. L. Dudley was employed by the corporation as a salaried caretaker of the property. Thereafter, Dudley was still employed as a caretaker. Instead of receiving a cash salary, however, he was allowed to use the property in return for taking care of it and paying the taxes.\nJ. Kenyon Wilson, Jr., for plaintiff appellants.\nLeroy, Wells, Shaw, Hornthal, Riley & Shearin, P.A., by Dewey W. Wells and Norman W. Shearin, Jr., for defendant appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0281-01",
  "first_page_order": 309,
  "last_page_order": 314
}
