{
  "id": 8554425,
  "name": "REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF DURHAM v. MARGARET G. HOLMAN (Widow); MADGE T. HARGRAVES (Widow); City of Durham; and County of Durham",
  "name_abbreviation": "Redevelopment Commission of Durham v. Holman",
  "decision_date": "1976-08-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 7514SC942",
  "first_page": "395",
  "last_page": "398",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "30 N.C. App. 395"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "69 S.E. 627",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1910,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "153 N.C. 567",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        11273321
      ],
      "year": 1910,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/153/0567-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "103 S.E. 2d 357",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1958,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "362"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "248 N.C. 249",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8621954
      ],
      "year": 1958,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/248/0249-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "118 S.E. 834",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.",
      "year": 1923,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "186 N.C. 26",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8652606
      ],
      "year": 1923,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/186/0026-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "136 S.E. 2d 38",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "261 N.C. 730",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8575404
      ],
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/261/0730-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 327,
    "char_count": 5606,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.659,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.1747789170547927e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8641530838284395
    },
    "sha256": "f869cb816b7a46c155e63a7d30002740d3381ebc8a4a7a4700f5e552b3c644de",
    "simhash": "1:bbe665f57d060c94",
    "word_count": 937
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Vaughn concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF DURHAM v. MARGARET G. HOLMAN (Widow); MADGE T. HARGRAVES (Widow); City of Durham; and County of Durham"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nPetitioner contends that the trial court erred in allowing respondents\u2019 motion for a remittitur and refusing to grant the petitioner\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nWhile it is generally stated that the judgment should follow the verdict, Bethea v. Kenly, 261 N.C. 730, 136 S.E. 2d 38 (1964), the court has the power to reduce the verdict of its own motion so long as the party in whose favor it was rendered does not object. Cohoon v. Cooper, 186 N.C. 26, 118 S.E. 834 (1923). See Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E. 2d 357 (1958). This practice of remittitur with the successful party\u2019s consent, as in the case here, has been followed for many years by the courts in this State, and under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59, the practice is still permissible in our courts. 2 McIntosh, North Carolina Practice and Procedure 2d (Phillip\u2019s Supp. \u00a7 1596, p. 58). See 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, \u00a7 2815, pp. 99-100. Concerning contentions that this practice denies petitioner his constitutional right to a trial by jury, it would appear that such procedure does not so deprive him, \u201cbecause he will pay less under such procedure than the amount which a jury awarded by its verdict against him, and he will pay no more than a reasonable jury might award against him.\u201d Caudle v. Swanson, supra, at 256, 103 S.E. 2d at 362.\nAs to the argument that the verdict in the amount of $59,471.00 exceeded a sum supported by competent evidence, we note that while the verdict in the instant case exceeded competent evidence, the judgment is based on competent evidence. The voluntary reduction of respondents\u2019 recoveries as established by the judgment was not prejudicial to petitioner. Further, in Harvey v. R. R., 153 N.C. 567, 69 S.E. 627 (1910), the majority stated that when a jury\u2019s verdict exceeds the evidence, the decision to grant a new trial is in the discretion of the trial judge, and the appellate court will review the trial judge only if it appears he grossly abused his discretion. Here there is nothing to indicate that the judge abused his discretion.\nWe conclude that in this particular case, where the judgment was supported by competent evidence and was in accordance with the amount a reasonable jury might award, and there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, the court was correct in allowing respondents\u2019 motion for a remit-titur and refusing petitioner\u2019s motion for a new trial. Therefore, the judgment appealed from is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Vaughn concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Edwards and M-cmson, by Daniel K. Edwards, for petitioner.",
      "Eugene C. Brooks III and Richa/rd N. Watson, for respondents."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF DURHAM v. MARGARET G. HOLMAN (Widow); MADGE T. HARGRAVES (Widow); City of Durham; and County of Durham\nNo. 7514SC942\n(Filed 4 August 1976)\n1. Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 59\u2014 reduction in verdict \u2014 agreement by successful party\nThough the judgment should generally follow the verdict, the court has the power to reduce the verdict of its own motion so long as the party in whose favor it was rendered does not object.\n2. Eminent Domain \u00a7 14; Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 59\u2014 condemnation proceeding \u2014 verdict reduced by trial court \u2014 no error\nIn a condemnation proceeding where the jury awarded respondents $59,471 but the respondents agreed to a remittitur to $58,000 and judgment was entered for that amount, the judgment was supported by competent evidence and was in accordance with the amount a reasonable jury might award; there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the judge; and the court was correct in allowing respondents\u2019 motion for a remittitur and refusing petitioner\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nAppeal by Redevelopment Commission of the City of Durham from Braswell, Judge. Judgment entered 10 July 1975. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 March 1976.\nThis is a condemnation proceeding whereby petitioner, Redevelopment Commission of the City of Durham, seeks to acquire land of respondents, Margaret G. Holman and Madge T. Hargraves, in order that petitioner can carry out the Redevelopment Plan for an area of Durham. Petitioner filed the condemnation petition to condemn land located at 408 and 410 Fowler Avenue and 405 and 407 Piedmont Avenue in the City of Durham on 11 July 1974 and respondents answered, requesting they be awarded the fair market value of the property. At the pre-trial conference on 3 June 1975 the parties stipulated that the contested issue to be tried by the jury was the amount of the fair market value of the property on 11 July 1974, the date of the \u201ctaking\u201d of respondents\u2019 property.\nAt the trial, respondents presented competent evidence showing the fair market value of the property to be $58,000.00. Petitioner offered evidence that the fair market value as of 11 July 1974 was $30,560.00. Petitioner\u2019s witness further testified that the total replacement cost of the four dwellings as of 11 July totalled $59,471.00 before discounting for depreciation. More specifically, the witness stated that the cost of replacing the four houses on the respective lots would total $59,471.00, and with depreciation factor, would indicate a value for the property of $31,250.00.\nThe jury awarded respondents $59,471.00. The judge found that there was no evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict and that he would set the verdict aside unless respondents agreed to a remittitur to $58,000.00. Respondents so agreed, petitioner\u2019s motion to set the verdict aside and have a new trial was denied, and judgment was entered for respondents in the amount of $58,000.00. Petitioner appealed.\nEdwards and M-cmson, by Daniel K. Edwards, for petitioner.\nEugene C. Brooks III and Richa/rd N. Watson, for respondents."
  },
  "file_name": "0395-01",
  "first_page_order": 423,
  "last_page_order": 426
}