{
  "id": 8547951,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CROWDER DIXON, JR.",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Dixon",
  "decision_date": "1977-04-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 7619SC886",
  "first_page": "78",
  "last_page": "81",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "33 N.C. App. 78"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 416",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "276 N.C. 123",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8560350
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/276/0123-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 398,
    "char_count": 6176,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.696,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.2058482946303047
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    "sha256": "3df6534e9e503fa5e3efeaa88744e507b327a36298f977bb7d27a605bb86cc15",
    "simhash": "1:92315bfa35663c72",
    "word_count": 1048
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:09:28.190456+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CROWDER DIXON, JR."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nWe have considered defendant\u2019s exceptions Nos. 2, 4 and 5, taken in connection with his examination of the proposed character witness. If exception No. 2 relates to a question propounded, that question is not set out as required by Rule 9(c) (1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exception No. 3 has been abandoned.\nException No. 4 is without merit. Defendant asked the following question:\n\u201cNow, as a result of your daily meeting with . . . [defendant], do you know his general reputation and character in the community?\u201d\nThe question was improper. A witness does not learn the \u201cgeneral reputation\u201d of another \u201cas a result of daily meetings with\u201d that person. He learns it, if at all, from others. The witness, nevertheless, was allowed to testify that defendant had a very good work record at the plant.\nDefendant\u2019s exception No. 5 must also be overruled. Assuming that the question was proper, the record does not disclose what the defendant would have answered. We cannot, therefore, determine whether the exclusion of the answer was prejudicial. State v. Kirby, 276 N.C. 123, 171 S.E. 2d 416.\nAssignments of error Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are directed to the judge\u2019s charge.\nIn assignment of error No. 6 defendant \u201ccontends and argues that the instructions of the trial judge were incomprehensible to the jury . \u201d Defendant argues that the instruction to which he excepts \u201cattempts to say too much with too few words.\u201d The problem defendant faces in this argument, however, is that he ignores the rest of the charge. The part to which he excepts is in one paragraph of the judge\u2019s final mandate dealing with voluntary manslaughter. Almost two pages in the record were required to set out the judge\u2019s earlier explanation of the law of voluntary manslaughter as it relates to the case being tried. In his final mandate, the judge is not required to repeat all that he has said earlier.\nIn assignment of error No. 7 defendant contends the judge failed to give \u201ca specific instruction on the law of self-defense\u201d in his final mandate. In this assignment of error defendant ignores that part of the final mandate beginning on page 43 of the record which is as follows:\n\u201cOn the other hand, the killing would be justified on the grounds of self-defense and it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty, if under the circumstances as they existed at the time of the killing the State has failed to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt of the absence on the part of Crowder Dixon, Jr., of a reasonable belief that he was about to suffer death or serious bodily harm at the hands of Lee Curtis Gillespie or that Crowder Dixon used more force than reasonably appeared to him to be necessary or that Crowder Dixon was the aggressor.\u201d\nEarlier in the charge, the judge had explained the law of self-defense as it applied to the case being tried. Thereafter, in what were almost his last words to the jurors before they went to the jury room, the judge said:\n\u201cLadies and gentlemen of the jury, the court again instructs you as J have heretofore, that if you find that the defendant acted in self-defense and you will recall my instructions about that, you will find the defendant not guilty of anything.\u201d\nAfter the jurors went to the jury room they returned and asked questions with respect to voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The judge repeated his earlier instructions but did not refer to self-defense. Defendant\u2019s 8th and final assignment of error is that the judge did not repeat instructions on self-defense. We overrule this assignment of error. No prejudicial error has been shown with respect to the way the judge answered the jury\u2019s question.\nWe find no prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "VAUGHN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney James E. Scarbrough, for the State.",
      "Burke, Donaldson & Holshouser, by George L. Burke, Jr., for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CROWDER DIXON, JR.\nNo. 7619SC886\n(Filed 20 April 1977)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 85.1\u2014 character evidence \u2014 basis for opinion\nThe trial court properly excluded a question asked a character witness as to whether he knew defendant\u2019s general reputation in the community \u201cas a result of your daily meeting\u201d with defendant.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 28\u2014 self-defense \u2014 instruction in final mandate\nThe trial court in a homicide case did not fail to give an instruction on self-defense in his final mandate to the jury.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 28\u2014 additional instructions \u2014 failure to charge again on self-defense\nThe trial court did not err in giving additional instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter without again instructing on self-defense.\nAppeal by defendant from Wood, Judge. Judgment entered 3 August 1976 in Superior Court, Rowan County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 April 1977.\nDefendant was placed on trial for murder in the second degree. He was convicted of manslaughter.\nThe evidence tends to show the following:\nOn the afternoon of Sunday, 11 April 1976, defendant went to a place in East Spencer known as \u201cJerry\u2019s Cafe.\u201d Food is not prepared and served in this \u201ccafe.\u201d It has a jukebox and a pool table. Space for dancing is available. Deceased had been there an hour or so before defendant arrived and had been drinking. Defendant and a man named Ford arrived and each bought a drink of vodka in the back room. Defendant then walked into the room where the pool table was located and saw deceased. Defendant and deceased worked for the same employer and, apparently, were not on the friendliest of terms. Deceased walked up to defendant and told him, \u201cyou ain\u2019t the only one that\u2019s got a gun. I\u2019ve got one too . . . let\u2019s get it on.\u201d Defendant told deceased to leave him alone. Deceased told defendant they would talk about it the next day. More words were exchanged. Defendant had a .22 caliber pistol. Deceased had a .32 caliber pistol. Defendant fired at deceased and hit him at least twice. The deceased\u2019s gun was never fired. It was stipulated that death was caused by gunshot wounds. The evidence was conflicting as to what occurred just before the shooting.\nJudgment was entered imposing a prison sentence of fifteen years.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney James E. Scarbrough, for the State.\nBurke, Donaldson & Holshouser, by George L. Burke, Jr., for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0078-01",
  "first_page_order": 106,
  "last_page_order": 109
}
