{ "id": 8550052, "name": "DR. RALPH L. WARD, DR. THOMAS E. LEATH, DR. JOHN T. ROGERS and DR. JAMES B. JOHNSON v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; D. L. PHILLIPS INVESTMENT BUILDERS, INC. v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE COLVIS COMPANY v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and ECKERD'S DRUGS, INC.; HARRIS-TEETER SUPER MARKETS, INC. v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and ECKERD'S DRUGS, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Ward v. Hotpoint Division, General Electric Co.", "decision_date": "1978-03-07", "docket_number": "No. 7726SC162", "first_page": "495", "last_page": "500", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "35 N.C. App. 495" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "538 F. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "393 F. Supp. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3793697 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/393/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560600 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Wake Forest L.Rev. 327", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wake Forest L. Rev.", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 S.E. 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1899, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658652 ], "year": 1899, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/124/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 S.E. 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652560 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/140/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 S.E. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629447 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570569, 8570621, 8570694, 8570655 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0180-01", "/nc/280/0180-02", "/nc/280/0180-04", "/nc/280/0180-03" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 N.C. App. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552262 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/12/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552455 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568283 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262-263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555517 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0706-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 652, "char_count": 12156, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7530610858007551 }, "sha256": "91f38b074a11fdd8bdfc5f36ae49a5b6fe67bfc5405939a04fe4085e9db4bfbc", "simhash": "1:296757201164ef18", "word_count": 2081 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:32.681632+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Clark and Mitchell concur." ], "parties": [ "DR. RALPH L. WARD, DR. THOMAS E. LEATH, DR. JOHN T. ROGERS and DR. JAMES B. JOHNSON v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY D. L. PHILLIPS INVESTMENT BUILDERS, INC. v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY THE COLVIS COMPANY v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and ECKERD\u2019S DRUGS, INC. HARRIS-TEETER SUPER MARKETS, INC. v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and ECKERD'S DRUGS, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nThe sole question presented by this appeal is whether the record discloses that plaintiffs\u2019 claims are barred by the statute of limitations. If so, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary. judgment was appropriate. Brantley v. Dunstan, 10 N.C. App. 706, 179 S.E. 2d 878 (1971).\nFor purposes of this appeal, we assume the truth of plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that the deep-fat fryer was defective. We also assume as true the undisputed date of sale of the deep-fat fryer.\nPlaintiffs contend that because there was no contractual relationship between them and defendant with regard to the defective goods, they had no cause of action until the date of their actual injury (i.e., 9 May 1969, the date of the fire), and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against them until that date, no matter how far in the past the defective product was manufactured and sold by defendant. Plaintiffs further contend that since they were not in privity with defendant, they suffered no injury that was \u201cnot readily apparent\u201d prior to the date of the fire, and thus G.S. l-15(b) (providing that claims arising out of injuries due to a latent defect must be brought within 10 years of the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim) does not apply as to them. In support of these arguments, plaintiffs cite two recent decisions, to wit: Raftery v. Construction Co., 291 N.C. 180, 230 S.E. 2d 405 (1976), and Pinkston v. Baldwin, Lima, Hamilton Co., 292 N.C. 260, 232 S.E. 2d 431 (1977).\nDefendant, on the other hand, contends that plaintiffs\u2019 claims arose and the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the manufacture of the deep-fat fryer (1962); that G.S. l-15(b) would apply to the claims sub judice had they not arisen more than three years prior to its enactment (1971); and that language to the contrary in Raftery, supra, a wrongful death action, is merely dicta and is not a correct statement of the law in this State. (Defendant\u2019s brief was filed on 6 April 1977 and does not take into account the decision in Pinkston, supra, filed 7 March 1977).\nWe think the holdings in Raftery and Pinkston support plaintiffs\u2019 position. In discussing the question of whether plaintiff\u2019s intestate would have been entitled to maintain an action for personal injuries had he survived the blow to his head, the majority in Raftery stated that\n\u201cObviously, the negligence of the defendant (assumed for the purposes of this appeal) would confer no right of action upon the plaintiff\u2019s intestate until he suffered an injury proximately caused thereby. Until then, his cause of action was not complete and, nothing else appearing, the three-year statute would not begin to run against his right to sue. (Citations omitted).\u201d 291 N.C. at 186, 230 S.E. 2d at 408.\nThis statement of the rule was affirmed by the majority in Pinkston.\n\u201cIn Raftery, the majority and concurring opinions reaffirmed the well-established rule that a statute of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action has accrued and the plaintiff has a right to maintain a suit. A plaintiff\u2019s cause of action accrues only when he suffers some injury.\u201d 292 N.C. at 262-263, 232 S.E. 2d at 432.\nWe are not unaware of two decisions of this Court, State v. Aircraft Corp., 9 N.C. App. 557, 176 S.E. 2d 796 (1970), and Jarrell v. Samsonite Corp., 12 N.C. App. 673, 184 S.E. 2d 376 (1971), cert. den. 280 N.C. 180 (1972), which held that the cause of action arises at the time of defendant\u2019s wrongful act or omission, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had no contractual or other relationship with the defendant. The result reached by this Court was based upon Hooper v. Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E. 2d 818 (1939), which clearly held that even though the plaintiff brought his action within three years of the injury, the statute of limitations ran from the time of the wrongful act or omission from which the injury occurred. However, it should be noted that the Court in Hooper did not cite or discuss any of the earlier cases holding to the contrary, including Mast v. Sapp, 140 N.C. 533, 53 S.E. 350 (1906), and Hocutt v. R.R., 124 N.C. 214, 32 S.E. 681 (1899), a case factually similar to Hooper. See Lauerman, The Accrual and Limitation of Causes of Actions for Nonapparent Bodily Harm and Physical Defects in Property in North Carolina, 8 Wake Forest L.Rev. 327, 373-377 (1972).\nThe Hocutt case, supra, arose out of the construction of ditches to drain railroad property which wrongfully diverted water from its natural course, and resulted in the flooding of plaintiff\u2019s land some 20 years after the digging of the ditches. This was the fourth such case and there were others subsequent to Hocutt. See Lauerman, The Accrual and Limitation of Causes of Actions for Nonapparent Bodily Harm and Physical Defects in Property in North Carolina, supra. Mast v. Sapp, supra, was not a railroad case, but arose from the collapse of a water reservoir owned by the City of Winston and which had been in use for quite some time without having caused injury. The action involved determination of entitlement to damages paid by the City for property damage, the City having also paid damages for wrongful death. Language of the Court in Mast is interesting:\n\u201cThe defective condition of the reservoir was a menace to adjoining property, against which the owners might perhaps have had preventive relief in equity, but no legal right of another was at all infringed until by the process of time and the gradual operation of the primary cause, the wall was undermined and fell, in consequence of what the city had before that time done or failed to do. Roberts v. Read, 16 East, 215. This is what is called in law the \u2018consequential damage,\u2019 or, more correctly, the consequential injury, resulting from the faulty construction of the reservoir, and that is the causa litis. Hocutt v. R.R., supra. But just as soon as the wall fell on the lot of Mrs. Peoples and struck her house, the first injury, as said in Ridley v. R.R., was sustained and her cause of action immediately arose. Roberts v. Read, supra.\u201d 140 N.C. at 542, 53 S.E. at 353.\nIn Motor Lines v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E. 2d 413 (1962), an action for property damage allegedly caused by a defective carburetor on a truck sold to plaintiff, the Court followed Hooper, but left open the question of whether it would follow Hooper \u201cin a case where there is no injury to plaintiff or invasion of his rights at the time of defendant\u2019s negligent act or omission, . . .\u201d 258 N.C. at 326, 128 S.E. 2d at 416.\nThus it appears that the Supreme Court in Raftery and Pinkston did not exressly reject a rule of law it had previously adopted by holding that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of injury to a plaintiff who is not in privity with the manufacturer or seller of defective goods and thus suffered no technical or slight injury at the time of the sale of the goods. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 393 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff\u2019d. 538 F. 2d 327 (4th Cir. 1976), cited by the Raftery majority. The earlier rule enunciated in Hocutt and similar cases as to property damage and Mast as to property and personal injury has now been extended and made applicable to these situations. On the facts of the case sub judice, we hold that plaintiffs\u2019 causes of action did not arise, and thus the applicable statute of limitations did not commence to run, until the date of the fire which caused plaintiffs\u2019 injuries.\nRaftery and Pinkston also firmly establish that G.S. 145(b) with its 10-year limitation does not apply in cases where the injured party, a stranger to the sale of the defective goods, suffered no latent injury due to the existence of a defect in the goods at the time of sale. According to this interpretation, G.S. 145(b) applies only where the plaintiff\u2019s initial injury is \u201cnot readily apparent\u201d. In the instant case, plaintiffs\u2019 initial injuries were readily apparent on the date of the fire. Thus G.S. 145(b) does not apply, and plaintiffs\u2019 claims are not barred even though the deep-fat fryer was manufactured and sold more than 10 years prior to the institution of these actions.\nThe applicable statute of limitations in this case is G.S. 1-52(5), which is a three-year statute. It began to run on 9 May 1969. The four actions involved in this appeal were instituted before the running of the three-year period and thus the statute of limitations had not run so as to bar these actions. Accordingly, the order of the trial judge granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment is\nReversed.\nJudges Clark and Mitchell concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Grier, Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage and Preston, by William E. Poe, W. Samuel Woodard, and Irvin W. Hankins III; Golding, Crews, Meekins, Gordon and Gray, by James P. Crews and Marvin K. Gray; Fleming, Robinson and Bradshaw, by Gibson L. Smith, Jr., for plaintiff appellants.", "Helms, Mulliss and Johnston, by W. Donald Carroll, Jr., and E. Osborne Ayscue, Jr., for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DR. RALPH L. WARD, DR. THOMAS E. LEATH, DR. JOHN T. ROGERS and DR. JAMES B. JOHNSON v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY D. L. PHILLIPS INVESTMENT BUILDERS, INC. v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY THE COLVIS COMPANY v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and ECKERD\u2019S DRUGS, INC. HARRIS-TEETER SUPER MARKETS, INC. v. HOTPOINT DIVISION, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and ECKERD'S DRUGS, INC.\nNo. 7726SC162\n(Filed 7 March 1978)\nLimitation of Actions \u00a7 4.2\u2014 damages from fire \u2014 defective appliance \u2014 no privity with manufacturer \u2014 statute of limitations \u2014 accrual of action\nIn an action to recover for damages sustained in a fire which occurred in a shopping center on 9 May 1969, said fire originating in a deep-fat fryer manufactured by defendant and sold to a company not a party to this action on 27 April 1962, the plaintiffs\u2019 causes of action did not arise and thus G.S. 1-52(5), the applicable statute of limitations, did not commence to run until the date of the fire which caused plaintiffs\u2019 injuries, since a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of injury to a plaintiff who is not in privity with the manufacturer or seller of defective goods and who thus suffered no technical or slight injury at the time of the sale of the goods.\nAPPEAL by plaintiffs from order of Snepp, Judge, entered 19 August 1976 in Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 1978.\nThis, is a consolidated appeal involving four lawsuits resulting from a fire which occurred in a shopping center in Charlotte on 9 May 1969. The various plaintiffs in the four suits suffered damage as a result of the fire. They allege that the fire began in a deep-fat fryer located in Eckerd\u2019s Drug Store; that the deep-fat fryer was negligently designed by defendant Hotpoint Division, General Electric Company; and that defendant\u2019s negligence was the proximate cause of the fire and damage which resulted therefrom.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 complaint also included counts relating to breach of warranties and strict liability in tort, which counts were dismissed in 1972. From the order dismissing these counts plaintiffs did not appeal.\nDefendant filed answer and pled as a defense the three-year statute of limitations, G.S. 1-52, alleging that title to the instrumentality in question had passed from General Electric over nine years prior to the institution of these actions.\nOn 23 May 1975, defendant, pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, filed its motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs\u2019 claims were barred by the statute of limitations. This motion was supported by an affidavit which tended to show that the deep-fat fryer in question was purchased on 27 April 1962. No affidavits in opposition to defendant\u2019s motion appear in the record.\nAfter reviewing the files in the actions and hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court allowed the motion for summary judgment, to which plaintiffs excepted and gave notice of appeal to this Court.\nGrier, Parker, Poe, Thompson, Bernstein, Gage and Preston, by William E. Poe, W. Samuel Woodard, and Irvin W. Hankins III; Golding, Crews, Meekins, Gordon and Gray, by James P. Crews and Marvin K. Gray; Fleming, Robinson and Bradshaw, by Gibson L. Smith, Jr., for plaintiff appellants.\nHelms, Mulliss and Johnston, by W. Donald Carroll, Jr., and E. Osborne Ayscue, Jr., for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0495-01", "first_page_order": 523, "last_page_order": 528 }