{
  "id": 8554242,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONEY LEE JOHNSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Johnson",
  "decision_date": "1976-08-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 7610SC87",
  "first_page": "376",
  "last_page": "379",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "30 N.C. App. 376"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "139 S.E. 608",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1927,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "194 N.C. 336",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1927,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/nc/194/0336-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "209 S.E. 2d 531",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1974,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "23 N.C. App. 723",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8554006
      ],
      "year": 1974,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/23/0723-01"
      ]
    }
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Britt and Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONEY LEE JOHNSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BROCK, Chief Judge.\nBefore trial defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars, which reads in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201c1. That the defendant cannot adequately prepare or conduct his defense without the following information:\n\u201ca. State with particularity the exact circumstances which the State contends constitute the alleged \u2018malice aforethought\u2019 of the defendant.\n\u201cb. State with particularity and in detail the exact circumstances and manner in which the State contends the defendant killed the deceased.\u201d\nIn our view the motion requested far more than what a defendant is rightfully entitled to have. An accused is not entitled to an order requiring the State to recite matters of evidence in a bill of particulars. G.S. 15A-925(c). The purpose of a bill of particulars is to give an accused notice of the specific charge or charges against him and to apprise him of the particular transactions which are to be brought in question on the trial. State v. Conner, 23 N.C. App. 723, 209 S.E. 2d 531 (1974); State v. Wadford, 194 N.C. 336, 139 S.E. 608 (1927).\nIn the present case the defendant sought to have the State choose between offering defendant\u2019s confession wherein he stated that upon being struck a blow by deceased, he drew his pistol and fired; and offering the testimony of the State\u2019s eyewitnesses to the effect that after a fight with deceased, defendant obtained a pistol from his automobile and returned to the building, where he shot deceased. Clearly these were discrepancies in the State\u2019s evidence, as there generally are, but they were for the jury to resolve. An accused is not entitled to require the State to resolve these discrepancies in advance by a bill of particulars. Nor is an accused entitled to require the State to elect, by a bill of particulars, which witness\u2019s version of the events it will present.\nThe bill of particulars filed by the State in this case reads as follows:\n\u201cOn the date alleged in the indictment the defendant took a gun from his car or his pocket. Notwithstanding the discouragement of those around him, he pointed the gun at the decedent and pulled the trigger. The gun discharged and the bullet propelled thereby entered the decedent\u2019s heart and fatally wounded him.\u201d\nThe foregoing bill furnished to the defendant all and more than that to which he was entitled, particularly with respect to the first sentence. Defendant was not entitled to have the State specify the precise place from where defendant obtained or produced the pistol with which he shot the deceased. Such specification constitutes a recitation of matters of evidence. Defendant\u2019s arguments regarding the insufficiency of the bill of particulars are without merit and are overruled.\nDefendant argues that the trial court committed error in permitting the State to offer defendant\u2019s confession of the shooting because the confession conflicted with the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses and constituted impeachment by the State of its own witnesses. The State\u2019s eyewitness version was that defendant left the building, secured the pistol from the trunk of his car, returned to the building, and fired the fatal shot, notwithstanding the fact that defendant\u2019s brother tried to restrain defendant. Defendant\u2019s confession presented the version that deceased struck defendant, and defendant drew the pistol from his pocket and fired in self-defense. Obviously this does not constitute impeachment by the State of its own witnesses. It is merely a variation in the versions of how the shooting took place. The discrepency was for the jury to resolve. In any event the offering of defendant\u2019s confession was beneficial to defendant because it placed before the jury a possible justification for the shooting. Apparently it had some beneficial effect on the jury because the verdict was second degree murder instead of first degree. We find no merit in this argument.\nDefendant argues that the district attorney\u2019s remarks to the jury were improper. If so, the trial judge promptly and clearly remonstrated with the district attorney and properly instructed the jury. Defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error are related to the court\u2019s instructions to the jury. We have reviewed these and find no prejudicial error. Considered as a whole, the instructions fairly present the case to the jury under applicable principles of law. In our opinion defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Britt and Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BROCK, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Jack Cozort, for the State.",
      "Manning, Fulton & Skinner, by Howard E. Manning, Jr., for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONEY LEE JOHNSON\nNo. 7610SC87\n(Filed 4 August 1976)\n1. Indictment and Warrant \u00a7 13\u2014 bill of particulars \u2014 choice by State between different versions of shooting\nDefendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars by which the State would be required to choose between offering defendant\u2019s version of the shooting as contained in his confession and a different version of the shooting by two eyewitnesses since an accused is not entitled to have discrepancies in the State\u2019s evidence resolved by a bill of particulars.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 75, 90\u2014 confession \u2014 no impeachment of State\u2019s own witnesses\nThe State\u2019s offer of defendant\u2019s confession which conflicted with testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses did not constitute impeachment by the State of its own witnesses; furthermore, defendant was not prejudiced by admission of the confession since it placed before the jury a possible justification for the shooting for which defendant was being tried.\nAppeal by defendant from Hobgood, Judge. Judgment entered 15 October 1975 in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 1976.\nDefendant was charged in a bill of indictment with the murder of Jesse Ronzie Cooper.\nThe State\u2019s evidence, through the State\u2019s two eyewitnesses, tended to show that an argument developed between defendant and deceased during, or as the result of, a poker game. Defendant and deceased engaged in a scuffle and fisticuffs. Defendant then went outside to his automobile and removed a pistol from its trunk. As defendant started back towards the building, his brother tried to hold him. Despite his brother\u2019s efforts to stop him, defendant fired two shots from the pistol, one of which struck deceased in the heart and fatally wounded him.\nThe State\u2019s evidence, through defendant\u2019s confession, tended to show that an argument developed between defendant and deceased as the result of a poker game. Deceased hit defendant with his fist, and defendant drew his pistol from his pocket. Defendant fired twice at deceased\u2019s legs. Defendant did not intend to kill deceased.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Jack Cozort, for the State.\nManning, Fulton & Skinner, by Howard E. Manning, Jr., for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0376-01",
  "first_page_order": 404,
  "last_page_order": 407
}