{ "id": 8552523, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES EDWARD HUNT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hunt", "decision_date": "1978-08-01", "docket_number": "No. 779SC1033", "first_page": "315", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "37 N.C. App. 315" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "171 S.E. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550964 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575701 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 S.E. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605810 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567692 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573948 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E. 2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559625 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548750 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/24/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.Ct. 1990", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 L.Ed. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 987", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541890, 541282, 541378, 541959, 541706, 541194, 541102, 541363, 541241 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0987-07", "/us/421/0987-05", "/us/421/0987-03", "/us/421/0987-09", "/us/421/0987-01", "/us/421/0987-06", "/us/421/0987-08", "/us/421/0987-02", "/us/421/0987-04" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563315 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561152 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 S.E. 2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571639 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561677 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.Ct. 3207", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 L.Ed. 2d 1208", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 903", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183298, 6181252, 6182756, 6183146, 6182571, 6181805, 6182223, 6181423, 6181585, 6182964, 6182388, 6181945, 6182076 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0903-13", "/us/428/0903-01", "/us/428/0903-10", "/us/428/0903-12", "/us/428/0903-09", "/us/428/0903-04", "/us/428/0903-07", "/us/428/0903-02", "/us/428/0903-03", "/us/428/0903-11", "/us/428/0903-08", "/us/428/0903-05", "/us/428/0903-06" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E. 2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562870 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E. 2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.C. App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556329 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/25/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.Ct. 3204", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 L.Ed. 2d 1206", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 902", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180680, 6180844, 6180492, 6180302, 6181071, 6180146 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0902-04", "/us/428/0902-05", "/us/428/0902-03", "/us/428/0902-02", "/us/428/0902-06", "/us/428/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562667 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0326-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 825, "char_count": 20500, "ocr_confidence": 0.837, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.309558839236361e-07, "percentile": 0.9170024970567782 }, "sha256": "ddfe3216d7240fab6c32446eca2cfbcc75ffee3b4c89735bee44d18ca51289c3", "simhash": "1:8e41ec50b4ee3def", "word_count": 3449 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:37.287571+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge BROCK and Judge HEDRICK concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES EDWARD HUNT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Judge.\nThe defendant first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s actions in sustaining the State\u2019s objections to two of his questions to prospective jurors during jury selection. The defendant asked one prospective juror: \u201c[I]f you are firmly convinced the defendant was not guilty, would you permit anything to change your mind or influence you in your decision as to how to vote?\u201d The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection to this question. At a later point in jury selection, the defendant asked another prospective juror: \u201cWould you allow the fact a considerable number of jurors were voting differently from you to influence you to change your verdict?\u201d The trial court also sustained the State\u2019s objection to this question. The defendant contends that sustaining the objection to either question constituted a failure to permit defense counsel the latitude required in order to adequately assess each of these prospective juror\u2019s fitness and constituted reversible error. We do not agree.\nWe find the two questions were properly excluded as tending to \u201cstake out\u201d the two prospective jurors and cause them to pledge themselves to a future course of action. This is neither contemplated nor permitted by the law. The trial court should not permit counsel to question prospective jurors as to the kind of verdict they would render or how they would be inclined to vote, under a given state of facts. State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E. 2d 60 (1975), modified as to death penalty, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1206, 96 S.Ct. 3204 (1976). The hypothetical question posed here could not reasonably be expected to result in an answer bearing upon a juror\u2019s qualifications. Rather it would tend to commit the juror to a decision on the performance of his duties prior to an instruction by the court with regard to their proper performance pursuant to law. The trial court properly sustained the objections to both questions. State v. Poole, 25 N.C. App. 715, 214 S.E. 2d 774 (1975).\nThe defendant also contends the trial court erred in halting his attempts to ask repetitive questions without the State having objected. Regulation of the manner and extent of the inquiry of a prospective juror concerning his fitness rests largely in the trial court\u2019s discretion and will not be found to constitute reversible error unless harmful prejudice and clear abuse of discretion are shown. State v. Young, 287 N.C. 377, 214 S.E. 2d 763 (1975), modified as to death penalty, 428 U.S. 903, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1208, 96 S.Ct. 3207 (1976). This contention is without merit.\nThe defendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his challenge for cause of prospective juror, Clarence Varker. Mr. Varker had previously indicated that he was a member of the Henderson Police Department and had heard the defendant\u2019s case discussed by other police officers. On this basis the defendant challenged the prospective juror for cause. The court inquired as to whether Mr. Varker could listen to the evidence and the court\u2019s instructions on the law and be guided solely by those two things and nothing else. The prospective juror answered affirmatively and the court denied the motion to excuse for cause. The court then specifically offered counsel for the defendant the opportunity to pursue the issue further with the prospective juror, but no further questions were asked.\nWe note that the defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges and thereafter asserted his right to challenge peremptorily an additional juror. Error by the trial court in denying the defendant\u2019s challenge for cause would, therefore, be reversible. State v. Young, 287 N.C. 377, 214 S.E. 2d 763 (1975), modified as to death penalty, 428 U.S. 903, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1208, 96 S.Ct. 3207 (1976); State v. Fox, 277 N.C. 1, 175 S.E. 2d 561 (1970). We do not, however, under the particular circumstances of this case, find the ruling of the trial court erroneous.\nThe defendant refers us to State v. Lee, 292 N.C. 617, 234 S.E. 2d 574 (1977), and contends that the holding of that case required the trial court to grant this defendant\u2019s challenge of Mr. Varker for cause due to his status as a police officer and the fact that he had heard the case discussed. We do not find the holding in Lee so broad as to have required the trial court to excuse the juror for cause in this case. We decline to hold that any individual must be excused for cause solely by virtue of the nature of his employment. Such holding might well require exclusion of numerous classes of individuals solely by virtue of employment or membership in voluntary associations which were perceived as indicating some type of predisposition on the part of a prospective juror.\nNeither do we find the fact that the prospective juror had heard the case to be tried discussed previously to be determinative of his competence to serve as a member of the jury. To exclude all individuals who had prior information concerning a given case from jury duty would, in cases involving extensive publicity, often tend to require the exclusion of most individuals who regularly read newspapers or otherwise kept themselves informed as to current affairs of public note. Arguably, this would require our courts to exclude from service those best qualified to hear and deal with evidence and to understand instructions upon the law.\nOur Supreme Court specifically indicated in Lee that its holding was limited to the particular circumstances of that case. Those circumstances are easily distinguishable from the circumstances presented by the case sub judice. In Lee the prospective juror was a police officer\u2019s wife who knew a crucial State\u2019s witness well and had known him over a period of time. More importantly, however, the prospective juror indicated in that case that she felt it possible she might be unable to keep herself from giving more weight to the testimony of police officers she knew than she would give to other witnesses. Here, the prospective juror clearly indicated that he could base his determination solely upon the evidence and the law without being swayed by anything else.\nThe trial court offered the defendant the opportunity to pursue these matters further with the prospective juror by asking additional questions. No further questions were asked. The record does not indicate what the prospective juror had heard about this case when he heard it discussed by other officers. In order to find error by the trial court in denying the challenge by Mr. Varker for cause, we would, therefore, be required to hold that he could be excluded for cause solely by virtue of his employment as a police officer who had been exposed to some unspecified information about the case to be tried. We do not believe such a holding is required by law, and we decline so to hold. 8 Strong, N.C. Index 3d, Jury, \u00a7 7.10, pp. 186-7.\nThe defendant next assigns as error the ruling of the trial court that the search of the defendant\u2019s automobile, which resulted in the introduction into evidence of blood samples and other physical evidence, was conducted with the defendant\u2019s consent. Upon objection by the defendant to the introduction of this evidence, the trial court held a voir dire out of the presence of the jury and heard evidence concerning the events leading up to the search of the defendant\u2019s automobile. The law enforcement officers who testified for the State on voir dire indicated that, when the defendant was stopped in the early morning hours of 9 March 1977, he was asked to and did drive his automobile to the sheriff\u2019s office. Upon arrival there, the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and asked by the officers if they could search his automobile. The defendant responded at that time by stating that the keys were in the switch, and they could search the automobile. The officers further testified that the defendant appeared at this time to understand his rights, to be sober, not frightened and to understand the questions asked him. The trial court made specific findings of fact incorporating the substance of this testimony and concluded that the search of the defendant\u2019s automobile was with consent which had been given freely and voluntarily.\nWhen the State seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, it has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L.Ed. 2d 854, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973). Additionally, the presumption is against the waiver of such fundamental constitutional rights. State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E. 2d 755 (1971). Where, as here, the defendant objects to the admissibility of the State\u2019s evidence on the ground that it was obtained by an unlawful search, it is the duty of the trial court, in the absence of the jury, to hear the evidence of the State and of the defendant as to the lawfulness of the search and seizure. The trial court is further required to make findings of fact from the evidence, and such findings are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence. State v. Crews, 286 N.C. 41, 209 S.E. 2d 462 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 987, 44 L.Ed. 2d 477, 95 S.Ct. 1990 (1975).\nHere, the trial court heard evidence and made findings of fact and concluded that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his automobile. The defendant contends, however, that the trial court erred in failing to specifically find and conclude that the voluntary consent was given without duress. The defendant additionally contends that such finding would have been unsupported by the evidence before the trial court. We do not agree.\nThe trial court heard specific testimony that, at the time the defendant gave his consent to the search, he did not appear to be frightened. The court specifically adopted this as a finding of fact. We think that this evidence and finding, together with the other evidence and findings previously set forth, was sufficient to support a conclusion that consent was given without duress. We do not find the trial court committed error by failing to specifically state in its findings and conclusions that the consent was \u201cwithout duress.\u201d See State v. Glaze, 24 N.C. App. 60, 210 S.E. 2d 124 (1974). The trial court found the defendant consented to the search and that his consent was voluntary. As consent is not in fact voluntary if the product of duress or coercion, the trial court\u2019s finding and conclusion that the defendant voluntarily consented was also an implicit finding that the consent was without duress. See State v. Haskins, 278 N.C. 52, 178 S.E. 2d 610 (1971). Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the fruits of the consensual search of the defendant\u2019s automobile.\nThe defendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s action in overruling his objections to certain portions of the district attorney\u2019s closing arguments to the jury. The defendant contends that these portions of the closing argument on behalf of the State emphasize the defendant\u2019s failure to produce an essential defense witness and tended to require the defendant to prove his innocence. The trial court in its discretion controls the arguments of counsel, and the court\u2019s rulings will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion. State v. Maynor, 272 N.C. 524, 158 S.E. 2d 612 (1968). Further, appellate courts do not ordinarily interfere with the trial court\u2019s control of jury arguments, unless the impropriety of counsel\u2019s remarks is extreme and is clearly calculated to prejudice the jury in its deliberations. We are unable to make any such determination here, as the argument of counsel for the defendant in its entirety and the majority of the argument of the district attorney are omitted from the record. When a portion of the argument of either counsel is omitted from the record on appeal, the arguments are presumed proper. See State v. Taylor, 289 N.C. 223, 221 S.E. 2d 359 (1976); State v. Dew, 240 N.C. 595, 83 S.E. 2d 482 (1954); 1 Strong, N.C. Index 3d, Appeal and Error, \u00a7 42.2, pp. 293-4. This assignment of error is overruled.\nThe defendant also assigns as error a portion of the trial court\u2019s charge in which the court stated that one of the State\u2019s witnesses had testified that soil samples taken from an area near the body of the deceased were \u201cthe same\u201d as soil samples taken from the defendant\u2019s shoes. The witness had in fact testified that the soil samples matched as to color, texture type and mineral composition. He also testified that it was highly likely they came from the same source. Later in the charge the trial court specifically instructed the jury that they were to rely upon their own recollection of the evidence and to disregard the court\u2019s recollection if the two differed. We find, therefore, that this inadvertent and slight inaccuracy in recapitulating the evidence was not reversible error.\nWe also note that the defendant did not object to this slight misstatement in recapitulating the evidence. Such inadvertent misstatements must be called to the trial court\u2019s attention in time for correction if they are to be relied upon on appeal. State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509, 160 S.E. 2d 469 (1968). We will not hold such slight inaccuracies to be reversible error when not called to the trial court\u2019s attention in apt time to afford an opportunity for correction. State v. Walker, 6 N.C. App. 740, 171 S.E. 2d 91 (1969).\nThe defendant also assigned as error certain matters in the record concerning the trial court\u2019s charge on circumstantial evidence. These appear to have arisen from transcribing or typographical errors and were waived and abandoned by the defendant during oral arguments. Although we have reviewed them and find no reversible error, we will not deal here with those assignments in detail.\nThe defendant has brought forward and argued numerous other exceptions and assignments of error. We have reviewed each of them and find that they do not present reversible error.\nThe defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error, and we find\nNo error.\nChief Judge BROCK and Judge HEDRICK concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Thomas H. Davis, Jr., for the State.", "Kermit W. Ellis, Jr., for the defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES EDWARD HUNT\nNo. 779SC1033\n(Filed 1 August 1978)\n1. Jury \u00a7 6.3\u2014 examination of prospective jurors \u2014 questions about performance-objections properly sustained\nWhere defense counsel asked one prospective juror if he would permit anything to influence him in his decision and another prospective juror if he would allow the fact that a considerable number of jurors were voting differently from him to influence him to change his verdict, the trial court properly sustained the State\u2019s objections, since the questions could not reasonably be expected to result in answers bearing upon the jurors\u2019 qualifications but instead would tend to commit the jurors to a decision on the performance of their duties prior to an instruction by the court with regard to their proper performance pursuant to law.\n2. Jury \u00a7 7.10\u2014 policeman as prospective juror \u2014 knowledge of defendant\u2019s case \u2014 no challenge for cause\nThe trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s challenge for cause of a prospective juror who was a police officer and who had heard defendant\u2019s case discussed by other police officers since it is not required that any individual must be excused for cause solely by virtue of the nature of his employment; the prospective juror clearly indicated that he could base his determination solely upon the evidence and the law without being swayed by anything else; and the court offered defendant the opportunity to examine the witness further, but no additional questions were asked.\n3. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 14\u2014 consent to search vehicle \u2014 failure to find no duress \u2014specific finding not required\nEvidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that a search of defendant\u2019s automobile was made with his consent which was given at a time when he understood his rights, was sober, was not frightened and understood the questions asked him, and the court did not err in failing specifically to find and conclude that the voluntary consent was given without duress, since the court\u2019s finding that defendant did not appear to be frightened when he gave consent and that he gave consent voluntarily was sufficient to support a conclusion that consent was given without duress.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 158.2\u2014 argument omitted from record \u2014 presumption of propriety\nWhen a portion of the argument of either counsel is omitted from the record on appeal, the arguments are presumed proper.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 113.1\u2014 jury instructions \u2014 misstatement of evidence \u2014 no reversible error\nIn a homicide prosecution where the trial court charged that one of the State\u2019s witnesses had testified that soil samples taken from an area near the victim\u2019s body were \u201cthe same\u201d as soil samples taken from defendant\u2019s shoes, but the witness had in fact testified only that it was highly likely that the samples came from the same source, such inadvertent and slight inaccuracy in recapitulating the evidence was not reversible error, since later in the charge the court specifically instructed the jury that they were to rely upon their own recollection of the evidence and to disregard the court\u2019s recollection if the two differed.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Graham, Judge. Judgment entered 12 July 1977 in Superior Court, WILSON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 April 1978.\nDefendant was indicted and tried for murder in the first degree. Upon his plea of not guilty, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. From judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for a period of sixty years, the defendant appeals.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that the deceased, Charlene Perry, and the defendant, James Edward Hunt, had dated for a time prior to 8 March 1977, but that she had stopped dating the defendant and was dating another man. Approximately two weeks prior to 8 March 1977, the defendant and the deceased had a conversation at a funeral home. At that time the defendant told the deceased that \u201cif she didn\u2019t watch what she was doing, someone would be viewing her body.\u201d\nThe State also offered evidence tending to show that the defendant went to a party in the home of one Christine Hargrove on 8 March 1977. He had a conversation there with the deceased and asked her if he could speak to her for a few minutes. The two went outside the Hargrove home where the defendant bent the deceased backward over an automobile. The deceased appeared to try to get away from the defendant at this time. When told to, he released the deceased and returned to the inside of the home. At this time he displayed a knife and a pistol.\nThe State\u2019s evidence further tended to show that on 8 March 1977, after the defendant and deceased returned to the inside of the Hargrove home, the defendant again asked to speak to the deceased. They then left the home together. The body of the deceased was found later, on the evening of 8 March 1977, beside a public highway. Her death was the result of gunshot wounds.\nThe defendant was stopped by members of the Vance County Sheriff\u2019s Department while driving his automobile at 5:00 a.m. on 9 March 1977. At their request, the defendant followed the officers to the sheriff\u2019s office. The defendant then consented to a search of his automobile. During a search of the automobile, blood stains were found. Blood and soil samples were taken from the automobile and from the defendant\u2019s shoes and tested by the State Bureau of Investigation. The blood in the car and on the defendant\u2019s shoes matched the blood type of the deceased but not that of the defendant. The soil found on the defendant\u2019s shoes was tested and found to be of a similar type to that at the point where the deceased\u2019s body was found. Elmer T. Miller, a specialist in soil comparison for the State Bureau of Investigation, testified that it was highly likely that the two soil samples came from the same original source.\nThe defendant offered evidence tending to show that he had gotten along well with the deceased, Charlene Perry. The defendant also offered evidence tending to show that the deceased had been seen going to a party in the apartment of another person at 9:00 p.m. on the evening of her death.\nOther relevant facts are hereinafter set forth.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Thomas H. Davis, Jr., for the State.\nKermit W. Ellis, Jr., for the defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0315-01", "first_page_order": 343, "last_page_order": 351 }