{
  "id": 8547353,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME MITCHELL",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Mitchell",
  "decision_date": "1978-01-17",
  "docket_number": "No. 775SC606",
  "first_page": "95",
  "last_page": "98",
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      "cite": "35 N.C. App. 95"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
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      "year": 1954,
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    {
      "cite": "282 N.C. 304",
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      "cite": "191 S.E. 2d 405",
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      "year": 1972,
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      "cite": "235 S.E. 2d 819",
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      "year": 1977,
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      "cite": "293 N.C. 132",
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    {
      "cite": "275 N.C. 288",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 6592,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:32.681632+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge BROCK and Judge CLARK concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME MITCHELL"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s exclusion of defendant\u2019s testimony on direct examination relative to the punishment imposed on him for a prior conviction. After testifying on direct examination to the time and place of a prior conviction, defendant was asked by his counsel, \u201cand what sort of sentence did you receive?\u201d The State\u2019s objection to this question was sustained. Defendant\u2019s counsel then asked, \u201cAre you presently on parole or probation?\u201d Again, the State objected and was sustained.\nDefendant contends that the fact that he was on parole at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged was relevant to his intent or state of mind at that time in that it tends to establish that defendant would not knowingly commit another crime and risk reactivation of a twenty-two (22) year prison term. In arguing that this evidence should have been admitted, defendant relies on the well-recognized rule that evidence tending to establish the requisite, specific intent of the accused is competent notwithstanding such evidence also discloses the commission of another offense, see State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 161 S.E. 2d 241 (1969), and seeks to extend this rule to allow inquiry into the punishment imposed as a result of the former offense. We find no merit in this contention.\nWe find no controlling authority in North Carolina on this point. It is true that the rule permitting, for purposes of impeachment, cross-examination of witnesses with respect to their prior convictions has been extended to allow inquiry into the punishment imposed as a result of these convictions. State v. Finch, 293 N.C. 132, 235 S.E. 2d 819 (1977); Ormond v. Crampton, 16 N.C. App. 88, 191 S.E. 2d 405, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 304, 192 S.E. 2d 194 (1972). However, we do not think this rule lends support to defendant\u2019s position in the instant case. The underlying purpose of the rule allowing a witness to be cross-examined with respect to prior convictions is separate and distinct from that allowing evidence to be elicited on direct examination which discloses the commission of another offense. See State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E. 2d 174 (1971); State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364 (1954). Under the former, evidence elicited goes to the credibility of the witness and is admitted for impeachment purposes only. State v. Williams, supra; 1 Stansbury\u2019s N.C. Evidence (Brandis Rev. 1973) \u00a7 112. However, under the latter rule \u2014 upon which defendant relies \u2014 the evidence is admissible, as substantive evidence, only if it tends to establish a material element of the crime charged. State v. McClain, supra.\nGuided by these principles, we are of the opinion that any probative value the proffered testimony may have had was far outweighed by the distraction inherent in placing such details before the jury. Therefore, this evidence was irrelevant and properly excluded.\nDefendant further assigns as error the following portion of the court\u2019s charge:\n\u201c. . . and third, that when the defendants presented that bill in payment for goods or in payments for any item worth any money from either of the stores they knew that it was false or had no reason to believe that it was a good bill.\" (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant contends that the emphasized portion of the instruction was erroneous in that it put the burden of proof on the defendant to show that he had reason to believe that the bill was good. He argues that the jury would be misled to think that, in order to acquit defendant, they must believe defendant\u2019s story as to how he got the bill. This contention is without merit.\nThe challenged instruction recited one of the elements which the court charged that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt before finding defendant guilty of attempting to obtain property by false pretense. It was the State, not the defendant, upon whom the court cast the burden. This burden, which the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, was \u201cthat defendants knew the bill was false or had no reason to believe that it was a good bill.\u201d We can see no burden resting on the defendant as a result of the challenged instruction. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe have carefully examined the remaining assignments of error and find them to be without merit.\nIn the trial we find no prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge BROCK and Judge CLARK concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Charles M. Hensey, for the State.",
      "Parker, Rice & Myles, by Charles E. Rice III, for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEROME MITCHELL\nNo. 775SC606\n(Filed 17 January 1978)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 34.7\u2014 prior conviction \u2014 evidence of punishment \u2014 inadmissibility to show intent\nThe trial court did not err in excluding defendant\u2019s testimony on direct examination concerning the punishment imposed on him for a prior conviction, since such evidence was not relevant, as defendant contended, to show his intent or state of mind at the time of the commission of the crime charged.\n2. False Pretense \u00a7 3.2\u2014 jury instructions \u2014 burden of proof properly on State\nIn a prosecution for attempting to obtain property by false pretenses where defendant allegedly attempted to obtain goods with a counterfeit $100 bill, the trial court\u2019s instructions that the State must prove \u201cthat defendants knew the bill was false or had no reason to believe that it was a good bill\u201d properly placed upon the State the burden of proving one of the elements of the crime charged.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Walker (Hal HJ, Judge. Judgment entered 2 March 1977 in Superior Court, New HANOVER County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November 1977.\nDefendant was indicted on two counts of attempting to obtain property by false pretenses.\nState\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant by the use of a $100 counterfeit bill attempted to obtain merchandise from Sears and Rose\u2019s Stores.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that a co-defendant Muldrow won the fake $100 bill gambling on 18 January and on 19 January the two men went shopping; that Muldrow handed the bill to defendant after he had twice tried unsuccessfully to get it changed; and that defendant did not examine the bill and did not know that it was false.\nIn rebuttal, State presented evidence to the effect that both defendant and Muldrow had claimed at the time of their arrest that defendant had won the fake bill in gambling.\nDefendant was convicted by a jury of both charges and from a consolidated sentence of imprisonment for a term of two to four years, defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Charles M. Hensey, for the State.\nParker, Rice & Myles, by Charles E. Rice III, for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0095-01",
  "first_page_order": 123,
  "last_page_order": 126
}
