{ "id": 8552807, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY HYATT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hyatt", "decision_date": "1977-04-06", "docket_number": "No. 7630SC762", "first_page": "623", "last_page": "629", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "32 N.C. App. 623" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "201 S.E. 2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562720 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570226 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S.Ct. 157", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 L.Ed. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 874", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11762922, 11762669, 11763119, 11762751, 11762997, 11762845, 11763196, 11762557, 11762495 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0874-06", "/us/414/0874-03", "/us/414/0874-08", "/us/414/0874-04", "/us/414/0874-07", "/us/414/0874-05", "/us/414/0874-09", "/us/414/0874-02", "/us/414/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561152 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560069 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 L.Ed. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 S.Ct. 182", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 869", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11759308, 11758893, 11759376, 11758961, 11758771, 11759445, 11759126, 11759224, 11759034, 11758815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0869-08", "/us/414/0869-03", "/us/414/0869-09", "/us/414/0869-04", "/us/414/0869-01", "/us/414/0869-10", "/us/414/0869-06", "/us/414/0869-07", "/us/414/0869-05", "/us/414/0869-02" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 2d 725", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566971 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572613 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564264 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566256 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 F. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3758115, 1263262 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/205/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 U.S. 396", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8298891 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/151/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570781 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574773 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 S.E. 2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564742 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570856 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507, 508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0500-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 737, "char_count": 15297, "ocr_confidence": 0.678, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.912960672357197e-07, "percentile": 0.7319523261780899 }, "sha256": "7a4caf180e7fdf7789d20de05008ab82bb465dc6cfaab35cf4bbfcf03c8eb802", "simhash": "1:82e26527d62f9aea", "word_count": 2574 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:52:52.366891+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Morris and Martin concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY HYATT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nDefendant brings forward nine assignments of error which have been grouped into eight arguments. His first assignment is that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to sever the three cases for trial. Defendant contends that if the cases h\u00e1d been tried separately, he would have had the election of presenting evidence in one case without being forced to present evidence in the others. Severance of criminal cases is governed by G.S. 15A-927.\nIn State v. Davis, 289 N.C. 500, 507, 508, 223 S.E. 2d 296, the Supreme Court stated:\n\u201cThe general rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial judge may consolidate for trial two or more indictments in which the defendant is charged with crimes of the same class and the crimes are so connected in time or place that evidence at the trial of one indictment will be competent at the trial of the other. State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E. 2d 721; State v. Anderson, 281 N.C. 261, 188 S.E. 2d 336; State v. Frazier, 280 N.C. 181, 185 S.E. 2d 652.\u201d\nThe Supreme Court in Davis stated further that:\n\u201cIt is true that in ruling upon a motion consolidation of charges, the trial judge should consider whether the accused can fairly be tried upon more than one charge at the same trial. If such consolidation hinders or deprives the accused of his ability to present his defense, the cases should not be consolidated. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 14 S.Ct. 410, 38 L.Ed. 208; Dunaway v. United States, 205 F. 2d 23. Nevertheless, it is well established that the motion to consolidate is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and his ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Jarrette, supra; State v. Yoes and Hale v. State, 271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E. 2d 386; State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 153 S.E. 2d 44; Dunaway v. United States, supra.\u201d\nThere was no error in the court\u2019s refusal to grant defendant\u2019s motion to sever the three cases for trial. Moreover, defendant waived any right to severance by failing to renew his motion as required by G.S. 15A-927 (a) (2).\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s failure to grant his motion for a continuance. No motion to continue the case had been made until after the case was called for trial. See G.S. 15A-952.\nDuring the hearing on the motion, defendant\u2019s counsel stressed that they had worked almost full time on defendant\u2019s case since their appointment and said they were ready to go to trial. They also said that an extension of time would not necessarily enable them to locate any witnesses beneficial to the defendant. There was no evidence offered as to what defendant would attempt to prove by any witness that was not available. It is clear from the record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deny defendant any substantial right when it denied defendant\u2019s untimely motion for continuance and, in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion or a denial of a substantial right, the court\u2019s ruling is not subject to review on appeal. State v. Brower, 289 N.C. 644, 224 S.E. 2d 551. This assignment of error is, therefore, without merit.\nDefendant\u2019s third assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for the sequestration of the jury during the taking of evidence in this case.\nIt is within the sound discretion of the trial court whether to require the sequestration of the jury during the course of trial. State v. Bynum, 282 N.C. 552, 193 S.E. 2d 725, cert. den., 414 U.S. 869, 94 S.Ct. 182, 38 L.Ed. 2d 116. There is not the slightest suggestion in this record of any impropriety on behalf of any juror. The assignment of error is overruled.\nThe defendant next assigns as error the admission into evidence of testimony that warrants were issued charging defendant and Lloyd Green with the murders for which defendant was being tried. We find this assignment of error to be without merit. The warrants were not read or shown to the jury and their contents were not revealed. The warrants were simply shown to the sheriff in order to refresh his recollection as to the date when the defendant was finally charged after months of investigation. In this, there was no error. Moreover, defendant\u2019s counsel, during cross-examination of the sheriff, elicited the same information about which he complains in this assignment of error. An objection to certain evidence, even though seasonably made upon a sound ground, is waived when like evidence is thereafter admitted without objection and especially where like evidence is subsequently offered or elicited by the objecting party himself. State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E. 2d 353; State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E. 2d 755, cert. den., 414 U.S. 874, 38 L.Ed. 2d 114, 94 S.Ct. 157.\nDefendant\u2019s fifth assignment of error is that the court erred in allowing into evidence testimony concerning admissions made by him as to his involvement in the crimes for which he was being tried and other crimes for which he was not being tried. Defendant concedes that his alleged admissions of having killed three people was admissible under the rule that \u201c [a] nything that a party to the action has done, said or written, if relevant to the issues and not subject to some specific exclusionary statute or rule, is admissible against him as an admission.\u201d 2 Stansbury, N. C. Evidence (Brandis rev.), \u00a7 167. It is his contention that evidence that he had been charged with receiving in connection with the breaking and entering at White\u2019s Auto Store was irrelevant to the issue of his guilt in this case and should have been excluded. The testimony was competent for the purpose of establishing defendant\u2019s intent and motive for the killings. The State\u2019s evidence disclosed that Wayne Buchanan, Billy Joe Franks, Kenneth Potts and others were involved in a breaking and entering at White\u2019s Auto Store in Jackson County, North Carolina. Defendant expressed to several of the State\u2019s witnesses his fear that Buchanan and Franks would testify against him in the receiving stolen goods case that was pending against him. Defendant also offered a witness for the State $5,000.00 to \u201cknock off\u201d two of the three decedents and openly discussed with another witness having all of those involved in the breaking and entering \u201cbeaten up\u201d or \u201cknocked off.\u201d The evidence was properly admitted.\nDefendant also assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion for dismissal at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the conclusion of all the evidence. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence to survive a motion to dismiss, the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, is deemed to be true and inconsistencies or contradictions therein are disregarded. After the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, the ultimate question for the court\u2019s determination is whether there is a reasonable basis upon which the jury might find that the offenses charged in the indictments had been committed and that the defendant was the perpetrator, or one of the perpetrators of the offenses. State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 184 S.E. 2d 866. The evidence in this case points unerringly to defendant\u2019s guilt. The motion to dismiss was properly overruled.\nDefendant\u2019s seventh assignment of error is that the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of manslaughter and in failing to submit voluntary manslaughter to the jury as a possible verdict. The jury was told that it could return three possible verdicts: guilty of murder in the first degree, guilty of murder in the second degree, or not guilty. It suffices to say that there was no evidence in the record to justify an instruction on manslaughter as a possible verdict. State v. Vestal, supra; State v. Crews, 284 N.C. 427, 201 S.E. 2d 840.\nDefendant\u2019s final assignment of error, directed to a portion of the judge\u2019s charge to the jury, has been carefully considered. It fails to disclose prejudicial error.\nWe find no prejudicial error in defendant\u2019s trial.\nNo error.\nJudges Morris and Martin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "VAUGHN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Ralf F. Haskell, for the State.", "Rodgers, Cabler \u25a0& Henson, by John Edwin Henson, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY HYATT\nNo. 7630SC762\n(Filed 6 April 1977)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 92 \u2014 three charges of first degree murder \u2014 severance properly denied\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to sever three first degree murder charges for trial.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 91\u2014 untimely motion for continuance \u2014 denial proper\nThe trial court in a first degree murder prosecution did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for continuance made after the case was called for trial where there was no showing that defendant was thereby denied any substantial right.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 101\u2014 sequestration of jury \u2014 denial proper\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for the sequestration of the jury during the taking of the evidence in a first degree murder prosecution.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 87, 169 \u2014 witness\u2019s reference to warrants \u2014 similar testimony elicited by defendant \u2014 no error\nThe trial court in a first degree murder prosecution did not err in admitting into evidence testimony that warrants were issued chargr ing defendant and another with the murders for which defendant was being tried, since the warrants themselves were not read or shown to the jury, but they were simply shown to the sheriff in order to refresh his recollection as to the date when the defendant was finally charged after months of investigation; moreover, defendant\u2019s counsel, during the cross-examination of the sheriff, elicited the same information complained about and defendant thereby waived his objection to the evidence.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 34\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 prior offense of receiving stolen goods \u2014 evidence properly admitted\nThe trial court in a first degree murder prosecution properly admitted evidence that defendant had been charged with receiving stolen goods in connection with a breaking and entering committed by the murder victims who, defendant feared, would testify against him, since the evidence was competent to establish defendant\u2019s intent and motive for the killings.\n6. Homicide \u00a7 21\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury in a first degree murder prosecution where it tended to show that the three victims were last seen in defendant\u2019s presence; defendant offered a State\u2019s witness $5000 to \u201cknock off\u201d the victims; defendant feared the victims would testify against him in another criminal prosecution pending against him; and defendant told an informant in Alabama that he had killed three people in N. C. and there were warrants out for him.\nAppeal by defendant from Martin (Harry), Judge. Judgments entered 20 May 1976 in Superior Court, Jackson County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 February 1977.\nDefendant was tried on three charges of first degree murder. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following:\nOn 22 September 1975, the bodies of Wayne Buchanan, Gerald Franks and Billy Joe Franks were found in the vicinity of an electric company\u2019s powerhouse located on the Tuckaseegee River. The victims had died of a stab wound to the right of the heart, loss of blood caused by a wound in the left chest, and loss of blood caused by the severing of major blood vessels to the head, respectively. All had been dead for over 2 days when discovered and could possibly have been dead for 10 to 14 days. Autopsies revealed that they were all intoxicated at the time of death. The bodies had all been placed in the Tucka-seegee River after the fatal wounds had been inflicted.\nThe deceased were last seen by relatives and others on 16 September 1975. One witness saw them with defendant and Lloyd Green [Green has apparently been charged but not tried in connection with the murders] in the vicinity of Munger\u2019s Shell Station, around 7:30 p.m., on that date. Another witness saw defendant, Wayne Buchanan and Billy Joe Franks at the same filling station sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. That day Buchanan and Franks \u201cacted a little high.\u201d Around 8:30 p.m. on the same date defendant, Gerald Franks, Wayne Buchanan, and another man were seen in a pickup truck at a Phillips 66 station in Sylva. Gerald Franks was intoxicated and Buchanan had been drinking.\nDefendant and Lloyd Green went to Georgia on the night of 16 September 1975, arriving at about midnight. Defendant told those with whom he was seeking refuge that he was fleeing from \u201cthe law\u201d in North Carolina.\nThe sheriff began looking for the defendant and Lloyd Green after the discovery of the bodies on 22 September 1975. The authorities were unable to locate either of them despite surveillance of their residences, numerous telephone calls and trips to South Carolina and Georgia.\nAn informant testified that he met defendant and Green at a trailer park in Birmingham, Alabama on 2 December 1975. The men sat around drinking beer and discussing the warrants that were outstanding against them. According to two witnesses to this discussion, the defendant bragged that warrants for traffic violations were nothing and that there were warrants out for him for possession of stolen property, weapons and \u201cputting some people away.\u201d During this conversation the defendant did not mention in what state the warrants were outstanding, but the next day while defendant and the informant were driving to Atlanta the defendant said in response to an inquiry, \u201c . . . I killed three people back in North Carolina, and I\u2019ll do it again . \u201d After spending the night in Atlanta, the defendant cautioned the witness, while en route to Birmingham, in the following manner: \u201cBe damned sure you don\u2019t get stopped, because I have a $5,000.00 reward out for me.\u201d\nUpon their return to Birmingham, this witness notified the authorities that the defendant had an outstanding warrant against him in North Carolina and, as a result of this information, defendant and Lloyd Green were arrested on 4 December 1975 by FBI agents on a federal warrant for crossing state lines after having been charged with a local felony. Defendant was returned to Jackson County, North Carolina on 12 December 1975.\nAnother witness testified that defendant had offered to pay him $5,000.00 if he would \u201cknock Wayne Buchanan and Billy Joe Franks off.\u201d The offer was made on 21 August 1975. Defendant took this witness to the site where the bodies were later discovered and suggested that the witness could shoot the two with a rifle, which defendant had with him, and then dump the bodies into the river at the powerhouse site. Defendant wanted these two people \u201cknocked off\u201d because he was afraid that they would testify for the State in a receiving stolen goods case pending against him.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence the defendant moved for dismissal of each case. The motion was denied. Defendant did not introduce any evidence and renewed his motion to dismiss. That motion was also denied. The jury returned verdicts of guilty of second degree murder in each of the three cases. Judgment was entered imposing consecutive prison sentences of 80, 60 and 40 years.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Ralf F. Haskell, for the State.\nRodgers, Cabler \u25a0& Henson, by John Edwin Henson, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0623-01", "first_page_order": 651, "last_page_order": 657 }