{ "id": 8553849, "name": "MARY RUTH EVANS v. WARREN HARVEY STILES", "name_abbreviation": "Evans v. Stiles", "decision_date": "1976-08-04", "docket_number": "No. 7630SC274", "first_page": "317", "last_page": "322", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 N.C. App. 317" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "201 S.E. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551300 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571164 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E. 2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553465 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548916 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E. 2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 N.C. App. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550440 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/19/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575817 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565425 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566829 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0258-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 591, "char_count": 11158, "ocr_confidence": 0.671, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3479421000992722 }, "sha256": "942a921ed585f4e7cb87f8900c11d0a4a367ac92943e919d3a76307e51b89e86", "simhash": "1:5cf7c0f31c7f842e", "word_count": 1930 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Britt and Martin concur." ], "parties": [ "MARY RUTH EVANS v. WARREN HARVEY STILES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the denial of his motion for a directed verdict. At trial the plaintiff offered evidence tending to show the following:\nThe plaintiff, who worked at the Peachtree Products plant in Cherokee County, N. C., arrived for work at approximately 6:45 a.m. on 18 June 1974 to begin work on the 7:00 a.m. shift. She parked in the parking lot maintained for employees and visitors which was in front of the plant.\nThe vehicular access lane in the parking lot has directional arrows painted on the pavement which indicate the intended flow of traffic \u2014 one-way\u2014through the parking lot. There are marked parking spaces which slant in the direction of on-coming traffic to enable easier entrance from the access lane as you travel around the lot.\nAfter plaintiff parked, she had to walk through the parking lot in order to get to the plant. There were no marked passageways for pedestrians. Before crossing the lot, she waited at the rear of her car for two cars to pass, the second of which was the defendant\u2019s. She then looked to her left, the direction of oncoming traffic. Seeing no traffic, she began to cross. As she crossed, she spoke a greeting to a friend, then looked back to her right and saw defendant\u2019s car, being driven by his wife, Ruby Stiles, backing toward her. She then testified:\n\u201c [J] ust as I turned around, I spotted the car, and it was so close that I couldn\u2019t get from one side to the other side of the car, so I wheeled around, I jerked around, and my body backwards, to try to keep from being hit at the bottom, which I did throw my hands on the car to try to brace myself from being hurt or knocked down. * * *\n[B]y the time she stopped, it was against me.\u201d\nRuby Stiles testified, as plaintiff\u2019s witness, that she came into the parking lot and began to pull into a space. As she turned in she saw that the space was occupied by a small car, s\u00f3 she put the car in reverse and began to back out. She looked behind her but did not see plaintiff, although she had seen her as she passed by her while driving toward the parking space. Suddenly, Kathleen Elliot, who was riding with Mrs. Stiles, \u201chollered\u201d and Mrs. Stiles stopped. She then put the car in forward gear and proceeded on until she found a parking space.\nMrs. Elliott testified that she saw plaintiff as they came into the lot. Although she did not see her when Mrs. Stiles backed-up, she hollered because she knew plaintiff was behind the car. She also testified that Mrs. Stiles had not begun to pull into the space and that when she first stopped it had not been necessary for her to back-up in order to proceed forward in the parking lot.\nCiting Holloway v. Holloway, 262 N.C. 258, 136 S.E. 2d 559 (1964); Blake v. Mallard, 262 N.C. 62, 136 S.E. 2d 214 (1964); Rosser v. Smith, 260 N.C. 647, 133 S.E. 2d 499 (1963); Campbell v. Doby, 19 N.C. App. 94, 198 S.E. 2d 25 (1973); and Byrd v. Potts, 12 N.C. App. 262, 182 S.E. 2d 837 (1971), defendant contends the evidence in the present case discloses that plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout for motor vehicles using the access lane and that the failure on the part of the plaintiff was contributory negligence as a matter of law barring her claim. We do not agree. Each of the cited cases is distinguishable on its facts. In each of these cases, the plaintiff was attempting to cross a public highway where motor vehicles ordinarily travel in both directions. In the instant case, plaintiff was walking in one of the vehicular access lanes of a parking lot, where the traffic ordinarily moved in one direction, when she was injured as a result of defendant\u2019s automobile backing in a direction against the ordinary and usual flow of traffic in that particular lane. Whether the evidence disclosed that plaintiff was negligent in failing to see defendant\u2019s car as it backed toward her and whether such negligence was one of the proximate causes of her injuries was for the jury to determine. We cannot say that plaintiff\u2019s failure to see the defendant\u2019s car and avoid the injuries sustained was contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nCiting Taylor v. Boger, 27 N.C. App. 337, 219 S.E. 2d 290 (1975), reversed 289 N.C. 560, 223 S.E. 2d 350 (1976) and Ward v. Wentz, 20 N.C. App. 229, 201 S.E. 2d 194 (1973), defendant contends the court erred in allowing \u201cthe plaintiff to introduce into evidence the amount of the drug bill and the drug bill itself and the amount of the physician\u2019s bill and the bill itself without any evidence to the effect that medical attention she received was reasonably necessary for the treatment of injuries resulting from the incident of 18 June 1974, AND that the charges were reasonable in amount.\u201d In reversing the Court of Appeals decision in Taylor v. Boger, supra, the Supreme Court at 289 N.C. 560, 567, 223 S.E. 2d 350, 355 (1976), said:\n\u201cThe Court of Appeals sustained this ruling, stating:\n\u2018 . . . We find no error in the court\u2019s rulings. There is no evidence to show the necessity for plaintiff\u2019s treatment in Ohio (where she lived for awhile after the accident in North Carolina). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the medical expenses paid in Ohio were reasonable in amount.\u2019\nThe Court of Appeals relied on Ward v. Wentz, 20 N.C. App. 229, 201 S.E. 2d 194 (1973). Factually, that case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case, there was no evidence that plaintiff had been referred by any doctor in North Carolina to any doctor in Florida. Her testimony was as follows:\n\u2018 \u201c While I was in Florida, I did incur medical expenses for injuries sustained in the accident. The first doctor that I saw was Dr. Hilliard, and he charged me $50.00 and $62.00 that $112.00; the next doctor was Dr. Jackson and Dr. Annis, which together was $299.00, they are in the Watson Clinic. The next was Lakeland General Hospital for x-rays $65.00. The next was the physical therapist who charged $12.00 and $10.00, that\u2019s $22.00. Dr. Smith charged $12.00 for x-rays. Lee Memorial Hospital bill was $32.00. I bought prescription drugs while I was in Florida and paid approximately $80.00 for those ....\u201d\u2019\nThere was no showing of the need for such services or that these services were required by the injury which she had sustained in the accident involved in that case.\nIn the present case, Dr. Adams instructed plaintiff to consult an orthopedic surgeon in Ohio if she continued to have pain. Plaintiff then testified that she did see the orthopedic surgeon in Ohio suggested by Dr. Adams, and would have testified, if allowed to do so, that he treated her for the same injury for which Dr. Adams had treated her. She would have further outlined the treatment given her and the amount of the bills incurred for such treatment. Dr. Adams testified that on plaintiff\u2019s return to North Carolina, he treated her for the same injuries for which he had treated her prior to the time she went to Ohio. These facts clearly distinguish this'case from Ward v. Wentz, supra.\u201d\nWe find the facts in the present case, likewise, distinguishable from the facts in the Wentz case.\nPlaintiff testified that after the incident in the parking lot, she went to work but had to leave early because of the \u201cpain.\u201d That afternoon she went to see Dr. Tanksley. His office was full, however; so he directed her to go to the hospital emergency room, which she did. She was admitted to the hospital and stayed four days under the care of Dr. Tanksley. After being discharged, she was still in pain; so she remained in bed except to go see Dr. Tanksley. She was hospitalized again in July for \u201cserious pain in [her] back, about [her] rib cage, up, and [her] neck and head,\u201d and remained there for fourteen days. She remained out of work until 8 October 1974. During the period of time from 18 June until the time of trial, she has continued to see Dr. Tanksley and has taken medication for the pain.\nPlaintiff then introduced her medical bills and a record of her drug charges showing hospital expenses of $457.25 and $1,535.55 and drug expenses of $678.65. Plaintiff also introduced a deposition of Dr. Tanksley wherein he testified that her pain and injuries \u201ccould very well\u201d have been caused \u201cby the jerking and twisting of her body in response to defendant\u2019s car.\u201d He also testified that in his opinion the hospitalization, office visits, and treatment he administered were necessary for treating the plaintiff\u2019s condition.\nWe think the evidence here clearly discloses that the hospital and drug bills incurred by plaintiff and introduced into evidence were reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injuries she sustained as a result of the defendant\u2019s negligence. Taylor v. Boger, supra.\nIn the trial in the superior court, we find\nNo error.\nJudges Britt and Martin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jones, Jones and Key by James U. Downs for plaintiff ap-pellee.", "Morris, Golding, Blue and Phillips by William C. Morris, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARY RUTH EVANS v. WARREN HARVEY STILES\nNo. 7630SC274\n(Filed 4 August 1976)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 83\u2014 pedestrian in parking lot \u2014 failure to see backing car \u2014 contributory negligence\nPlaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to see defendant\u2019s car as it backed toward her in a parking lot in a direction against the ordinary and usual flow of traffic for the particular lane.\n2. Evidence \u00a7 44; Damages \u00a7 13\u2014 necessity for medical treatment \u2014 admissibility of medical bills\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence was sufficient to show that hospital and drug bills she incurred were reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injuries she sustained as a result of defendant\u2019s negligence, and such bills were properly admitted in evidence.\nAppeal by defendant from Thornburg, Judge. Judgment entered 6 November 1975 in Superior Court, Cherokee County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 June 1976.\nThis is a civil action wherein the plaintiff, Mary Ruth Evans, is seeking damages from the defendant, Warren Harvey Stiles, allegedly resulting from injuries incurred when plaintiff was struck by an automobile owned by defendant and driven by defendant\u2019s wife, Ruby Stiles.\nAt the close of plaintiff\u2019s evidence, the defendant made a motion for directed verdict on the grounds, among other things, that \u201cthe evidence of the plaintiff, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, discloses contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff as a matter of law.\u201d The motion was denied and the following issues were submitted to and answered by the jury as indicated:\n\u201c1. Was Ruby Lee Stiles the agent of the defendant and acting in the course and scope of her agency at the time complained of in plaintiff\u2019s complaint?\nAnswer: Yes.\n2. Was the plaintiff injured and damaged by the negligence of Ruby Lee Stiles as alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint?\nAnswer: Yes.\n3. If so, did the plaintiff, by her own negligence, contribute to her own injuries and damages as alleged in defendant\u2019s answer?\nAnswer: No.\n4. What amount, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant?\nAnswer : $5,000.00.\u201d\nFrom a judgment entered on the verdict, defendant appealed.\nJones, Jones and Key by James U. Downs for plaintiff ap-pellee.\nMorris, Golding, Blue and Phillips by William C. Morris, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0317-01", "first_page_order": 345, "last_page_order": 350 }