{ "id": 8552930, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EUSTER CLAY RAINES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Raines", "decision_date": "1976-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 7610SC151", "first_page": "176", "last_page": "181", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 N.C. App. 176" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "46 L.Ed. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 L.Ed. 2d 313", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6175104 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Subsequent interrogation and resulting confession were upheld after defendant initially asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E. 2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "cited with approval in Pruitt, supra" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620243 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "cited with approval in Pruitt, supra" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568818 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 S.E. 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. 809", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629047 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 S.E. 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1893, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1893, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559994 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8688595 ], "year": 1827, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/12/0259-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 556, "char_count": 11597, "ocr_confidence": 0.67, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1813549812920936e-07, "percentile": 0.7726292150623454 }, "sha256": "05d7c516a7debe464dc5476a9ca375b5e5c0e927489357aee46a539f664505ea", "simhash": "1:6b6a1761b7c40c43", "word_count": 1856 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Parker and Arnold concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EUSTER CLAY RAINES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThe defendant assigns as error that portion of the order denying his motion to suppress.\nThe material facts of this case offered into evidence at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motions are not in dispute. Constant Horton was accompanying two police officers, who were driving on the streets of Raleigh on 24 September 1975, when he made an on-the-street identification of defendant as being the person who had robbed him. The defendant was arrested and taken to the investigative division of the police department. He was interviewed by Detective G. S. Black who fully advised him of his rights. The defendant stated that he desired an attorney, whereupon the interview was terminated and the defendant was taken to the Wake County Magistrate\u2019s Office and booked.\nThe defendant\u2019s mother and his sister met Detective Black and the defendant at the Magistrate\u2019s office, and defendant\u2019s mother requested that she be allowed to talk with the defendant. She went with defendant into a room adjacent to the \u201cbooking room.\u201d Approximately ten minutes later, she came to the door and asked what her son was charged with. Detective Black explained the charges to her and she advised her son to tell the truth. Black also \u201cadvised him at that time that it would be better for him to tell the truth.\u201d Black then left them alone again.\nWhile defendant\u2019s mother continued talking with defendant, two people who had been robbed in the \u201cChurch\u2019s Chicken robbery\u201d were shown a picture lineup. Each made a positive identification of defendant as the perpetrator. Detective Black re-entered the room where the defendant and his mother were talking and informed them that he had been identified by the victims of the robbery. He asked the defendant \u201cif he wished to talk\u201d and defendant responded \u201cthat he would like a minute to think about it.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s sister was allowed to talk with defendant. Five or ten minutes later, the defendant informed Detective Black that he wished to make a statement. The defendant was taken, alone, to the Sheriff\u2019s Department and interviewed. He was advised of his rights and signed a written waiver in the presence of Detectives Black and Jones. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights. He appeared to be normal in all respects. There were no threats or promises made, and he agreed to talk without a lawyer present. He then proceeded to make a statement which was written down by Black and Jones and signed by the defendant. The interview was completed at 5:12 p.m.\nLater that evening Detective Jones talked with defendant\u2019s sister at her home. He told her \u201cthat him [the defendant] being truthful with us [the police] could possibly help him in court.\u201d Subsequent to the twenty-fourth, the defendant\u2019s sister talked with the defendant; and subsequent to the twenty-fourth, defendant had several more conversations with the police where he made incriminating statements.\nOn these facts, Judge Bailey concluded that there was no violation of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights prior to 5:12 p.m. on 24 September 1975. He also concluded, however, that the statement by Detective Jones to defendant\u2019s sister was \u201cimproper\u201d \u2014 that it \u201cwas such as the officer knew or should have known would be communicated to Raines by his relatives.\u201d Based on this conclusion, he entered an order that any statements prior to 5:12 p.m., 24 September, were admissible into evidence but that all subsequent statements by the defendant were inadmissible.\nDefendant contends on appeal that the facts offered into evidence at the hearing demonstrate that he was denied the right to counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and that he was \u201cillegally compelled, through inducement and a suggestion of hope, to make incriminating statements,\u201d in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Since statements made subsequent to 24 September were suppressed, we consider defendant\u2019s contentions only as they apply to the statement made on 24 September.\nWith regard to defendant\u2019s claim that he was denied his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, he argues that Detective Black\u2019s statement to the defendant that \u201cit would be better for him to tell the truth\u201d was an inducement or a promise of reward tvhich compelled him to make the incriminating statement. If a statement is \u201cobtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear,\u201d it should be rejected. State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259, 260 (1827). Thus, where defendant was told it would be \u201cbetter for him in court\u201d (State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E. 2d 492 (1968)), or \u201cto make an honest confession. It might be easier for you ...\u201d (State v. Drake, 113 N.C. 625, 18 S.E. 166 (1893)), or \u201cit would be lighter on [him]\u201d (State v. Livingston, 202 N.C. 809, 164 S.E. 337 (1932)), the subsequent confession has been excluded, because, in each instance, the defendant was offered hope, reward, or inducement that he would benefit from the police or the court by telling the truth. Nothing in those cases, however, proscribes general \u201ccustodial admonitions to an accused by police officers to tell the truth.\u201d State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 458, 212 S.E. 2d 92, 102 (1975). In State v. Thompson, 227 N.C. 19, 40 S.E. 2d 620 (1946) (cited with approval in Pruitt, supra), the officers told defendant, \u201cit would be better to go on and tell us the truth than try to lie about it.\u201d The admission of the confession in that case was upheld.\nWe believe that the language in the instant case falls within the language of Thompson. The circumstances which existed when the statement was made in no sense were coersive. Defendant was with his mother; he was not even being questioned by police at the time. Black\u2019s statement was nothing more than a general custodial admonition to tell the truth. The trial court correctly concluded there was no Fifth Amendment violation in regard to the 24 September statement.\nWith regard to defendant\u2019s claim that the procedure above violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the U. S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966), said the following:\n\u201cIf the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to the police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.\u201d\nDefendant contends that Miranda prescribes a blanket prohibition against further communication by the police with the defendant, until the defendant has consulted with an attorney.\nIn the present case, when defendant indicated he wanted an attorney, the police respected his request and promptly terminated all questioning. It was on the defendant\u2019s own initiative that Detective Black talked with the defendant again. Before talking with defendant, Black read and explained to him his rights under the Constitution, including his right to have an attorney present. Defendant waived those rights, signing the written waiver presented to him by Black.\nThe presence of counsel in an in-custody police interrogation is designed to insure \u201cthat statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion,\u201d Miranda, supra. This insurance was never meant to be absolute, however, in proscribing the use of confessions per se. Miranda requires that the police respect the Constitutional rights of the defendant in obtaining custodial statements from the defendant. \u201cThe defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently,\u201d Miranda, supra. We can find nothing in Miranda, and have been cited to no subsequent case by defendant, which implies that once defendant has indicated he wishes to exercise his right to an attorney he may not voluntarily make a subsequent informed and intelligent waiver of that right. See Michigan v. Mosley, 46 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1975) (Subsequent interrogation and resulting confession were upheld after defendant initially asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.).\n\u201c[A] blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigation activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests.\u201d Mosley, id., at 46 L.Ed. 2d 320.\nWe conclude that the defendant in this case did voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to counsel on 24 September before making the statement which he sought to have suppressed. The trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the 24 September statement is affirmed.\nThe judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Parker and Arnold concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Richard L. Griffin for the State.", "Manning, Fulton & Skinner by Howard E. Mcmning, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EUSTER CLAY RAINES\nNo. 7610SC151\n(Filed 21 July 1976)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 75\u2014 incriminating statements \u2014 officer\u2019s admonition to tell the truth\nOn officer\u2019s statement to defendant that \u201cit would be better for him to tell the truth\u201d was not an inducement or promise or reward which rendered defendant\u2019s subsequent incriminating statements inadmissible in evidence.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 75\u2014 request for attorney \u2014 subsequent waiver of attorney \u2014 admissibility of confession\nDefendant\u2019s incriminating statements were not inadmissible because he initially indicated he wanted an attorney where officers terminated all questioning of defendant when he stated that he wanted an attorney, defendant was allowed to talk with his mother and sister and was informed that robbery victims had identified him, defendant then told officers he wanted to make a statement, defendant was informed of his constitutional rights and signed a written waiver of those rights, and defendant then made the incriminating statements to officers.\nAppeal by defendant from Bailey, Judge. Judgment entered 26 November 1975 in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 May 1976.\nThe defendant, Euster Clay Raines, was charged in separate indictments, proper in form, with the armed robbery of Constant L. Horton on 24 September 1975, the armed robbery of Richard Sampson on 8 June 1975, and the armed robbery of Latha Whittington on 14 June 1975. Prior to trial, pursuant to G.S. 15A-975, defendant moved to suppress certain incriminating statements made by him to the police. He also moved to dismiss the charges against him, pursuant to G.S. 15A-954, alleging that \u201c[t]he defendant\u2019s constitutional rights have been flagrantly violated and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant\u2019s preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s motions came on for a hearing before Judge Bailey on 25 November 1975, after which he made findings and conclusions and entered an order allowing defendant\u2019s motion to suppress in part but denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. On 2 December 1975 the defendant appeared for trial and entered pleas of \u201cno contest\u201d to the three armed robbery charges. Defendant\u2019s pleas were accepted by the court. The three charges were consolidated for judgment. From judgment entered that he be imprisoned for twenty-five to thirty years, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Richard L. Griffin for the State.\nManning, Fulton & Skinner by Howard E. Mcmning, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0176-01", "first_page_order": 204, "last_page_order": 209 }