{ "id": 8553295, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALBERT FINLEY CHESTER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Chester", "decision_date": "1976-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 7625SC141", "first_page": "224", "last_page": "228", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 N.C. App. 224" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "212 S.E. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.C. App. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554668 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/24/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549779 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E. 2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8595202 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601946 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554477 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E. 2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566209, 8566342, 8566381, 8566415, 8566289 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0459-01", "/nc/277/0459-03", "/nc/277/0459-04", "/nc/277/0459-05", "/nc/277/0459-02" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551919 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0477-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 336, "char_count": 8352, "ocr_confidence": 0.675, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.117279515889369e-07, "percentile": 0.9102934186510487 }, "sha256": "85d3369e6f0397e4d002730932ffa5c7d280cdae7fed363e49c12d0afe37443c", "simhash": "1:b609852b037d087a", "word_count": 1405 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Martin concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALBERT FINLEY CHESTER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CLARK, Judge.\nIn State v. Teasley, 9 N.C. App. 477, 176 S.E. 2d 838, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 459, 177 S.E. 2d 900 (1970), this Court held that to convict for a violation of G.S. 20-28 (a) the State must prove: (1) the operation of a motor vehicle, (2) on a public highway, (3) while one\u2019s operator\u2019s license is suspended or revoked; and that when the Department complied with the procedure (G.S. 20-48) as to notice of suspension or revocation of operator\u2019s license, such compliance constituted constructive notice to the defendant that his license had been suspended or revoked. Judge Mallard, for the Court, wrote: \u201cThere is nothing in the statute [G.S. 20-28(a)] which would imply that knowledge or intent is a part of the crime of operating a motor vehicle after one\u2019s license has been suspended.\u201d\nIn State v. Atwood, filed 17 June 1976, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in reversing the Court of Appeals (27 N.C. App. 445), held that all the evidence indicated that defendant had no notice or knowledge of the suspension of her operator\u2019s license, which removed the criminal character from defendant\u2019s conduct, and the trial court should have granted a nonsuit. State v. Teasley, supra, was not overruled but was distinguished in that there was no evidence in Teasley to rebut the presumption that notice was received upon the mailing, whereas in Atwood all the evidence rebutted that presumption.\nIn the case before us all of the evidence did not rebut the presumption of notice and knowledge, but the defendant offered evidence that he did not receive a notice mailed by the Department because at the time of mailing he had left this State and moved to Tennessee. Thus, defendant\u2019s evidence raised the issue of guilty knowledge.\nThe question of guilty knowledge was raised in State v. Elliott, 232 N.C. 377, 61 S.E. 2d 93 (1950), wherein defendant, charged with transporting intoxicating liquor, offered evidence of lack of knowledge of the presence of liquor in his automobile. The court ordered a new trial for failure of the trial court to charge that defendant was guilty only in the event he knew the liquor was in his automobile, and 232 N.C. at 378 stated:\n\u201cA person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. [Citations omitted.] Hence, ordinarily, where a specific intent is not an element of the crime, proof of the commission of the unlawful act is sufficient to support a verdict. [Citation omitted.] ....\nNothing else appearing, it would not be necessary for the court, in the absence of a prayer, to make reference in its charge to guilty knowledge or intent. Scienter is presumed. ...\u201d\nSee also State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 59 S.E. 2d 199 (1950); State v. Stacy, 19 N.C. App. 35, 197 S.E. 2d 881 (1973); State v. Gleason, 24 N.C. App. 732, 212 S.E. 2d 213 (1975).\nWhile a specific intent is not an element of the offense of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while one\u2019s license is suspended or revoked, the burden is on the State to prove that defendant had knowledge at the time charged that his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked; the State satisfies this burden when, nothing else appearing, it has offered evidence of compliance with the notice requirements of G.S. 20-48 because of the presumption that he received notice and had such knowledge. When there is some evidence to rebut this presumption, the issue of guilty knowledge is raised and must be determined by the jury under appropriate instruction from the trial court.\nWe conclude that in a prosecution for violation of G.S. 20-28 (a) where the evidence for the State discloses that the Department complied with the notice requirements of G.S. 20-48: (1) where there is no evidence that defendant did not receive the notice mailed by the Department, it is not necessary for the trial court to charge on guilty knowledge; (2) where there is some evidence of failure of defendant to receive the notice or some other evidence sufficient to raise the issue, then the trial court must, in order to comply with G.S. 1-180 and apply the law to the evidence, instruct the jury that guilty knowledge by the defendant is necessary to convict; and (3) where all the evidence indicates that defendant had no notice or knowledge of the suspension or revocation of license, a nonsuit should be granted.\nSince in the case before us the defendant offered evidence that he did not receive notice and had no knowledge that his license had been suspended and the court did not charge the jury that it could find the defendant guilty only if he knew of the license suspension, we find error, and there must be a\nNew trial.\nJudges Vaughn and Martin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CLARK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray and Special Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin for the State.", "L. H. Wall for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALBERT FINLEY CHESTER\nNo. 7625SC141\n(Filed 21 July 1976)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 3\u2014 driving while license suspended \u2014 knowledge that license revoked \u2014 burden of proof\nWhile a specific intent is not an element of the offense of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while one\u2019s license is suspended or revoked, the burden is on the State to prove that defendant had knowledge at the time charged that his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked; the State satisfies this burden when, nothing else appearing, it has offered evidence of compliance with the notice requirements of G.S. 20-48 because of the presumption that he received notice and had such knowledge. However, when there is some evidence to rebut this presumption, the issue of guilty knowledge is raised and must be determined by the jury under appropriate instruction from the trial court.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 3\u2014 driving while license suspended \u2014 notice to defendant \u2014 proper jury instructions\nIn a prosecution for violation of G.S. 20-28 (a) where the evidence discloses that the Department of Motor Vehicles complied with the notice requirements of G.S. 20-48: (1) where there is no evidence that defendant did not receive the notice mailed by the Department, it is not necessary for the trial court to charge on guilty knowledge; (2) where there is some evidence of failure of defendant to receive the notice or some other evidence sufficient to raise the issue, then the trial court must, in order to comply with G.S. 1-180 and apply the law to the evidence, instruct the jury that guilty knowledge by the defendant is necessary to convict; and (3) where all the evidence indicates that defendant had no notice or knowledge of the suspension or revocation of license, a nonsuit should be granted.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 3\u2014 driving while license suspended \u2014 knowledge of defendant\u2014 improper jury instruction\nIn a prosecution of defendant for driving while his license was suspended where defendant offered evidence that he did not receive notice and had no knowledge that his license had been suspended, and the trial court did not charge the jury that it could find defendant guilty only if he knew of the license suspension, defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nAppeal by defendant from Baley, Judge. Judgment entered 29 October 1975, Superior Court, Caldwell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 May 1976.\nDefendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while his chauffeur license was suspended.\nEvidence for the State tends to show that on 20 May 1975 defendant\u2019s car was stopped by Trooper Owens because of a defective rear light. Defendant surrendered his operator\u2019s license and registration card. Trooper Owens wrote to the Department of Motor Vehicles and received a certified copy of defendant\u2019s driving record, which indicated that as of 29 March 1975 defendant\u2019s license was in a state of suspension. A letter from the Department entitled \u201cOrder of Security Requirement or Suspension\u201d was also introduced in evidence which was signed by a Department employee who verified that the letter was deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid to defendant\u2019s address as it appeared on the records of the Department on the date of mailing.\nDefendant offered evidence tending to show that he did not receive the letter, had moved to Tennessee where he turned in his North Carolina license, and received a Tennessee license. Defendant was found guilty and appealed from the judgment.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray and Special Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin for the State.\nL. H. Wall for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0224-01", "first_page_order": 252, "last_page_order": 256 }