{
  "id": 8548011,
  "name": "IN RE: CLARENCE WOODS",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Woods",
  "decision_date": "1977-04-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 7612SC914",
  "first_page": "86",
  "last_page": "88",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "33 N.C. App. 86"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 184",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "30 N.C. App. 118",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8552391
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc-app/30/0118-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 240,
    "char_count": 3705,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.641,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.20584945299899723
    },
    "sha256": "94b8c3bc301de1e2f715c3429bc00772ffc3dbb40335f53c206c06ead062a1d2",
    "simhash": "1:db3b8e79084115e9",
    "word_count": 598
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:09:28.190456+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN RE: CLARENCE WOODS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "VAUGHN, Judge.\nThe order dismissing this proceeding must be reversed. The mandatory revocation by the Division of Motor Vehicles was nothing more than the performance of a ministerial duty by that administrative agency, which it was required to perform under G.S. 20-17 (2) and G.S. 20-19 (e). The revocation by the division is, in no sense, \u00e1 \u201cjudgment\u201d that can preclude the Superior Court from acting on a petition filed in that court pursuant to Article 8 of Chapter 20 of the General Statutes, entitled \u201cHabitual Offenders.\u201d\nIn State v. Freedle, 30 N.C. App. 118, 226 S.E. 2d 184, a similar factual background was presented. Freedle\u2019s license had been permanently revoked because of three convictions for driving under the influence. An action was brought in the Superior Court to have him declared an \u201chabitual offender\u201d as defined in G.S. 20-221. Freedle appealed from the judgment declaring him an habitual offender and barring him from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this State. Freedle did not argue that the division\u2019s action was \u201cres adjudicata\u201d so as to bar the action in the Superior Court. He argued, instead, that the habitual offender article was not intended to apply where the division had already imposed the mandatory permanent revocation. The Court overruled that argument and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.\nThe judgment dismissing the action is reversed. The case is remanded for hearing on the facts alleged in the petition.\nReversed and remanded.\nChief Judge Brock and Judge Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "VAUGHN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin, for the State.",
      "Kenneth E. Banks and Doran J. Berry, by Kenneth E. Banks, for respondent appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN RE: CLARENCE WOODS\nNo. 7612SC914\n(Filed 20 April 1977)\nAutomobiles \u00a7 2.9\u2014 revocation of license by DMV \u2014 subsequent habitual offender proceeding\nThe permanent revocation of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license by the Division of . Motor Vehicles pursuant to G.S. 20-19 (e) upon his third conviction of driving under the influence was the performance of a ministerial duty and hot' a \u201cjudgment\u201d which could preclude the superior court from acting on a petition to have defendant declared an habitual offender of the traffic laws as defined in G.S. 20-221.\nAppeal by the State of North Carolina from Herring, Judge. Judgment entered 2 July 1976 in Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 April 1977.\nThis proceeding was instituted by the State, pursuant to G.S. 20-223, to determine whether defendant, Clarence Woods, is an habitual offender of the traffic laws within the meaning of G.S. 20-221.\nDefendant answered and admitted that he had been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor on 9 February 1971,15 September 1972 and 17 September 1975. He further alleged that, on 7 October 1975, his license was permanently revoked pursuant to G.S. 20-17 (2) and G.S. 20-19 (e), by the Division of Motor Vehicles.\nDefendant moved for summary judgment. The judge, in pertinent part, made the following conclusion of law:\n\u201cBecause of the identity of parties and subject matter existing between the revocation of the respondent\u2019s privilege to drive by the Department of Motor Vehicles and the. parties, subject matter, facts, and relief sought in the pending action initiated by the State, the permanent revocation of the respondent\u2019s privilege to drive operates by reason of res judicata to bar this proceeding. The Court therefore concludes as a matter of law that by reason of res judicata the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this cause.\u201d\nThe judge allowed defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment against the State and dismissed the action.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin, for the State.\nKenneth E. Banks and Doran J. Berry, by Kenneth E. Banks, for respondent appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0086-01",
  "first_page_order": 114,
  "last_page_order": 116
}