{
  "id": 8555109,
  "name": "CALVIN SHULER v. GASTON COUNTY DYEING MACHINE COMPANY, A CORPORATION",
  "name_abbreviation": "Shuler v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co.",
  "decision_date": "1976-09-01",
  "docket_number": "No. 7627SC202",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges Hedrick and Arnold concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "CALVIN SHULER v. GASTON COUNTY DYEING MACHINE COMPANY, A CORPORATION"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nChapter 1157 of the 1971 Session Laws, which was ratified on 21 July 1971, is as follows:\n\u201cSection 1. G.S. 1-15 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph as subsection (b) and by designating the first paragraph as subsection (a) so that G.S. 1-15 shall read as follows:\n\u2018\u00a7 1-15. Statute runs from accrual of action.\u2014 (a) Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this Chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute.\n(b) Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than one for wrongful death, having as an essential element bodily injury to the person or a defect in or damage to property which originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deehled to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such cases the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.\u2019\nSec. 2. This act shall become effective upon ratification and shall not affect pending litigation.\u201d\nThe present action was not commenced until 26 November 1973, which was after the effective date of Ch. 1157, 1971 Session Laws. This action, therefore, was not \u201cpending litigation\u201d when that statute became effective. We find nothing in the statute to manifest a legislative intent that it should not affect claims, such as plaintiff\u2019s which were in existence on the effective date of the statute but as to which no litigation was then pending. Had that been the legislative intent, language appropriate for that purpose could easily have been employed. Trust Co. v. Redwine, 204 N.C. 125, 167 S.E. 687 (1933), cited by defendant, is not here controlling. The legislative act involved in that case provided it should be \u201cin force and effect from and after its ratification\u201d (emphasis added), and the court held the statute to operate prospectively only. Section 2 of Ch. 1157 of the 1971 Session laws provides that the act \u201cshall become effective upon ratification,\u201d the sole exception being that it \u201cshall not affect pending litigation.\u201d The 1971 act is remedial in nature, and absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent that it apply prospectively only, we hold it applicable to claims in existence and not yet barred when the statute became effective, the sole exception being- that the statute \u201cshall not affect pending litigation.\u201d Although an action already barred may not be revived by the legislature, \u201cthat body may extend at will the time for bringing actions not already barred by an existing statute.\u201d Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459, 461, 142 S.E. 2d 1, 3 (1965).\nApplying G.S. 1-15 (b) in the present case, plaintiff\u2019s cause of action against defendant \u201cis deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs.\u201d In this case that date was 27 November 1970, the date plaintiff received bodily injuries as result of the allegedly defective safety device. The action having been commenced within three years after that date, plaintiff\u2019s action is not barred by G.S.1-52 (5).\nSince we hold G.S. 1-15 (b) applicable to the present case, it is not necessary that we pass upon plaintiff\u2019s further contention that even without the benefit of that statute, plaintiff\u2019s cause of action against defendant accrues only at the date he received bodily injuries. In this connection, plaintiff points out that he had no direct contract or dealings with defendant, and although his employer might have had an action for breach of warranty against defendant when the allegedly defective safety device was installed, plaintiff had no cause of action until he was injured. Plaintiff\u2019s contention is supported by Stell v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 306 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. N.C. 1969); contra, Jarrell v. Samsonite Corp. 12 N.C. App. 673, 184 S.E. 2d 376 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 180, 185 S.E. 2d 704 (1972); State v. Aircraft Corp., 9 N.C. App. 557, 176 S.E. 2d 796 (1970). The last two cited cases followed the decision in Hooper v. Lumber Company, 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E. 2d 818 (1939). For a critical analysis of that case, see: Lauerman, \u201cThe Accrual and Limitation of Causes of Actions for Nonapparent Bodily Harm and Physical Defects in Property in North Carolina,\u201d 8 Wake Forest Law Review 327, at 375 et seq. (1972).\nWe also do not consider whether G.S. 1-50(5) might be applicable to the present case. That statute makes a six year period of limitation applicable to an action for bodily injury \u201carising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.\u201d The record now before us is not adequate to permit a determination whether the safety equipment installed by defendant was, or was not, \u201can improvement to real property.\u201d\nThe judgment appealed from, which dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action, is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges Hedrick and Arnold concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PARKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Roberts, Caldwell and Planer, P.A. by Joseph B. Roberts III, for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Grier, Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston by William E. Poe and Irvin W. Hankins III, for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CALVIN SHULER v. GASTON COUNTY DYEING MACHINE COMPANY, A CORPORATION\nNo. 7627SC202\n(Filed 1 September 1976)\n1. Limitation of Actions \u00a7 4 \u2014 bodily injury \u2014 statute of limitation \u2014 effect on claims in existence\nCh. 1157 of the 1971 Session Laws which was ratified on 2 July 1971 and which amended G.S. 1-15 applied to claims in existence but not yet barred when the statute became effective, the sole exception being that the statute should not affect pending litigation; therefore, G.S. 1-15 (b) was applicable to this action which was not commenced until 26 November 1973.\n2. Limitation of Actions \u00a7 4 \u2014 installation of safety device \u2014 subsequent injury \u2014 time of accrual of action\nWhere defendant installed a safety device on machinery in plaintiff\u2019s place of employment on 9 February 1970, plaintiff received bodily injuries as a result of the allegedly defective safety device on 27 November 1970, and plaintiff filed his action against defendant on 26 November 1973, plaintiff\u2019s action was not barred by G.S. 1-52(5), since his cause of action against defendant accrued at the time the injury was discovered or ought reasonably to have been discovered by plaintiff, whichever first occurred. G.S. 1-15 (b).\nAppeal by plaintiff from Briggs, Judge. Judgment entered 28 January 1976 in Superior Court, Gaston County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 June 1976.\nOn 9 February 1970 defendant installed a safety device on machinery in the plant of Textron Company. On 27 November 1970 plaintiff, an employee of Textron, was injured while working with the machinery. On 26 November 1973 plaintiff filed this action against defendant seeking damages for his injuries, alleging that defendant was negligent in manufacturing and installing a defective safety device. Defendant answered, denying negligence and pleading defenses, including the statute of limitations.\nBy agreement, the plea in bar of the statute of limitations was submitted to the court for determination prior to trial. The court, finding that plaintiff\u2019s complaint was filed more than three years after the installation of the allegedly defective safety device and concluding as a matter of law that G.S. 1-15 (b) does not apply to claims which arose prior to its effective date, sustained the plea in bar and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action.\nRoberts, Caldwell and Planer, P.A. by Joseph B. Roberts III, for plaintiff appellant.\nGrier, Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage & Preston by William E. Poe and Irvin W. Hankins III, for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0577-01",
  "first_page_order": 605,
  "last_page_order": 609
}
