{ "id": 8550020, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL ANGELO WILLIAMS", "name_abbreviation": "In re Williams", "decision_date": "1976-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 7519DC713", "first_page": "462", "last_page": "465", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "28 N.C. App. 462" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027325 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570180 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E. 2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561170 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0131-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 398, "char_count": 7835, "ocr_confidence": 0.541, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2058880652887485 }, "sha256": "3f350206f471a92ffff891886acd8c2b12c89fad98ec31127aa1ca5254bffbd6", "simhash": "1:dc1e54b1c2b523e8", "word_count": 1266 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:46.500479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Morris concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL ANGELO WILLIAMS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRITT, Judge.\nBy his first assignment of error, respondent contends the court erred in ordering him incarcerated for ten days without finding facts justifying detention. The assignment has merit.\nG.S. 7A-286(3) in pertinent part provides: \u201c ... No child shall be held in any juvenile detention home or jail for more than five calendar days without a hearing to determine the need for continued detention under the special procedures established by this Article. If the judge orders that the child continue in the detention home or jail after such a hearing to determine the need for continued detention, the court order shall be in writing with appropriate findings of fact.\u201d\nIt is clear that the quoted portion of G.S. 7A-286(3) governs respondent\u2019s appeal. Therefore, that portion of the judgment providing for ten days\u2019 confinement is vacated and the cause will be remanded to the district court for entry of judgment in compliance with the statute.\nIn his second assignment of error, respondent contends the court erred \u201cin entering a judgment in a prior action against [him] in which prayer for judgment had been continued on condition, without notice to [him] that the court\u2019s action was contemplated, and without affording him an opportunity to be represented in that matter by his court appointed attorney of;record.\u201d In his third assignment of error, he contends the court erred in entering a dispositional order immediately after the adjudicatory hearing in which respondent was adjudged delinquent when the summons gave notice only of an adjudication hearing. We find no merit in either of these assignments and since they \u00e1re interrelated, we will discuss them together.\nWhile the conditions upon which the earlier judgment was continued were considered by the court in rendering the judgment appealed from, at the time the latter judgment was entered, respondent was before the court for an entirely separate and distinct offense. We conclude that the latter judgment was based on the court\u2019s second determination of delinquency resulting from the shoplifting charge.\nAt the hearing on that charge, respondent and his mother waived the right to counsel and the court found that the waivers were intelligently and understandably made. State v. Boyd, 287 N.C. 131, 214 S.E. 2d 14 (1975) ; State v. Silver, 286 N.C. 709, 213 S.E. 2d 247 (1975) ; See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 29 L.Ed. 2d 647, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed. 2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).\nWith respect to notice, we think respondent and his mother were sufficiently informed that the hearing on 23 July 1975 could result not only in a second determination that respondent was delinquent, but in the disposition of his case as well. G.S. 7A-285 provides that a juvenile hearing \u201cshall be a simple judicial process\u201d and further provides as follows: \u201c ... At the conclusion of the adjudicatory part of the hearing, the court may proceed to the disposition part of the hearing, or the court may continue the case for disposition after the juvenile probation officer or family counselor or other personnel available to the court has secured such social, medical, psychiatric, psychological or other information as may be needed for the court to develop a disposition related to the needs of the child or in the best interest of the State. ...\u201d We hold that respondent was afforded due process during the 23 July 1975 hearing before Judge Montgomery.\nExcept for the ten days\u2019 confinement provision, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nJudgment vacated in part and cause remanded.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Morris concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRITT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William Woodward Webb, for the State.", "Davis, Koontz & Horton, by Clarence E. Horton, Jr., for respondent appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL ANGELO WILLIAMS\nNo. 7519DC713\n(Filed 4 February 1976)\n1. Infants \u00a7 10 \u2014 delinquent minor \u2014 incarceration for 10 days \u2014 findings of fact required\nThe trial court erred in ordering respondent, a thirteen year old, incarcerated for ten days without finding facts justifying detention. G.S. 7A-286(3).\n2. Infants \u00a7 10 \u2014 second determination of delinquency \u2014 no denial of counsel \u2014 disposition at same time as adjudicatory hearing\nThe trial court did not enter a judgment in a prior action against .respondent in which prayer for judgment had been continued on condition, without notice to respondent that the court\u2019s action was contemplated as respondent contended, but instead made a second determination of delinquency resulting from a shoplifting charge which was an entirely separate and distinct offense from that resulting in the first finding of delinquency and the earlier continued judgment; nor was respondent denied the right to counsel where he and his mother intelligently and understandingly waived counsel; moreover, respondent and his mother had notice that the hearing could result not only in a second determination of deliquency but in the disposition of the case as well. G.S. 7A-285.\nAppeal by respondent from Montgomery, Judge. Judgment entered 23 July 1975 in District Court, Cabarrus County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 January 1976.\nIn a juvenile petition, dated 31 January 1975, respondent, age thirteen, was alleged to be a delinquent child for the reason that he had broken into and entered a cafe in Kannapolis and stolen a quantity of merchandise. A juvenile summons was served on respondent and his mother ordering them to appear at an adjudicatory hearing.\nRespondent was represented at the hearing by court appointed counsel. On 12 February 1975, Judge Warren entered an order finding respondent a delinquent child defined by G.S. 7A-278(2) in that he had broken into and entered the cafe and stolen merchandise therefrom as alleged in the petition. The court continued the matter for disposition pending a home investigation by the family court counselor.\nOn 12 March 1975, following a report of the investigation by the court counselor, respondent and his mother were summoned to appear for a dispositional hearing. Following a hearing at which respondent was represented by court appointed counsel, Judge Montgomery entered an order continuing prayer for judgment \u201cfrom month to month for a period of one year\u201d upon certain conditions. The conditions included requirements that respondent attend school and apply himself to his schoolwork, that he not violate any laws of this or any other state, that he not be out any night later than 10:00 p.m. and that he not associate with one Judy Williams at whose direction he was alleged to have acted.\nIn a second juvenile petition, dated 10 July 1975, respondent was alleged to be a delinquent child for the reason that he committed the offense of \u201cshoplifting\u201d on 29 June 1975. Pursuant to that petition, respondent, his mother and her husband were summoned to appear at an adjudication hearing. At that hearing, after being apprised of their right to counsel, respondent and his mother waived the right, and the court found that the waiver was voluntarily and understanding^ made. Respondent admitted in open court that he was guilty of the shoplifting alleged in the petition.\nThe court entered judgment finding as a fact that respondent had committed the shoplifting act complained of and, based on that finding, determined respondent to a delinquent child. The judgment ordered that respondent be committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Cabarrus County and placed in quarters provided for juveniles in the county jail for a period of ten days, following which he would be released on probation for a period of two years under the supervision of the family court counselor subject to certain specified conditions. Respondent appealed from the judgment and counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William Woodward Webb, for the State.\nDavis, Koontz & Horton, by Clarence E. Horton, Jr., for respondent appellant." }, "file_name": "0462-01", "first_page_order": 490, "last_page_order": 493 }