{
  "id": 8552544,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. T. G. BURCHFIELD",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Burchfield",
  "decision_date": "1976-07-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 7627SC231",
  "first_page": "128",
  "last_page": "130",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "30 N.C. App. 128"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "193 S.E. 2d 404",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "17 N.C. App. 22",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8552826
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/17/0022-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "181 S.E. 273",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "208 N.C. 456",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8610807
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/208/0456-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "193 S.E. 388",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "212 N.C. 361",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8610416
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/212/0361-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "193 S.E. 2d 308",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "17 N.C. App. 15",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8552765
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/17/0015-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 260,
    "char_count": 3787,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.641,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.206747897699882e-08,
      "percentile": 0.2680555893413091
    },
    "sha256": "012f857239229ca30f85834500f51a68d202b67225214c7cd7ccf58167f5c03d",
    "simhash": "1:8da7156afb9832dc",
    "word_count": 627
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Morris and Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. T. G. BURCHFIELD"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted of feloniously receiving stolen goods. Judgment imposing a prison sentence of not less than 9 nor more than 10 years was entered. Since an erroneous portion of the charge requires that we order a new trial, we consider it unnecessary to set out the facts of the case.\nThe judge, in his charge to the jury, repeatedly told the jury they might convict if they found . . defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe . . that the goods were stolen. Jury instructions of like import have been consistently disapproved when guilty knowledge was an element to be proved. In State v. Grant, 17 N.C. App. 15, 193 S.E. 2d 308, we held that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury in a prosecution for feloniously receiving stolen goods, when it said that the defendant had guilty knowledge if he \u201chad good reason to believe\u201d that the property was stolen. We based our opinion in that case, as we must in this one, on such relevant decisions as State v. Miller, 212 N.C. 361, 193 S.E. 388 and State v. Stathos, 208 N.C. 456, 181 S.E. 273.\n\u201c \u2018To reasonably believe\u2019 and \u2018to know\u2019 are not interchangeable terms. While the latter may be implied or inferred from circumstances establishing the former, it does not follow that reasonable belief and implied knowledge are synonymous. The state must establish that the defendant received the goods \u2018knowing the same to have been feloni-ously stolen or taken,\u2019 and this is not necessarily accomplished by establishing the existence of circumstances \u2018such as to cause the defendant to reasonably believe\u2019 the goods were stolen. Knowledge connotes a more certain and definite mental attitude than reasonable belief, and whether knowledge is implied from circumstances sufficient to establish reasonable belief is a question for the jury.\u201d State v. St. Clair, 17 N.C. App. 22, 193 S.E. 2d 404.\nThe relevant statute, G.S. 14-71, \u201cReceiving Stolen Goods,\u201d was amended to include the language \u201cor having reasonable grounds to believe\u201d as of 1 October 1975. The indictment in this case alleges the commission of the crime \u201con or about the 7th day of August, 1975.\u201d The defendant was therefore entitled to an instruction on the offense as defined in G.S. 14-71 prior to 1 October 1975. The judge\u2019s instruction, based on the statute as amended, was prejudicial and requires that we order a new trial.\nDefendant\u2019s assignment of error, based on the failure to dismiss because of the alleged failure to conduct a preliminary hearing, is overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s assignments of error, based on the alleged insufficiency of the verdict, are overruled. The verdict, as returned by the jury and accepted by the court, was sufficient to support the judgment imposing punishment for feloniously receiving stolen goods.\nThe other alleged errors may not occur at the next trial of the case and will not be reviewed on this appeal.\nFor error in the charge, there must be a new trial.\nNew trial.\nJudges Morris and Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "VAUGHN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis, for the State.",
      "Robert C. Powell, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. T. G. BURCHFIELD\nNo. 7627SC231\n(Filed 7 July 1976)\nReceiving Stolen Goods \u2022\u00a7 6\u2014 instructions \u2014 reasonable grounds for believing goods stolen \u2014 crime prior to 1975 amendment to statute\nThe trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict defendant of receiving stolen goods if it found defendant knew \u201cor had reasonable grounds to believe\u201d the goods were stolen where the offense allegedly occurred prior to the amendment to G.S. 14-71 effective on 1 October 1975.\nAppeal by defendant from Falls, Judge. Judgment entered 21 January 1976 in Superior Court, Gaston County. Heard in the Court'of Appeals 14 June 1976.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis, for the State.\nRobert C. Powell, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0128-01",
  "first_page_order": 156,
  "last_page_order": 158
}
