{
  "id": 8553333,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES L. THOMPSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Thompson",
  "decision_date": "1978-08-01",
  "docket_number": "No. 7817SC236",
  "first_page": "444",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:37.287571+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges MORRIS and WEBB concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES L. THOMPSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThe defendant first assigns as error the trial judge\u2019s instruction distinguishing involuntary manslaughter from the lesser-included offense of death by vehicle. In his brief the defendant contends that the following portion of the trial judge\u2019s charge was in error: \u201cNow death by a vehicle differs from involuntary manslaughter in that the State need not prove that the defendant\u2019s violation of any safety statute was done intentionally or recklessly.\u201d\nGeneral Statute 20-141.4 which defines the offense of \u201cDeath by Vehicle\u201d provides:\n(a) Whoever shall unintentionally cause the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any State law or local ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic shall be guilty of death by vehicle when such violation is the proximate cause of said death.\nIn State v. Freeman, 31 N.C. App. 93, 228 S.E. 2d 516, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 449, 230 S.E. 2d 766 (1976), this Court had occasion to discuss the offense set out in the foregoing statute and its relation to the offense of involuntary manslaughter. Judge Martin, speaking for the majority, considered the common-law defin\u00edtion of involuntary manslaughter and concluded that \u201cit is apparent that the intention of the legislature in enacting G.S. 20-141.4 was to define a crime of lesser degree of manslaughter wherein criminal responsibility for death by vehicle is not dependent upon the presence of culpable or criminal negligence.\u201d 31 N.C. App. at 97, 228 S.E. 2d at 519.\nThe trial judge in the present case fully explained the elements of the offenses of involuntary manslaughter and death by vehicle. The defendant\u2019s contention that in distinguishing between the two, the court \u201cvastly reduced the effective scope of N.C. G.S. 20-141.4, to situations where there was no intent or recklessness\u201d is manifestly incorrect. The trial court merely pointed out that with respect to the offense of death by vehicle the State is not required to prove any intentional or reckless conduct on the part of the defendant. This instruction comports with the definition in G.S. 20-141.4 and our opinion in Freeman. Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nThe defendant also assigns as error the denial of his motion to quash the jury array. Prior to trial the court conducted a voir dire hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion and at its conclusion found \u201cthat there has been no discrimination against anyone or any group of people and that the list being chosen from the tax scrolls and the voter registration books would include a fair cross-section of all citizens and would be a fair way to select a jury list.\u201d The defendant does not attack the findings of the trial court; nor does he challenge the court\u2019s conclusion that the selection process was in compliance with the North Carolina General Statutes. Instead, he argues that use of tax scrolls and voter registration books to compile a jury roll is unconstitutional since some segments of our population are underrepresented on these lists. The defendant cites no authority for his position, and the courts of this State 'have held otherwise. See State v. Cornell, 281 N.C. 20, 187 S.E. 2d 768 (1972); State v. Foddrell, 291 N.C. 546, 231 S.E. 2d 618 (1977).\nFinally, the defendant assigns as error the denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of manslaughter, arguing that there was no evidence of intentional or culpably negligent conduct. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State tends to show that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol at an excessive rate of speed, weaving from one side of the highway to the other when he struck Niger\u2019s well-lighted motorcycle from behind. This evidence clearly was sufficient to submit the case to the jury and to support the verdict.\nWe hold that the defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges MORRIS and WEBB concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Henry H. Burgwyn, for the State.",
      "Renn Drum for the defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES L. THOMPSON\nNo. 7817SC236\n(Filed 1 August 1978)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 114\u2014 death by vehicle \u2014 instructions proper\nIn a prosecution for manslaughter where the trial court fully explained the elements of the offenses of involuntary manslaughter and death by vehicle, the court properly pointed out that with respect to the offense of death by vehicle the State was not required to prove any intentional or reckless conduct on the part of the defendant, and such instruction comported with the definition in G.S. 20-141.4.\n2. Jury \u00a7 7.1\u2014 challenge to the array \u2014 method of compiling jury list proper\nDefendant\u2019s contention that use of tax rolls and voter registration books to compile a jury list is unconstitutional since some segments of the population are underrepresented on these lists is without merit, and defendant\u2019s motion to quash the jury array was therefore properly denied.\n3. Automobiles \u00a7 113.1\u2014 manslaughter \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nDefendant\u2019s contention that his motion to dismiss the charge of manslaughter should have been granted because there was no evidence of intentional or culpably negligent conduct was without merit where the evidence tended to show that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol at an excessive rate of speed and was weaving from one side of the highway to the other when he struck the victim\u2019s well-lighted motorcycle from behind.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Crissman, Judge. Judgment entered 1 November 1977 in Superior Court, SURRY County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 June 1978.\nThe defendant was charged with manslaughter and operating a motor vehicle on the public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He pled not guilty to both charges, and the State presented evidence tending to show the following:\nOn the evening of 26 December 1976, Donna Scott was driving her automobile in a southerly direction on Highway 52 near Mt. Airy, North Carolina. A motorcycle driven by John Kiger was proceeding in the same direction ahead of Scott and was sufficiently lighted to be clearly visible from the distance at which Scott followed. Scott noticed a pickup truck approaching at a fast rate of speed from the rear. When the truck which was driven by the defendant pulled dangerously close behind her, she lightly tapped the brakes and moved to the right to signal him to pass. The truck pulled out to pass but when he was even with the front of Scott\u2019s automobile, he cut back into her lane. Scott applied her brakes to avoid collision. As Scott followed the defendant from a safe distance she noticed his truck weaving across the southbound lanes almost across the median. She then saw some black smoke but did not see the motorcycle. The truck weaved back across the south-bound lane, onto the paved shoulder and stopped. Scott, after running over a motorcycle helmet, drove her automobile to the shoulder and stopped behind the defendant\u2019s truck. In the meantime, Niger\u2019s motorcycle had come to rest nearby.\nWhen Scott got out of her car the defendant, who was leaning against his truck, asked \u201cwhere the cycle came from.\u201d Scott began searching for Kiger and found his body in the median of the highway approximately 1000 feet from the point of collision. Unable to feel any pulse, Scott determined that Kiger was dead.\nThe police arrived shortly thereafter, and the investigating officer detected a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant\u2019s breath. He also observed that the defendant was unsteady on his feet, that his eyes were red and glassy, and that he spoke with a slur. The defendant was then asked to go to the police station and on the way he fell asleep in the back seat of the police car. Upon their arrival at the station the defendant submitted to a breathalyzer test and was determined to have .21% blood alcohol content. It was later determined that Kiger had died instantly in the collision.\nThe defendant presented no evidence.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of both charges. From a consolidated judgment imposing 5-7 years imprisonment, the defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Henry H. Burgwyn, for the State.\nRenn Drum for the defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0444-01",
  "first_page_order": 472,
  "last_page_order": 476
}
