{
  "id": 8551047,
  "name": "IN THE MATTER OF HATTIE HOGAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Hogan",
  "decision_date": "1977-03-02",
  "docket_number": "No. 7627DC641",
  "first_page": "429",
  "last_page": "434",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "32 N.C. App. 429"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 792",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "26 N.C. App. 294",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8551586
      ],
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/26/0294-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 409",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "25 N.C. App. 442",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8554406
      ],
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/25/0442-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 790",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "25 N.C. App. 666",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8556075
      ],
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/25/0666-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 74",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "28 N.C. App. 354",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8549178
      ],
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/28/0354-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "231 S.E. 2d 633",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "291 N.C. 693",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8558987
      ],
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/291/0693-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 498,
    "char_count": 11530,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.685,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.510123162156865e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9463520846196052
    },
    "sha256": "dfd083d3b26abbcee524a957425aafc00d0c39c05dc4e99b97464d260b7723c4",
    "simhash": "1:d464bd4768abec2f",
    "word_count": 1888
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:52:52.366891+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Martin and Arnold concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN THE MATTER OF HATTIE HOGAN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nIncluded in the record is a certificate addressed to the clerk of superior court of Gaston County and signed by the Chief of Medical Services at Broughton Hosptial which states that respondent was no longer in need of hospitalization at that facility and accordingly was being unconditionally discharged on 23 April 1976. Although it thus appears that respondent has been released, her appeal is not moot. In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 231 S.E. 2d 633 (1977); In re Crouch, 28 N.C. App. 354, 221 S.E. 2d 74 (1976); In re Mostella, 25 N.C. App. 666, 215 S.E. 2d 790 (1975); In re Carter, 25 N.C. App. 442, 213 S.E. 2d 409 (1975).\nRespondent assigns error to the admission into evidence over her objection of the written report signed and sworn to by Dr. Robeson, the physician who examined respondent at Broughton Hospital. G.S. 122-58.7(e) provides that \u201c[certified copies of reports and findings of qualified physicians and medical records of the mental health facility are admissible in evidence, but the respondent\u2019s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses shall not be denied.\u201d Here, Dr. Robeson did not appear at the hearing, and respondent was clearly denied her right to confront and cross-examine him. In re Benton, 26 N.C. App. 294, 215 S.E. 2d 792 (1975). Denial of this right would at least entitle respondent to a new hearing. We do not order a new hearing, however, because more serious defects in these proceedings require reversal of the order from which appeal has been taken.\nG.S. 122-58.7(i) provides as follows:\n\u201cTo support a commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and imminently dangerous to himself or others. The court shall record the facts which support its findings.\u201d\nThis statutory mandate requires as a condition to a valid commitment order that the district court find two distinct facts: first, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, as those words are defined in G.S. 122-36; and second, that the respondent is imminently dangerous to himself or others. In re Carter, supra. Whether a person is mentally ill or inebriate and whether he is imminently dangerous to himself or others, present questions of fact. In the order appealed from in the present case the court purported to make these determinations as \u201cmatters of law.\u201d We will ignore the incorrect designation and treat the court\u2019s conclusions as findings of the ultimate facts required by G.S. 122-58.7 (i). The questions for our determination then become (1) whether the court\u2019s ultimate findings are indeed supported by the \u201cfacts\u201d which the court recorded in its order as supporting its findings, and (2) whether in any event there was competent evidence to support the court\u2019s findings.\nDirecting our attention to the first question, the finding that respondent was \u201cpreoccupied with religious subjects\u201d hardly furnishes support for an ultimate finding either that she was mentally ill or that she was imminently dangerous to herself or others. The remaining facts which the court recorded as supporting its ultimate findings, that respondent had delusions as to the extent of the danger posed by the Ku Klux Klan, that she misinterpreted stimuli, and that she was out of touch with reality, may furnish some support for the ultimate finding that she was mentally ill as those words are defined in G.S. 122-36. They furnish no support for the court\u2019s alternative finding that she was inebriate. (Indeed, there is no evidence in this record which even suggests that respondent was ever an inebriate.) More importantly, none of the facts recorded by the court in its order furnish any support for its ultimate finding that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others. Thus, one of the two essential findings required for a valid commitment order is without any support from the facts recorded in the court\u2019s order.\nTurning our attention to the second question, whether, quite apart from the facts recorded in the court\u2019s order, there was any competent evidence from which the court could have found the essential ultimate facts required for a valid commitment order, we find that the only competent evidence presented at the hearing bearing on the question whether respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others was contained in the testimony of Dr. Russ. Although Dr. Russ signed a statement that in his opinion respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others, at the hearing he testified that he \u201cdidn\u2019t get any indication that she was aggressively motivated in that sense of being physically violent.\u201d Indeed, it is abundantly clear from his testimony given at the hearing that he arrived at his opinion that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others solely because he felt that her persistence in trying to convert someone on the street might cause that person to resist the idea, so that \u201cthey could become physically aggressive toward her.\u201d If so, it would seem more appropriate to commit her aggressor rather than the respondent. In any event, we are unable to find in this record any competent evidence to support the court\u2019s finding that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others. Absent that evidence,\nThe order appealed from is\nReversed.\nJudges Martin and Arnold concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PARKER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Isaac T. Avery III for the State.",
      "Assistant Public Defender Larry B. Langson for respondent appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF HATTIE HOGAN\nNo. 7627DC641\n(Filed 2 March 1977)\n1. Appeal and Error \u00a7 9 \u2014 commitment to mental health facility \u2014 appeal not moot\nAppeal of a person involuntarily committed to a mental health care facility was not moot although the commitment period had expired.\n2. Insane Persons \u00a7 1 \u2014 report of absent physician \u2014 denial of confrontation and cross-examination\nIn a proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental health care facility, the admission of a written report signed and sworn to by a physician who was not present at the hearing denied respondent her right to confront and cross-examine the physician. G.S. 122-58.7 (e).\n3. Insane Persons \u00a7 1\u2014 mental illness \u2014 imminent danger \u2014 preoccupation with religion\nA finding that respondent was \u201cpreoccupied with religious subjects\u201d furnished no support for the court\u2019s ultimate finding either that respondent was mentally ill or that she was imminently dangerous to herself or others.\n4. Insane Persons \u00a7 1 \u2014 imminent danger to self or others \u2014 insufficiency of findings\nWhile findings that respondent had delusions as to the extent of the danger posed by the Ku Klux Klan, that she misinterpreted stimuli, and that she was out of touch with reality may have furnished support for the court\u2019s ultimate finding that respondent was mentally ill, they furnished no support for the court\u2019s alternate finding that she was inebriate or for the court\u2019s ultimate finding that she was imminently dangerous to herself or others.\n5. Insane Persons \u00a7 1 \u2014 imminent danger to self or others \u2014 insufficiency of testimony\nA physician\u2019s testimony that he arrived at the opinion that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others because he felt that her persistence in trying to convert someone on the street might cause that person to resist the idea, so that \u201cthey could become physically aggressive toward her\u201d did not support the court\u2019s finding that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others.\nAppeal by respondent from Bulwinkle, Judge. Order entered 15 April 1976 in District Court, Gaston County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 January 1977.\nOn 12 April 1976, A. W. Michalak, an officer of the Gas-tonia Police Department, appeared before a magistrate and swore to a petition for involuntary commitment against respondent, Hattie Hogan, alleging that respondent was a mentally ill or inebriate person who was imminently dangerous to herself or others. The facts upon which this opinion was based were stated in the petition to be that respondent:\n\u201cGets upon the public streets of the City of Gastonia, blocks people from walking, preaching loud words, refuses to leave after being directed by Gastonia City Police, is in a mentally ill state of mind and is imminently dangerous to herself and others and petitioner says she needs medical treatment.\u201d\nBased on this petition, the magistrate found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in the petition were true and that respondent was probably mentally ill or inebriate and imminently dangerous to herself or others. Accordingly, the magistrate issued a custody order authorizing law enforcement personnel to take respondent into custody for examination by a qualified physician in accord with the provisions of G.S. 122-58.4. Pursuant to this order, respondent was taken into custody and was examined by Dr. Zack Russ, Jr., a psychiatrist at the Gaston County Mental Health Clinic. Dr. Russ found respondent to be mentally ill and imminently dangerous to herself or others, and he recommended she be committed to Broughton Hospital. She was taken to Broughton Hospital, where she was examined on the afternoon of 12 April 1976 by Dr. William P. Robeson, who recommended hospital treatment.\nOn 15 April 1976 the hearing prescribed by G.S. 122-58.7 was held in district court. Over objection of respondent\u2019s counsel, the State introduced as its only evidence the written report signed and sworn to by Dr. Robeson which was based on his examination of respondent made at Broughton Hospital on the afternoon of 12 April 1976.\nRespondent presented as her only witness Dr. Russ, who testified that he had examined respondent on 12 April 1976 and that he found respondent\n\u201cto be religiously preoccupied; she had ideas of persecution; delusions of grandeur. She was quite evasive and tangential in her responses. She had poor impulse control and her judgment and insight were impaired. I thought she could not take care of herself because of her impaired judgment, and that she needed to be hospitalized for her own care and protection.\u201d\nOn being asked why he had concluded respondent was a danger to herself and others, Dr. Russ replied:\n\u201cI thought because of her impaired judgment and lack of insight, and from her own statements, her persistence in trying to preach on the streets even without a license, and the fact she had gone to the City Hall for a license and they had refused to give her one \u2014 and she couldn\u2019t understand it \u2014 why they wouldn\u2019t. That were she to persist in this type of behavior that it would be detrimental to her welfare.\n. . . \u201c[W]ith her attitude that she was expressing at that time, if she persisted in trying to convert someone on the street and they would resist the idea, they could become physically aggressive towards her.\n* * *\nI didn\u2019t get any indication that she was aggressively motivated in that sense of being physically violent.\u201d\nThe court made findings as follows:\n\u201cThat the Respondent has delusions of danger imposed by the Klu Klux Klan (sic) for the nation as a whole and the world; That she is preoccupied with religious subjects; That she misinterprets stimuli; That she is out of touch with reality.\u201d\nBased on these findings of fact, the court concluded \u201cas a matter of law\u201d that the respondent was \u201cmentally ill or inebriate, and imminently dangerous to herself or others,\u201d and ordered her committed to Broughton Hospital for a period not to exceed 90 days.\nFrom this order, respondent appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Isaac T. Avery III for the State.\nAssistant Public Defender Larry B. Langson for respondent appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0429-01",
  "first_page_order": 457,
  "last_page_order": 462
}