{ "id": 8554550, "name": "IN RE: MARY ALBERTA HATLEY", "name_abbreviation": "In re Hatley", "decision_date": "1976-08-18", "docket_number": "No. 7515DC762", "first_page": "413", "last_page": "420", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 N.C. App. 413" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.C. App. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554406 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/25/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615534 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 F. 2d 964", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2117209, 3580638 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/406/0964-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 F. 2d 1095", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2166098 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/418/1095-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 563", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9560 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "especially concurring opinion of Burger, C.J." }, { "parenthetical": "especially concurring opinion of Burger, C.J." }, { "parenthetical": "especially concurring opinion of Burger, C.J." }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 A.L.R. 2d 570", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "especially concurring opinion of Burger, C.J." } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 712, "char_count": 14238, "ocr_confidence": 0.64, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.39453690157225385 }, "sha256": "98c2fbcfefd4b39d4d921f77bc95f5af4ade8ed67346ab45502fff0b4db00262", "simhash": "1:5f4c3347ce878830", "word_count": 2285 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Brock concurs.", "Judge Morris dissents." ], "parties": [ "IN RE: MARY ALBERTA HATLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRITT, Judge.\nG.S. 122-58.7(i) provides:\n\u201cTo support a commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and imminently dangerous to himself or others. The court shall record the facts which support its findings.\u201d\nPrerequisite to a valid commitment the quoted statute mandates that the district court make two distinct findings: (1) that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate as those terms are defined in G.S. 122-36, and (2) that the respondent is \u201cimminently dangerous to himself or others.\u201d In re Carter, 25 N.C. App. 442, 213 S.E. 2d 409 (1975).\nIn the case at hand, the district court found and concluded that respondent was mentally ill and there is no exception to that finding and conclusion. Respondent\u2019s only exception is to the finding that she was imminently dangerous to others \u201cwithout there being any evidence that there was a recent overt act, attempt or threat.\u201d\nThe district court\u2019s finding No. 7 is as follows:\n\u201c7. That based on the evidence the Court finds that the respondent is imminently dangerous to herself in that she was driving in a careless and reckless manner such that the lives of persons with whom she came in contact might or could be endangered and in that she entered a house at a time when that house was not physically present [sic] by that neighbor who usually occupied the house.\u201d\nIn her testimony, after stating that respondent was born in 1943 and had been treated in mental institutions on several occasions, respondent\u2019s mother testified that \u201c . . . [s] he could be a danger in that when she is driving a car in the condition that she is currently in, she may operate the car as in a way to endanger others on the road. And she has been driving her car recently.\u201d On cross-examination she testified that respondent drove carelessly and dangerously in that when \u201cbacking up\u201d she would not look over her shoulder as she should and would \u201cback up\u201d too fast. She further testified that when driving respondent would not \u201cmake the proper sign.\u201d\nWe think the court\u2019s finding, however inartfully stated, that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself and others was adequately supported by the evidence relating to her driving an automobile. Needless to say, an automobile driven by an incompetent driver can be a lethal instrumentality, a real danger to the driver and other people on the highway.\nRespondent insists that to be valid a finding that one is imminently dangerous to herself or others must be based on evidence showing a recent overt act, attempt or threat and that such evidence was lacking in this case. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent\u2019s argument is correct, we think there was evidence of an overt act, namely, the improper operation of an automobile.\nIt will be noted that respondent does not challenge the determination that she was mentally ill. It could be persuasively argued that the mere operation of an automobile on a public highway by a mentally ill person constitutes an overt act imminently dangerous to the driver and others. Here, the evidence not only showed that respondent was driving her car but that she was driving carelessly and dangerously.\nThe judgment is\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge Brock concurs.\nJudge Morris dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRITT, Judge." }, { "text": "Judge Morris\ndissenting.\nRespondent, involuntarily committed to a State mental institution, contends that the District Court, proceeding without benefit of clear, cogent and convincing evidence, erred in entering its commitment order. I am constrained to agree.\nThere is no question that civil commitment is a drastic and critical intervention by the State into the private affairs of its citizenry. See: Livermore, et al, \u201cOn the Justifications for Civil Commitment,\u201d 117 U. Pa. Law Rev. 75-96 (1968). Consequently, our Legislature carefully limited the scope and range of behavior appropriate for involuntary commitment and provided at the outset of Chapter 122, Article 5A of our General Statutes \u201c . . . that no person shall be committed . . . unless he is mentally ill or an inebriate and imminently dangerous to himself or others; that a commitment will be accomplished under conditions that protect the dignity and constitutional rights of the person; and that committed persons will be discharged as soon as a less restrictive mode of treatment is appropriate.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) G.S. 122-58.1.\nThe Legislature further provided that judicial commitment orders must be supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Without such evidence, and the requisite supporting findings of fact, no commitment can lawfully issue. See: G.S. 122-58.7 (i).\nFinally, the General Assembly, amplifying on this basic process, defined the fundamentally important terms:\n\u201c\u00a7 122-58.2 Definitions. \u2014 As used in this Article: (1) The phrase \u2018dangerous to himself\u2019 includes, but is not limited to, those mentally ill or inebriate persons who are unable to provide for their basic needs for food, clothing, or shelter; (2) The words \u2018inebriety\u2019 and \u2018mental illness\u2019 have the same meaning as they are given in G.S. 122-36 ...\u201d\n\u201c\u00a7 122-36. Definitions.\u2014 . . .\n(d) The words \u2018mental illness\u2019 shall mean an illness which so lessens the capacity of the person to use his customary self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs, and social relations as to mate it necessary or advisable for him to be under treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control. The words \u2018mentally ill\u2019 shall mean a person with a mental illness.\u201d\nG.S. 122-58.7(i) provides that \u201c[t]o support a commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate and imminently dangerous to himself or others. The court shall record the facts which support its findings.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.)\nIn view of these overriding statutory guidelines, I am of the opinion that the District Court\u2019s commitment order must be vacated. There is no question but that respondent experienced mental illness in the past and that the mental condition adversely affected both respondent\u2019s life and the lives of those individuals personally involved with the respondent. Arguably, respondent may have exhibited certain signs of mental illness at the time of the District Court hearing. However, in my opinion there is not sufficient clear, cogent and convincing evidence indicating that respondent was either mentally ill or imminently dangerous. More specifically, this record is devoid of any evidence either showing or tending to show that respondent was unable to provide for her own needs. Respondent\u2019s perception of reality and her overall conception of her situation in life may have been, and may still be, burdened by psychologically-based infirmities, but this unfortunate condition did not warrant a finding that she was dangerous to herself or others.\nAs indicated above, the critical problem in this case is not related to the question of mental illness, but to the more intangible question of whether respondent is in fact \u201cdangerous\u201d to herself or others, within the meaning of the statute.\nI am aware of the considerable criticism leveled against the \u201cdangerous\u201d standard and the various suggestions for reform that have been advanced in recent years. See: Livermore, et al, supra; Peszke, \u201cIs Dangerousness an Issue for Physicians in Emergency Commitments?\u201d American Journal of Psychiatry, 132:8 pp. 825-828 and Comment by Stone at pp. 829-832 (Aug. 1975); Dershowitz, \u201cPsychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways.\u201d 4 Trial 29-33, (Feb.-March 1968). However, notwithstanding this criticism, it appears that the \u201cdangerous\u201d standard has been and continues to be an essential element in the commitment process. See: Brakel and Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (Revised ed. 1971) ; 92 A.L.R. 2d 570, \u201cRight, Without Judicial Proceeding to Arrest and Detain One Who is, or is Suspected of Being, Mentally Deranged\u201d; 44 C.J.S., Insane Persons, \u00a7\u00a7 64 et seq. Also see O\u2019Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 45 L.Ed. 2d 396, 95 S.Ct. 2486 (1975) (especially concurring opinion of Burger, C.J.); Cross v. Harris, 418 F. 2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Millard v. Harris, 406 F. 2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).\nCertainly \u201cdangerousness\u201d is, as the critics suggest, potentially an imprecise measurement of human behavior. To clarify its meaning and to retain its validity as a measuring device, the courts must consider the issue of dangerousness on a case-by-case basis with special emphasis on the likelihood of harm. As one court has stated:\n\u201c . . . [T]he State must balance the curtailment of liberty against the danger of harm to the individual or others. The paramount factor is the interest of society which naturally includes the interest of the patient in not being subjected to unjustified confinement. . . . [T]he \u2018science\u2019 of predicting future dangerous behavior is inexact, and certainly is not infallible. . . . [T]he mere establishment of a mental problem is not an adequate basis upon which to confine a person who has never harmed or attempted to harm either himself or another. However, we are of the opinion that a decision to commit based upon a medical opinion which clearly states that a person is reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct, and which is based upon the experience and studies of qualified psychiatrists, is a determination which properly can be made by the State.\u201d People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E. 2d 733, 739 (1974). (Emphasis supplied.)\nIn short, the State must balance its duty to protect its citizens from harm against the right of any one person to be free from restraint and interference barring conviction of the commission of a crime. This balance, however, should tilt in favor of involuntary commitment when it can be shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the mentally ill or inebriate respondent is incapable of \u201c . . . surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.\u201d O\u2019Connor v. Donaldson, 45 L.Ed. 2d, at 407. Underlying this entire process is the humanistic consideration that both the individual respondent and society would be better off if a commitment order would issue.\nThis is obviously a situation where respondent\u2019s family would be more comfortable if respondent were institutionalized. However, the evidence that \u201cshe could be a danger in that when she is driving a car in the condition that she is currently in, she may operate the car in a way to endanger others on the road, and she has been driving her car recently\u201d is not the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence required by the statute. Nor does the evidence elicited on cross-examination that respondent drove carelessly and dangerously in that when \u201cbacking up\u201d she would not look over her shoulder as she should and would \u201cback up\u201d too fast, or would not \u201cmake the proper sign,\u201d measure up to the required standard. If this type of evidence were sufficient to support a finding that a respondent is imminently dangerous to herself or others, I fear many of us sometimes engage in conduct which would support such a finding if commitment proceedings were begun. While I sympathize with the family and friends and neighbors of persons whose erratic behavior creates real problems in the home and community, I do not interpret the statute, as written, as affording the relief sought in this situation. I do not think the evidence is sufficient to support a finding or conclusion that respondent is imminently dangerous to herself or others.\nI would vote to vacate the judgment.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judge Morris" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Isaac T. Avery III, for the State.", "Jerry P. Davenport for respondent appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE: MARY ALBERTA HATLEY\nNo. 7515DC762\n(Filed 18 August 1976)\n1. Insane Persons \u00a7 1\u2014 involuntary commitment \u2014 required findings\nPrerequisite to a valid involuntary commitment to a mental health care facility, G.S. 122-68.7 (i) mandates that the district court make two distinct findings: (1) that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate as those terms are defined in G.S. 122-86, and (2) that the respondent is imminently dangerous to himself or others.\n2. Insane Persons \u00a7 1\u2014 careless and reckless driving \u2014 respondent imminently dangerous to herself or others\nEvidence that respondent drove her car carelessly and recklessly was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s determination that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others.\nJudge Morris dissenting.\nAppeal by respondent from Paschal, Judge. Judgment entered 4 August 1975 in District Court, Orange County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 January 1976.\nThis is a proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental health facility pursuant to Ch. 122, Article 5A, of the General Statutes.\nOn 25 July 1975 respondent\u2019s mother submitted a sworn petition alleging that her daughter, Mary Alberta Hatley, was mentally ill and imminently dangerous to herself or others. She based her opinion on respondent\u2019s erratic behavior, her threatening a relative with a brick, driving an automobile carelessly and recklessly, her inability at times to communicate with others, her failure to react normally in \u201ccaring for herself,\u201d and being \u201cout of contact with reality.\u201d\nA magistrate ordered that respondent be taken into custody for purpose of being examined by a qualified physician. Pursuant to the order, respondent was examined by Dr. Tom Wilson, a physician at North Carolina Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill. He concluded that respondent was mentally ill and imminently dangerous to herself or others and recommended that she be committed to John Umstead Hospital.\nAt Umstead Hospital, respondent was examined by Dr. M. Elmaghraby, a physician, who confirmed Dr. Wilson\u2019s opinion and recommended that she be hospitalized for medication and rehabilitation.\nOn 4 August 1975 a hearing was held on the petition in district court. After receiving evidence from the petitioner, (the respondent offering no evidence) and considering the medical reports, the court made findings of fact and ordered that respondent be committed to Umstead Hospital for a period not to exceed 90 days.\nRespondent appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Isaac T. Avery III, for the State.\nJerry P. Davenport for respondent appellant." }, "file_name": "0413-01", "first_page_order": 441, "last_page_order": 448 }