{ "id": 8555183, "name": "EXECUTIVE LEASING ASSOCIATES, INC. v. BILL I. ROWLAND and SYLVIA ROWLAND, Individually and t/a CAPITAL SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, and ROWLAND TRUCKING AND GRADING COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Executive Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Rowland", "decision_date": "1976-09-01", "docket_number": "No. 7610SC7", "first_page": "590", "last_page": "593", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 N.C. App. 590" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572119 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E. 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269524 ], "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E. 2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631119 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E. 2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563251 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 N.C. App. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555347 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/4/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571713, 8571746, 8571572, 8571606, 8571643 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0619-04", "/nc/279/0619-05", "/nc/279/0619-01", "/nc/279/0619-02", "/nc/279/0619-03" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549421 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572831 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0513-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 439, "char_count": 8251, "ocr_confidence": 0.677, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8577089137242763e-07, "percentile": 0.7244217713079025 }, "sha256": "1f688b8afb10ca244478960b33e9a8f695bf3e821c900e8d3cb19be7b66e7318", "simhash": "1:9f4e5de66b72af4d", "word_count": 1345 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:42:34.327987+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "EXECUTIVE LEASING ASSOCIATES, INC. v. BILL I. ROWLAND and SYLVIA ROWLAND, Individually and t/a CAPITAL SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, and ROWLAND TRUCKING AND GRADING COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CLARK, Judge.\nThe issue presented upon appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nG.S. 1A-1, Rule 56 provides for a summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\nSummary judgment is a drastic remedy, and its requirements must be carefully observed in order that no person be deprived of a trial on a genuinely disputed issue. The party moving for a summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of a triable issue of material fact by the record properly before the court. This is so irrespective of the burden of proof at trial upon the issues raised in the pleadings. The movant\u2019s papers are carefully scrutinized while those of the opposing party are indulgently regarded. Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E. 2d 897 (1972); Miller v. Snipes, 12 N.C. App. 342, 183 S.E. 2d 270 (1971), cert. denied 279 N.C. 619, 184 S.E. 2d 883 (1971).\nThe trial court held as a matter of law that there was no contract between the parties because there had been no acceptance of defendants\u2019 offer. An acceptance is an essential element of a contract because it manifests the offeree\u2019s intent to be bound by the terms of the offer. Intention is the key element. A written signature is not the exclusive means of signifying acceptance. Acceptance, unless otherwise specified, may be communicated by any means sufficient to manifest intent. This may include a signature, silence, or conduct. Foundation, Inc. v. Basnight, 4 N.C. App. 652, 167 S.E. 2d 486 (1969).\nThe burden on the party moving for summary judgment may be carried by proving that an essential element of the opposing party\u2019s claim is non-existent. Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E. 2d 795 (1974). Defendants here have contended that there was no acceptance of their offers as a matter of law. This contention cannot be sustained for two reasons.\nThe evidence before the trial court presented two modes of acceptance sufficient to deny defendants\u2019 motion. First, the copies of the lease forms attached to the complaint and to plaintiff\u2019s request for admissions show an entry of date of approval, which may constitute an acceptance by signature. Defendants point out that there was no evidence that plaintiff made the entry, but at the least, this raises a genuine issue of material fact.\nSecond, it is clear from the record that on the date of their answer and at times prior thereto, defendants were in possession of the equipment referred to in the eight lease offers. The conduct of the plaintiff in delivering to defendants the equipment which was the subject of the leases and in permitting defendants to use the same over an extended period may constitute acceptance of the lease offers. Acceptance by conduct is a well-recognized principle in North Carolina law. Durant v. Powell, 215 N.C. 628, 2 S.E. 2d 884 (1939); May v. Menzies, 184 N.C. 150, 113 S.E. 593 (1922). See also Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E. 2d 161 (1972). While such conduct may not amount to an acceptance as a matter of law, it is certainly sufficent to make improvident any ruling that there has been no acceptance as a matter of law.\nA third possible mode of acceptance is by signature of plaintiff or an authorized agent of plaintiff. The record upon appeal is unclear as to whether any genuine issue exists with respect to signatures on the original copies of the lease forms. Plaintiff may be able to clarify this issue upon remand. At any rate, such a finding is not essential to our disposition of the case.\nWe hold that summary judgment was improvidently granted.\nThe judgment is reversed.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CLARK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hatch, Little, Bunn, Jones, Few & Berry by John N. McClain, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.", "Purring ton, Hatch & Purrington by Ashmead P. Pipkin for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EXECUTIVE LEASING ASSOCIATES, INC. v. BILL I. ROWLAND and SYLVIA ROWLAND, Individually and t/a CAPITAL SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, and ROWLAND TRUCKING AND GRADING COMPANY\nNo. 7610SC7\n(Filed 1 September 1976)\n1. Contracts \u00a7 2\u2014 acceptance \u2014 methods of expressing\nAn acceptance is an essential element of a contract because it manifests the offeree\u2019s intent to be bound by the terms of the offer, and acceptance, unless otherwise specified, may be communicated by any means sufficient to manifest intent, including by signature, silence or conduct.\n2. Contracts \u00a7 27\u2014 offers to lease heavy equipment \u2014 acceptance of offers \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn an action to recover money and the possession of heavy equipment leased to defendants by plaintiff, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that defendants\u2019 written offers to lease equipment had never been accepted by plaintiff, as plaintiff had never signed the forms, and therefore plaintiff could not recover under the written lease forms, since the evidence before the trial court presented two methods of acceptance sufficient to withstand defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion: (1) the copies of the lease forms attached to the complaint showed an entry of date of approval, which could constitute an acceptance by signature, and (2) the conduct of plaintiff in delivering to defendants the equipment which was the subject of the leases and in permitting defendants to use the same over an extended period of time could constitute acceptance of the lease offers.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Smith, Judge. Order entered 24 September 1975, Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 1976.\nPlaintiff, a North Carolina corporation engaged in the business of leasing heavy equipment, alleged that on eight occasions between 27 February 1973 and 22 March 1974 defendants executed and delivered to plaintiff lease agreements for various items of equipment; that defendants had defaulted in payment of rent; that plaintiff was entitled to possession of the equipment and to the principal sum of $182,618.19, attorney\u2019s fees of $27,392.73, and costs of $18,100.00.\nDefendants admitted that they had offered to lease the equipment, but contended that the lease forms required written acceptance by the plaintiff, and that as the unsigned copies attached to plaintiff\u2019s complaint showed, there had been no acceptance. In their answer defendants also revoked the eight offers to lease and delivered constructive possession of all equipment to plaintiff\u2019s attorney.\nPlaintiff then filed several requests for admission, attaching copies of the lease agreements which defendants had signed. Plaintiff had not signed the copies, hut there were entries beside the words \u201cDate Approved.\u201d Defendants admitted the delivery and execution of the lease forms supplied by plaintiff and the genuineness of the defendants\u2019 signatures thereon, but denied that such forms constituted agreements because plaintiff had not signified acceptance.\nPlaintiff then moved for summary judgment under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56. Plaintiff stated that the original copies of the agreements had been signed by a duly authorized agent of plaintiff, and that the originals would be introduced at the hearing upon the motion.\nDefendants\u2019 response alleged upon information and belief that the signatures were not affixed until after the filing of plaintiff\u2019s answer, and therefore were without legal effect. At the same time, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c) upon the grounds that plaintiff\u2019s evidence failed to establish the existence of an agreement between plaintiff and defendants; to-wit, that the signature of an authorized agent of plaintiff was the only valid method to accept defendants\u2019 offers, and that defendants had revoked the offers before any such acceptance. Defendant Bill Rowland submitted an affidavit in support of the motion, and pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12 (c), the court treated the motion as one for summary judgment under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c). The trial court concluded as a matter of law that defendants\u2019 written offers to lease equipment had never been accepted by plaintiff and therefore plaintiff could not recover under the written lease forms.\nPlaintiff appeals from the summary judgment.\nHatch, Little, Bunn, Jones, Few & Berry by John N. McClain, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nPurring ton, Hatch & Purrington by Ashmead P. Pipkin for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0590-01", "first_page_order": 618, "last_page_order": 621 }