{ "id": 8549362, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE FREEMAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Freeman", "decision_date": "1976-11-03", "docket_number": "No. 7622SC313", "first_page": "335", "last_page": "340", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "31 N.C. App. 335" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573594 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561810 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559994 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 573, "char_count": 12678, "ocr_confidence": 0.684, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.665651525889828e-08, "percentile": 0.4059138196860126 }, "sha256": "09043df281f9b3e26ae6eebdbe50f78cbd14a8e44611628232238211c60e64ac", "simhash": "1:7c2ae388343f215b", "word_count": 2059 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:26.493722+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Britt and Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE FREEMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Judge.\nIn defendant\u2019s first assignment of error, he contends that the failure of the trial judge to grant his motion for separate trials or in the alternative to suppress the use of co-defendant Nichols\u2019 statement, constituted reversible error.\nIn regards to defendant\u2019s first argument concerning separate trials, we do not feel that the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to grant the defendant\u2019s motion for separate trials. The question as to whether there should be a joint or separate trial when defendants are jointly indicted is within the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion, absent a showing that the movant was denied a fair trial, cannot be disturbed on appeal. See State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E. 2d 492 (1968). There is no evidence that the trial judge abused this discretion in the present case and his refusal to grant a motion for a separate trial was therefore proper.\nAs an alternative argument in his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial judge erred by refusing to suppress from the evidence the entire confession by co-defendant Nichols. The applicable federal law on this point is Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed. 2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968). In its application of the Bruton decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated:\n\u201c ... in joint trials of defendants it is necessary to exclude extrajudicial confessions unless all portions which implicate defendants other than the declarant can be deleted without prejudice either to the State or the declarant.\u201d State v. Fox, supra at 291, 163 S.E. 2d at 502.\nIn the instant case, the record reveals that the trial judge properly admitted the confession only after modifying it as required by the Fox decision. The actual confession, as given by Nichols, reads as follows:\n\u201cMe and Lawrence I don\u2019t know his last name, he is Bill\u2019s half brother, were riding around in Lawrence\u2019s car, a \u201966 or \u201967 Pontiac gray station wagon. We went to Eddie\u2019s Grocery. Lawrence had a shotgun. We parked beside the store. We both went inside and demanded the money. We picked up Bill Alexander at Mooresville Drug. We went toward Coddle Creek and had a flat tire. Me and Bill went through the woods. Lawrence stayed with the car. We went to James Reid\u2019s house to get him to take us to Bill\u2019s house. We took the shotgun and rifle and asked him to keep them for us. Shortly after we left the police got behind us. I threw the money out of the car. Then the police stopped us.\u201d\nAt trial, the record reveals that the solicitor and the defendant\u2019s attorney rephrased Nichols\u2019 statement and it was admitted into evidence before the jury as follows:\n\u201cMe and two other guys were riding around in a car. We went to Eddie\u2019s Grocery; we had a shotgun; we parked beside the store \u2014 I and one of the other guys went in the store and demanded the money; then we went toward Coddle Creek and had a flat tire. Then I and one of the men went through the woods; the other guy remained with his car. I and the other man went to James Reid\u2019s house to get him to take us home; we took the shotgun and a rifle and asked Reid to keep them for us. Shortly after the police got behind us and I threw the money out of the car; then the police stopped us.\u201d\nIn reviewing the above portions of the trial record, it is apparent to this Court that the trial judge admitted Nichols\u2019 statement only after modifying it in accordance with the Fox decision. He admitted the extrajudicial confession only after deleting all parts that referred to or implicated the defendant. It is manifest that the statement admitted into evidence did not tend to incriminate the defendant Freeman. The statement merely indicated that Nichols had an accomplice and it in no way indicated the identity of that accomplice. Defendant\u2019s right to confrontation was therefore not infringed and the trial judge did not err in admitting the modified confession.\nDefendant\u2019s first assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.\nBy his third assignment of error defendant contends the court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the constitutionality of defendant Freeman\u2019s arrest. He contends that his arrest was illegal because it was based solely on Nichols\u2019 confession, and Nichols\u2019 confession was not sufficient to furnish probable cause for an arrest. He further argues that the photo identification of himself was tainted because the photos were obtained as a result of his unconstitutional arrest. Defendant cites State v. Accor and State v. Moore, 277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E. 2d 583 (1970).\nAccor is distinguishable. In that case photographs by which defendants were identified were held inadmissible on the ground that they were taken in violation of defendants\u2019 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants were picked up and brought to the police station without a warrant and without probable cause. The evidence was silent as to the circumstances under which defendants were picked up and there was no evidence that either defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers. The defendants were photographed prior to the issuance of warrants for their arrest, and at the time the photographs were taken there was no evidence to support a finding of probable cause of defendants\u2019 guilt. There was no evidence that one defendant consented to the taking of his photograph, and the evidence was insufficient to show that the other defendant voluntarily and understandingly consented to the taking of his photograph.\nIn the instant case a warrant was issued for Freeman\u2019s arrest prior to the taking of any photographs. In addition, probable cause for the issuance of the warrant existed. The basis upon which the warrant, was issued was \"the statement of the defendant Nichols, indicating Freeman\u2019s participation. These facts amount to sufficient probable cause and defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated.\nDefendant\u2019s third assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.\nBy his fifth assignment of error defendant contends that the court should have excluded Maddrey\u2019s in-court identification of him as one of the robbers, because the identification was the fruit of an illegal arrest. Defendant contends that his arrest was illegal because there was no probable cause to believe that he had taken part in the robbery and that Nichols\u2019 confession could not furnish probable cause for defendant\u2019s arrest because there was no evidence that he was a reliable informant, and because he had previously denied that he had been involved in the robbery.\nIt is clear that:\n\u201cThe Fourth Amendment requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the persons or things to be seized, applies to arrest warrants as well as to search warrants. The judicial officer issuing such warrant must be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that there is probable cause for issuing the arrest warrant.\u201d (Citation omitted.) State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 6, 187 S.E. 2d 706, 710 (1972).\nWe hold that the information furnished by Nichols to Officer Barger upon whose complaint the arrest warrant was issued, was sufficient information to authorize Officer Barger to make the complaint and to authorize the magistrate to issue the warrant. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends.the district attorney\u2019s comment concerning the ability of the defendant Freeman to testify in his own behalf constituted prejudicial error.\nIn cross-examining one of the State\u2019s witnesses, counsel for Nichols asked him if he knew that Nichols had no criminal record. The district attorney objected and stated, \u201cIf he wants to testify to his record, he can testify himself.\u201d The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the district attorney\u2019s comment. We think the court\u2019s instruction was adequate. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe have carefully considered defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error and have found them to be without merit. The defendant had a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Britt and Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Wilton E. Ragland, Jr., for the State.", "McElwee, Hall & McElwee, by E. Bedford Cannon, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE FREEMAN\nNo. 7622SC313\n(Filed 3 November 1976)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 92\u2014 two defendants tried for same crime \u2014 motion for separate trials properly denied\nIn a trial of defendant and another for the same armed robbery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for separate trials where there was no showing that defendant was denied a fair trial.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 31; Criminal Law \u00a7 95\u2014 confession of codefend-ant \u2014 exclusion of part implicating defendant \u2014 admission of confession proper\nIn a trial of defendant and his companion for the same armed robbery, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the entire confession of defendant\u2019s companion, since the confession was modified to delete all parts which referred to or implicated defendant, and the rule of Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, was thereby complied with.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 30\u2014 probable cause \u2014 arrest warrant properly issued \u2014 photographs taken of defendant \u2014 no constitutional rights violated\nProbable cause existed for the issuance of an arrest warrant for defendant on the basis of a confession by a codefendant which implicated defendant, and the taking of photographs of defendant after his arrest did not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights.\n4. Constitutional Law \u00a7 30; Criminal Law \u00a7 66\u2014 in-court identification \u2014 no illegal arrest \u2014 identification properly allowed\nDefendant\u2019s contention that an in-court identification of defendant by the victim of an armed robbery should have been excluded as the fruit of an illegal arrest is without merit, since the confession of a codefendant which implicated defendant in the crime was sufficient to constitute probable cause for issuance of the arrest warrant.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 102\u2014 district attorney\u2019s comment \u2014 instruction to disregard\u2014 no prejudice\nDefendant who did not take the stand was not prejudiced by the district attorney\u2019s comment that, if defendant wanted \u201c. . . to testify to his record, he can testify himself,\u201d since the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment.\nAppeal by defendant from Wood, Judge. Judgment entered 17 January 1974 in Superior Court, Iredell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 August 1976.\nLawrence Freeman and Lynn Carter Nichols, Jr. were indicted and tried together for armed robbery. The State offered evidence tending to show that on the night of 6 December 1973 R. W. Maddrey was employed at Eddie\u2019s Grocery in Mooresville. At 11:30 that night defendants came into the store and brought some groceries to the counter. As Maddrey was ringing up the groceries on the cash register, Freeman produced a shotgun and demanded the money in the cash register. Maddrey allowed them to take the money, and they then left the store.\nBefore Maddrey was allowed to identify Freeman and Nichols as the robbers, a voir dire hearing was held to determine the admissibility of his identification testimony. During this hearing the State offered evidence tending to show that about an hour after the robbery Maddrey observed a lineup of six people, including Nichols but not Freeman, and he identified Nichols as one of the robbers. On the morning of 7 December 1973, after being advised of his constitutional rights, Nichols confessed that he and Freeman had robbed Eddie\u2019s Grocery. On the basis of this confession, police officers obtained a warrant for Freeman\u2019s arrest, and he was arrested the next day and photographed. On December 10 Maddrey was shown a group of six photographs, and he correctly identified Nichols and Freeman as the robbers. The court held Maddrey\u2019s identification testimony admissible.\nDuring the course of the joint trial, the State attempted to introduce a confession by Nichols which implicated Freeman. The court, over defendant Freeman\u2019s objection, permitted Nichols\u2019 statement to be entered into evidence in a modified form which supposedly deleted any reference to defendant Freeman.\nDefendants offered no evidence. The jury found Freeman guilty and a prison sentence was imposed. The verdict and judgment as to Nichols do not appear in the record. Freeman appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Wilton E. Ragland, Jr., for the State.\nMcElwee, Hall & McElwee, by E. Bedford Cannon, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0335-01", "first_page_order": 363, "last_page_order": 368 }