{ "id": 8555681, "name": "COY E. BECK, Administrator of the Estate of BLANCHE K. BECK, and COY E. BECK, Individually v. PAUL C. BECK, PEGGY B. MANESS, POLLY B. DOBY, BOBBY RAY BECK, and THOMASVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION", "name_abbreviation": "Beck v. Beck", "decision_date": "1978-06-20", "docket_number": "No. 7722SC753", "first_page": "774", "last_page": "778", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "36 N.C. App. 774" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550332 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575351 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 A.L.R. 3d 8", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 A.L.R. 3d 174", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 S.E. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 N.C. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553296 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/3/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630605 ], "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S.E. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627390 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558339 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0386-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 421, "char_count": 8447, "ocr_confidence": 0.811, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4194517638789217e-07, "percentile": 0.6487080907033576 }, "sha256": "e8d35c0c72129c5dc34ebc3d4b86c30b70378145e0d29e3cdeca410057ffa503", "simhash": "1:8179ce0a5e178bcd", "word_count": 1366 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:02:41.791978+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Hedrick and Mitchell concur." ], "parties": [ "COY E. BECK, Administrator of the Estate of BLANCHE K. BECK, and COY E. BECK, Individually v. PAUL C. BECK, PEGGY B. MANESS, POLLY B. DOBY, BOBBY RAY BECK, and THOMASVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nPlaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear plaintiff\u2019s claim for recovery of administrator\u2019s fees and certain expenses he incurred on behalf of the estate of Blanche K. Beck. He argues that the clerk of superior court has no jurisdiction to hear his claim for fees and expenses. The statutes provide otherwise. G.S. 28A-2-1 provides that the clerk of superior court has \u201cjurisdiction of the administration, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents.\u201d Except for situations in which the clerk is disqualified to act, G.S. 28A-2-3, the clerk\u2019s probate jurisdiction is original and exclusive, and a superior court judge may hear such cases only upon appeal from the clerk. G.S. 7A-241; In re Estates of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E. 2d 541 (1976). In the present case there was no allegation that the clerk was disqualified to act, and there have been no proceedings before the clerk on plaintiff\u2019s claims against his wife\u2019s estate. Therefore, the superior court judge properly concluded that he lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff\u2019s claims for recovery of fees and expenses relating to administration of his deceased wife\u2019s estate.\nTurning now to plaintiff\u2019s claim to have the family settlement agreement set aside, we note that he alleged, as the grounds for his claim, that the family settlement agreement \u201cwas signed by the plaintiff without benefit of counsel and he was not aware of the full legal effects of his signing of said instrument . . . and that said agreement failed to protect the plaintiff\u2019s individual interests and the interests of the estate.\u201d Plaintiff further alleged that the agreement \u201cwas null and void, he being without counsel when he executed the said agreement and he relied upon the defendants other than the Thomasville City Board of Education to his detriment.\u201d We agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that these allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\nFamily settlement agreements providing for distribution of estates are favored and will be upheld if all beneficiaries are properly accounted for, if creditors are not prejudiced, and in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. In re Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E. 2d 562 (1960); Tise v. Hicks, 191 N.C. 609, 132 S.E. 560 (1926); Reese v. Carson, 3 N.C. App. 99, 164 S.E. 2d 99 (1968). Other possible grounds for setting aside a family settlement agreement include undue influence, duress, or breach of confidential or fiduciary relationship. Annot., 29 A.L.R. 3d 174 (1970); Annot., 29 A.L.R. 3d 8 (1970).\nEven when viewed with the liberality required under the notice theory of pleading, plaintiff\u2019s complaint fails to allege any legally sufficient basis for setting aside the family settlement agreement in this case. No specific formalities are required for execution of a family settlement, Tise v. Hicks, supra, and absence of counsel will not defeat an otherwise valid family settlement. Plaintiff alleged that he \u201cwas not aware of the full legal effects\u201d of the agreement, but there is no allegation that he was either unable or was denied an opportunity to read the agreement. Plaintiff alleged that he \u201crelied upon the defendants ... to his detriment,\u201d but there is no allegation that defendants gave him any false or misleading information. Therefore, plaintiff\u2019s second assignment of error is overruled.\nIn open court at the hearing on the individual defendants\u2019 motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff made a motion to amend his complaint to allege that his execution of the family settlement agreement was procured by misrepresentation by the defendants. The court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion, and this denial is the basis of plaintiff\u2019s third assignment of error. Plaintiff\u2019s motion was not made until a year and a half after his complaint was filed and long after responsive pleadings had been served. Under such circumstances, \u201c[a] motion to amend is addressed to the discretion of the court, and its decision thereon is not subject to review except in case of manifest abuse.\u201d Calloway v. Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E. 2d 484, 488 (1972). Plaintiff has failed to show any facts or circumstances that would indicate an abuse of discretion. Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nThe court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s action against the individual defendants is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Hedrick and Mitchell concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ottway Burton for plaintiff appellant.", "John T. Weigel, Jr., for defendants appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COY E. BECK, Administrator of the Estate of BLANCHE K. BECK, and COY E. BECK, Individually v. PAUL C. BECK, PEGGY B. MANESS, POLLY B. DOBY, BOBBY RAY BECK, and THOMASVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION\nNo. 7722SC753\n(Filed 20 June 1978)\n1. Executors and Administrators \u00a7 37\u2014 administrator\u2019s fees and expenses \u2014 jurisdiction\nThe superior court had no jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs claims for recovery of fees and expenses relating to the administration of his deceased wife\u2019s estate since the clerk of court has original jurisdiction of such claims, there have been no proceedings on such claims before the clerk, and there has been no allegation that the clerk was disqualified to act. G.S. 28A-2-1; G.S. 7A-241.\n2. Executors and Administrators \u00a7 33\u2014 action to set aside family settlement agreement \u2014 insufficiency of complaint\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint failed to allege a legally sufficient basis for setting aside a family settlement agreement for the distribution of an estate where it alleged that he signed the agreement without benefit of counsel, he was not aware of the full legal effects of the agreement, and he relied upon the defendants to his detriment.\n3. Pleadings \u00a7 33.3; Rules of civil Procedure \u00a7 15.1\u2014 denial of motion to amend complaint\nIn an action to set aside a family settlement agreement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion, made a year and a half after his complaint was filed and long after responsive pleadings had been served, to amend his complaint to allege that his execution of the agreement was procured by misrepresentation by the defendants.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Godwin, Judge. Judgment entered 16 July 1975 in Superior Court, DAVIDSON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 June 1978.\nPlaintiff instituted this civil action both in his individual capacity and as administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Blanche K. Beck. He sought to have a family settlement agreement set aside and to recover from the estate administrator\u2019s fees and certain expenses incurred by him on behalf of the estate. A prior appeal in this case was dismissed as being premature. Beck v. Beck, 28 N.C. App. 488, 221 S.E. 2d 763 (1976).\nThe family settlement agreement which plaintiff attacks, a copy of which was attached to plaintiff\u2019s complaint, was signed by plaintiff and by his four children, who are the individual defendants in this action and all of whom are adults. This agreement states that Blanche K. Beck died intestate in June 1969, leaving as her sole heirs at law her husband and her four children. The stated purpose of the agreement is to settle the respective interests of the parties in the proceeds from a promissory note held by plaintiff and Blanche K. Beck at the time of her death. Defendant Thomasville City Board of Education had purchased 5.42 acres of real property from plaintiff and his wife in April 1969 and had executed the note, in the face amount of $43,750, to cover the balance of purchase price of the property. Prior to Mrs. Beck\u2019s death, the Thomasville City Board of Education had paid $11,500 on the note, leaving a remaining principal indebtedness at the time of Mrs. Beck\u2019s death of $32,250. The family settlement agreement provides for allocation of this remaining indebtedness among plaintiff and the individual defendants.\nUpon motion of the individual defendants, the trial court directed that the action be dismissed as to the individual defendants. The dismissal was based upon the court\u2019s conclusions (1) that plaintiff\u2019s claims for recovery of administrator\u2019s fees and other expenses relating to administration of the estate are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the clerk of superior court and (2) that plaintiff\u2019s allegations regarding setting aside the family settlement agreement fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff appealed.\nOttway Burton for plaintiff appellant.\nJohn T. Weigel, Jr., for defendants appellees." }, "file_name": "0774-01", "first_page_order": 802, "last_page_order": 806 }