{ "id": 8551722, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT CARTER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Carter", "decision_date": "1976-07-07", "docket_number": "No. 7525SC1022", "first_page": "59", "last_page": "64", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 N.C. App. 59" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562638 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6401314, 6402245, 6401509, 6401607, 6401417, 6401772, 6401682, 6401879, 6401980, 6402110 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0948-01", "/us/409/0948-10", "/us/409/0948-03", "/us/409/0948-04", "/us/409/0948-02", "/us/409/0948-06", "/us/409/0948-05", "/us/409/0948-07", "/us/409/0948-08", "/us/409/0948-09" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571065 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570581 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541415 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567347 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0680-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 578, "char_count": 11932, "ocr_confidence": 0.651, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.398914757826158e-07, "percentile": 0.7986815061418638 }, "sha256": "789bedb19d5671e257f22f91e4a014c8b740e71d2890129a5c40d493f2e331d0", "simhash": "1:d3e712290a2618ce", "word_count": 2007 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Hedrick and Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT CARTER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nDefendant first argues that reversible error was committed when the defendant was arraigned immediately before trial and the bill of indictment read before the jury and that this error was compounded when the court later read the indictment to the jury at the beginning of his charge. Defendant calls attention to G.S. 15A-943 [effective 1 July 1975 and its procedures required only in counties in which there are regularly scheduled 20 or more weeks of criminal sessions of court], which provides that \u201cthe solicitor must calendar arraignments in the superior court on at least the first day of every other week in which criminal cases are heard. No cases in which the presence of a jury is required may be calendared for the day or portion of a day during which arraignments are calendared.\u201d Defendant argues that one of the purposes of this statute is to prevent the possibility of prejudicing the defendant\u2019s case by reading the indictment in the presence of the jury before whom the defendant is to be tried. This argument is completely groundless. The official commentary preceding Article 51, Arraignment, is specific with respect to the purposes of the article:\n\u201cIt is the purpose of this Article not only to define arraignment in any court but also to provide for a separate time of arraignment in superior court. Time for jurors and witnesses will be saved if matters not requiring their presence can be disposed of before they are brought in. The Commission feels that it is important to our system of justice that unnecessary impositions on the time of citizens be avoided. Thus, in the more populous counties here defined as those having as much as 20 weeks of criminal court (and others which the Chief Justice may designate), a separate time for arraignment will be required. In other counties it is authorized on an optional basis.\nThe Commission is under no illusion that this will cure problems of delay, or that it will end the practice of waiting until a jury is ready before entering a guilty plea, but it does set a pattern within which improvement is possible.\u201d\nG.S. 15A-941 defines arraignment as \u201cbringing a defendant in open court before a judge having jurisdiction to try the offense, advising him of the charges pending against him, and directing him to plead.\u201d It is obvious that the purpose of an arraignment is to advise the defendant of the crime with which he is charged. G.S. 15A-941 further provides that \u201c[t]he solicitor must read the charges or fairly summarize them to the defendant.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) The fact that this is done before the jury is not, as defendant contends, a violation of defendant\u2019s right to due process and equal protection as required by the Constitution of the State of North Carolina and the United States. Nor is there any merit to defendant\u2019s contention that prejudicial error resulted from the court\u2019s reading the indictment to the jury and advising the jury that the State had elected not to place the defendant on trial for murder in the first degree but would place him on trial for murder in the second degree or for such other offense as the evidence may warrant. This assignment of error is wholly without merit.\nDefendant next assigns as error the court\u2019s sustaining the State\u2019s objections to a question asked defendant by his counsel as to whether he had \u201cany knowledge of any prior incidents of Ralph Caldwell attempting to do harm to somebody,\u201d and questions of similar import. Defendant did not request that the evidence be admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the state of mind of defendant nor did he ask that the answers be placed in the record. Nevertheless, immediately thereafter he was asked: \u201cDo you know the deceased\u2019s, Ralph Caldwell\u2019s, reputation as a dangerous and violent fighting man?\u201d He responded \u201cYes\u201d; whereupon he was asked \u201cWhat was it?\u201d His totally unresponsive answer was \u201cWell, to my knowledge he had shot a couple and cut some.\u201d Although an objection was sustained at that point, the answer was before the jury, and he continued, \u201cIt was pretty bad as far as I knew.\u201d Obviously, defendant suffered no prejudice.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error are to the charge of the court. For the most part, the defendant has selected isolated portions of the charge to which he assigns as error the court\u2019s failure to state clearly that the legal presumptions of an unlawful and malicious killing are inapplicable if the defendant acted in the heat of passion and upon adequate provocation or in self-defense. However, when this aspect of the charge is read contextually, it is clear that the court, with clarity and without confusion, instructed the jury that they were \u201cnot [to] rely upon the presumption of malice or otherwise find that malice existed unless you first find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not entitled to have the crime reduced to voluntary manslaughter or manslaughter,\u201d and further that they could not return a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder unless they first found \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense.\u201d These instructions followed the court\u2019s -having told the jury that the presumptions would be raised \u201cif no other evidence is presented\u201d and were preceded by the court\u2019s stating the defendant\u2019s contention that \u201cthere is evidence in this case that he acted in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation.\u201d Also, after he gave the elements of manslaughter and preceding the instruction above noted, the court stated the defendant\u2019s contention that \u201cthere is evidence in this case that he acted in self-defense.\u201d When the charge is read contextually, as we are required to do, State v. McWilliams, 277 N.C. 680, 178 S.E. 2d 476 (1971), we think this aspect of the charge complies with the principles enunciated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E. 2d 575 (1975); and State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E. 2d 558 (1975).\nDefendant also contends that the court erred in failing properly to place the burden of proof upon the State with respect to the elements of manslaughter, self-defense, heat of passion upon adequate provocation. Again defendant chooses only isolated portions of the charge.\n\u201cA disconnected portion may not be detached from the context of the charge and then critically examined for an interpretation from which erroneous expressions may be inferred.\u201d State v. Bailey, 280 N.C. 264, 268, 185 S.E. 2d 683 (1972); cert. denied 409 U.S. 948.\nWhen it is read contextually, the charge clearly and repeatedly places the burden of proof upon the State to prove all the elements of manslaughter, substantially requires the State to disprove that the killing was done in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation, and repeatedly requires a verdict of not guilty \u201cunless the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not excused by the rule of self-defense.\u201d\nThe court\u2019s final mandate to the jury was as follows:\n\u201c ... in your deliberations and this is my final summary to you with reference to the charge of murder in the second degree, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden being on the State to so satisfy you that on October 14, of 1974, the defendant, Robert Carter, intentionally and with malice and without just cause or excuse shot Ralph Junior Caldwell, with a .25 caliber pistol, specifically the pistol introduced into evidence as State Exhibit 6, that the pistol which he shot Ralph Caldwell, if you find that it was a deadly weapon and that he thereby caused Ralph Caldwell\u2019s death, nothing else appearing, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. However, if you do not so find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of those things, then you will not return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder.\nIf you do not find the defendant guilty of second degree murder, you must consider whether he is guilty of manslaughter. With reference to manslaughter, if you find, from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that on or about October 14, 1974, the defendant, Robert Carter, intentionally shot Ralph Caldwell with the .25 caliber pistol offered into evidence as State Exhibit six, that State Exhibit six is a deadly weapon, and that he thereby caused . . . proximately caused the death of Ralph Junior Caldwell, and you find or the State has failed to satisfy you to the contrary and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed without malice, in the heat of passion, nothing else appearing or he being the aggressor without a murderous intent in bringing on the dispute with Ralph Caldwell or using excessive force in exercising his right of self-defense, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. However, if you do not find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of those things, then it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\nIn all events, you must return a verdict of not guilty unless the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not excused by the rule of self-defense . . . . \u201d\nThis mandate indicated the requisite elements of the offenses charged, pointed out those circumstances requiring reduction of the crime from murder to manslaughter and further indicated that self-defense would excuse the defendant from all culpability. Defendant cannot complain over the trial court\u2019s handling of the difficult legal questions presented and his position is simply without merit. See: State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E. 2d 575 (1975); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E. 2d 558 (1975); Cf: State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 203 S.E. 2d 815 (1974).\nWe have reviewed all other assignments of error and find them to be without merit.\nNo error.\nJudges Hedrick and Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorneys Jo Anne Routh and Daniel C. Oakley, for the State.", "Mitchell, Teele & Blackwell, by H. Dockery Teele, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT CARTER\nNo. 7525SC1022\n(Filed 7 July 1976)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7\u00a7 20, 30; Criminal Law \u00a7 22\u2014 arraignment \u2014 reading indictment before jury \u2014 no denial of equal protection or due process\nThe purpose of an arraignment is to advise defendant of the crime with which he is charged, and the solicitor must read the charges or fairly summarize them to defendant. The fact that this is done before the jury is not a violation of defendant\u2019s right to due process and equal protection as required by the N. C. and U. S. Constitutions. G.S. 15A-941.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 114; Homicide \u00a7 23\u2014 reading of indictment to jury by trial court \u2014 no prejudice\nPrejudicial error did not result from the trial court\u2019s reading the indictment to the jury and advising the jury that the State had elected not to place defendant on trial for murder in the first degree but would place him on trial for murder in the second degree or for such other offense as the evidence might warrant.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 24\u2014 presumptions of malice and unlawfulness \u2014 self-defense\u2014 burden of proof \u2014 instructions proper\nIn a prosecution for second degree murder, the trial court\u2019s instructions concerning the legal presumptions of an unlawful and malicious killing and concerning self-defense were proper; moreover, the court properly placed the burden of proof upon the State with respect to the elements of manslaughter, self-defense, and heat of passion upon adequate provocation.\nAppeal by defendant from Ervin, Judge. Judgment entered 7 August 1975 in Superior Court, Burke County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 April 1976.\nDefendant, indicted for murder, was tried for and convicted of murder in the second degree. From judgment sentencing him to a term of imprisonment, defendant appealed.\nOther facts necessary for decision are set out in the opinion.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorneys Jo Anne Routh and Daniel C. Oakley, for the State.\nMitchell, Teele & Blackwell, by H. Dockery Teele, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0059-01", "first_page_order": 87, "last_page_order": 92 }