{ "id": 8554471, "name": "RUBY T. WILLIFORD v. MATHA W. JACKSON and PEARL W. MARLEY, Co-Administrators of the Estate of MARTHA B. WILLIFORD, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "Williford v. Jackson", "decision_date": "1976-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 754DC863", "first_page": "128", "last_page": "131", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "29 N.C. App. 128" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "168 N.C., 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8660743 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/168/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.E. 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269987 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287-288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/171/0283-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 7888, "ocr_confidence": 0.618, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.34792318007729406 }, "sha256": "418d3f82b2b3b867705992d934ebcae497477bd226f480e51c6f4eb78a860ed8", "simhash": "1:f307d80cefb81cfe", "word_count": 1290 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:22.308082+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Clark concur." ], "parties": [ "RUBY T. WILLIFORD v. MATHA W. JACKSON and PEARL W. MARLEY, Co-Administrators of the Estate of MARTHA B. WILLIFORD, Deceased" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BROCK, Chief Judge.\nDefendants argue that their motions for directed verdict should have been allowed. Defendants concede that the relationship of plaintiff and decedent \u2014 daughter-in-law and mother-in-law \u2014 is not a sufficiently close relationship to raise a presumption that the services claimed to have been rendered were rendered gratuitiously. They contend, however, that the evidence disclosed a family relationship with all members of the family living in the home helping each other.\nThe evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, tends to show the following: In the early forties, plaintiff and her husband moved into the home with the husband\u2019s parents, Jody and Martha B. Williford. Jody Williford died in 1943. From that time until approximately 1954 or 1955, all of Martha\u2019s children were living at the homeplace. There were some 10 or 11 people living there, all sharing in the labor and expense, all eating together and living as a family unit. By 1954 or 1955 all of the members of the family except Martha Williford, plaintiff, and plaintiff\u2019s husband, had moved away from the home. After the death of Jody Williford, plaintiff\u2019s husband assumed management of the homeplace farm. The farm was rented out and the income used for the support of Martha, and plaintiff and her husband and family. When plaintiff\u2019s husband worked away from the farm, that income was also used for the support of the family. Plaintiff\u2019s husband, in 1961 or 1962, installed a bathroom for the convenience of the family, including Martha Williford, whose condition made it increasingly difficult for her to get to and from the outside bathroom. Plaintiff went to work at the 'Erwin Mill, but in 1960 or 1961, when Martha Williford\u2019s health was such that it became necessary for someone to be there in the home to care for her, plaintiff stopped work and stayed at the home to take care of Martha Williford. Plaintiff did the cooking and washing and ironing. Plaintiff changed the bed linens on Martha\u2019s bed. For three years prior to her death, Martha was not able to do anything for herself without help. On 2 July 1971, Martha had a heart attack, and after she was discharged from the hospital, plaintiff\u2019s husband carried her to a nursing home on 6 August 1971 where she stayed until 15 December 1971. Thereafter plaintiff\u2019s husband brought his mother home and bought a hospital bed for her. She was completely confined to her bed and lost normal control of her bodily functions. Plaintiff cared for her without any help until she again had to be hospitalized on 18 March 1972. She died in the hospital on 13 April 1972. During her period of hospitalization and stay in the nursing home plaintiff and her husband frequently stayed with her in the daytime and plaintiff\u2019s husband hired a nurse\u2019s aide to stay with her at night. Martha\u2019s other children would visit occasionally at the home but did not assist plaintiff in the care of Martha. During her hospitalization and stay at the nursing home, her other children would visit her at night after they got off work and would sometimes contribute to her care, but plaintiff and her husband did most of it. Martha Williford did not receive social security or any other government benefits but \u201cdid receive Medicaid or Medicare when she was in the hospital.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s husband testified that Martha Williford \u201chated for Ruby to have to wait on her like she was having to do, and all, and said she wanted her looked after for it.\u201d\nWe are of the opinion that the court properly submitted the issue to the jury.\nDefendants also contend that the trial court stated an opinion in charging the jury that one witness had corroborated the testimony of another witness. We agree.\nDuring the course of instructing the jury, the trial court noted that plaintiff\u2019s witness, Anne Williford, had \"... corroborated to a considerable extent the testimony of Mr. William Williford, the husband of the plaintiff in this case.\u201d\nThe issue of corroboration is a matter to be resolved by the jury and the trial court erred in removing this question from the jury\u2019s province. In Lassiter v. R. R., 171 N.C. 283, 287-288, 88 S.E. 335 (1916), the Court said:\n\u201cWe cannot approve an instruction, \u2018that one witness corroborates another,\u2019 as this is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. . . . The tendency of certain testimony to corroborate a witness, and the fact of corroboration, are considered, in law, as two different things. It is for the jury and not for the judge to say how the testimony of'a witness is affected by other testimony. Swan v. Carawan, 168 N.C., 472. The credibility of witnesses, the weight and sufficiency of testimony, are matters peculiarly within the province of the jury to consider and pass upon.\nWe are of the'opinion that the charge in the respects indicated was not an adequate one, and that the judge inadvertently expressed an opinion upon the weight of the testimony.\u201d\nBecause a new trial must be had, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other errors assigned by defendants.\nNew trial.\nJudges Vaughn and Clark concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BROCK, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "McLeod and McLeod, by Max E. McLeod, for \u2018plaintiff appellee.", "John R. Parker for defendant appellants. ." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RUBY T. WILLIFORD v. MATHA W. JACKSON and PEARL W. MARLEY, Co-Administrators of the Estate of MARTHA B. WILLIFORD, Deceased\nNo. 754DC863\n(Filed 7 April 1976)\n1. Executors and Administrators \u00a7 24\u2014 services rendered decedent \u2014 recovery under quantum meruit \u2014 sufficiency of evidence for jury\nIn an action to recover a sum for services rendered by plaintiff daughter-in-law to her mother-in-law during the last three years of the mother-in-law\u2019s life, the trial court properly submitted the issue to the jury where the evidence tended to show that plaintiff and her family lived in the mother-in-law\u2019s home, plaintiff cooked, washed, ironed, changed bed linens, and completely cared for the mother-in-law who was unable to do anything for herself without help, and the mother-in-law expressed her appreciation for the daughter-in-law and said that \u201cshe wanted her looked after for it.\u201d\n2. Trial \u00a7 36\u2014 expression of opinion by trial court \u2014 new trial\nDefendants are entitled to a new trial where the trial court stated an opinion in charging the jury that one witness had corroborated the testimony of another witness.\nAppeal by defendants from Crumpler, Judge. Judgment entered 27 May 1975 in District Court, Sampson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 February 1976.\nIn her complaint and attached \u201cexhibit,\u201d plaintiff, daughter-in-law of the deceased Martha Williford, alleged that in view of services rendered to her mother-in-law during the last three years of the mother-in-law\u2019s life she, the plaintiff, is entitled to $3,900 plus interest and costs.\nDefendant, administrators of the deceased\u2019s estate, denied all material allegations, contended that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and moved in their answer for dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action.\nAt trial, plaintiff contended, through h\u00e9r own testimony and the testimony of others, that she provided the mother-in-law services including nursing care, preparation of meals, washing clothes and linens and generally ext\u00e9nd\u00e9d to the mother-in-law the kind of personal care and attention required for a seriously ill and bedridden person. Plaintiff\u2019s evidence further indicated that no remuneration to plaintiff was ever made, but that Martha Williford, cognizant and appreciative of the daughter-in-law\u2019s efforts, wanted to have the plaintiff \u201clooked after\u201d because of the work she had done.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that the mother-in-law helped rear plaintiff\u2019s children and that personal care for Martha Williford was shared by other family members.\nFrom a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendants appealed.\nOther facts necessary for decision are cited below.\nMcLeod and McLeod, by Max E. McLeod, for \u2018plaintiff appellee.\nJohn R. Parker for defendant appellants. ." }, "file_name": "0128-01", "first_page_order": 160, "last_page_order": 163 }