{ "id": 8554209, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF THE REVOCATION OF THE LICENSE OF MARVIN JESSE HARRIS, LICENSE NO. 2842781", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Revocation of the License of Harris", "decision_date": "1978-08-15", "docket_number": "No. 772SC785", "first_page": "590", "last_page": "595", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "37 N.C. App. 590" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "114 S.E. 2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625622 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610541 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 205", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9566 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 601", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11342234 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "2916" }, { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S.E. 2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" }, { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0206-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 540, "char_count": 10496, "ocr_confidence": 0.818, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.099291899483843e-08, "percentile": 0.46760544726738895 }, "sha256": "043a313edfa8b91b23d5053d131be62551010b90041a5d236524ce121545c1c6", "simhash": "1:5b0a8033d27b41b3", "word_count": 1682 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:37.287571+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Martin concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF THE REVOCATION OF THE LICENSE OF MARVIN JESSE HARRIS, LICENSE NO. 2842781" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nG.S. 2049(e) provides that\n\u201cWhen a license is revoked because of a third or subsequent conviction for driving or operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or while under the influence of an impairing drug, occurring within five years after a prior conviction, the period of revocation shall be permanent; provided, that the Division may, after the expiration of three years, issue a new license upon satisfactory proof that the former licensee has not been convicted within the past three years with a violaton of any provision of motor vehicle laws, liquor laws or drug laws of North Carolina or any other state and is not an excessive user of alcohol or drugs. . . .\u201d\nThe trial court ruled that the statute, especially the phrase \u201cliquor laws\u201d was \u201cunconstitutionally vague, indefinite and over-broad\u201d and that a \u201cconviction of public drunkenness is not a violation of the \u2018liquor laws\u2019. . . .\u201d\nFirst, we determine whether the phrase \u201cliquor laws\u201d is \u201cunconstitutionally vague\u201d. Our Supreme Court has set out a detailed definition of \u201cvagueness\u201d.\n\u201c \u2018That the terms of a penal statute . . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalities, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.\u2019\n\u2018 . . . the terms of a criminal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to it what acts it is their duty to avoid or what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalities, and no one may be required, at the peril of life, liberty, or property to guess at, or speculate as to, the meaning of a penal statute.\u2019 \u201d Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 211, 125 S.E. 2d 764, 768 (1962).\nIn our opinion, the phrase \u201cliquor laws\u201d is not a term \u201cso vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. . . .\u201d Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. at 211, 125 S.E. 2d at 768. Quite to the contrary, we believe that the term is so clear and understandable to men of common intelligence that no further discussion is necessary.\nNext, is the statute constitutionally invalid because it is over-broad? A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad where \u201cthe possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech [or conduct] to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech [or conduct] of others will be muted [or inhibited]. . . .\u201d Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed. 2d 830, 840 (1973). A statute is not overbroad when it punishes, prohibits, or inhibits only conduct which is not constitutionally protected. Overbreadth is an issue only where some constitutionally protected conduct is punished, prohibited, or inhibited by the very same statutory provision which punishes, prohibits, or inhibits the unprotected behavior.\nOverbreadth has generally been an issue in cases which dealt with statutes allegedly interfering with first amendment rights. A good example of this pattern is Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed. 2d 125 (1975). There an ordinance was adopted which prohibited drive-in movie theaters from showing films containing nudity when the screen was visible from any public street or public place. Because the ordinance\u2019s prohibition encompassed some constitutionally protected conduct; for example, showing nudity which was not pornographic, along with constitutionally unprotected conduct, such as showing nudity which was pornographic, the ordinance was overbroad and was constitutionally invalid on its face.\nThe present case is completely different. The only conduct inhibited by the challenged statute, insofar as this case is concerned, is \u201cviolation ... of liquor laws ... of North Carolina. . . .\u201d Petitioner has argued that the statute is overbroad because the crime of public drunkenness is included in the phrase \u201cviolation of liquor laws\u201d and because, under the statute, conviction of the crime of public drunkenness precludes reinstatement of driving privileges for three additional years. This argument is totally without merit. Public drunkenness is not a constitutionally protected activity; nor is any other conduct within the purview of the phrase \u201cviolation of liquor laws of North Carolina\u201d. Thus, the statute is not and cannot be deemed constitutionally overbroad.\nFinally, we must determine whether the crime of public drunkenness is a violation of the \u201cliquor laws\u201d of North Carolina as the term is used in G.S. 20-19(e). The trial court concluded that public drunkenness was not a violation of the liquor laws of North Carolina. G.S. 14-335(a) provides that \u201c[i]f any person shall be found drunk or intoxicated in any public place, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .\u201d\n\u201cIn the construction of the Act our chief concern is to ascertain the legislative intent. . . .\n* * *\n\u2018It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that ordinarily words of a statute will be given their natural, approved, and recognized meaning. . . . [Citations omitted.]\n\u2018It is also an accepted rule of construction that in ascertaining the intent of the Legislature in cases of ambiguity, regard must be had to the subject matter of the statute, as well as its language, ie., the language of the statute must be read not textually, but contextually, and with reference to the matters dealt with, the objects and purposes sought to be accomplished, and in a sense which harmonizes with the subject matter. [Citations omitted.]\u2019 \u201d Greensboro v. Smith, 241 N.C. 363, 366, 85 S.E. 2d 292, 294 and 295 (1955).\nWe note first that the legislature intended to deny reis-suance of a driver\u2019s license where the petitioner has violated either of three broad categories of laws: \u201cmotor vehicle laws\u201d, \u201cliquor laws\u201d, or \u201cdrug laws\u201d. Furthermore, the expansive nature of the statute can be seen in that the prohibition extends to \u201claws of North Carolina or any other state\u201d. (Emphasis added.) It, therefore, appears that the legislature was demanding complete compliance with all laws governing the use of drugs, alcohol, and motor vehicles. This demand for compliance with the law is joined with the requirement that the petitioner not be \u201can excessive user of alcohol\u201d. We are compelled to the conclusion that the legislature fully intended to include the crime of public drunkenness in the phrase \u201cviolation of liquor laws of North Carolina\u201d. Additionally, this interpretation is in more complete harmony with the statute as a whole. We also believe that this interpretation conforms to the natural meaning of the phrases. Finally, this construction has been adopted by the Division of Motor Vehicles, and the construction adopted by the State officials who administer a statute is always strongly persuasive. Shealy v. Associated Transport, 252 N.C. 738, 114 S.E. 2d 702 (1960).\nWe, therefore, hold that the crime of public drunkenness is a violation of the liquor laws of North Carolina as that term is used in G.S. 20-19(e). The trial court erred as a matter of law in holding to the contrary. The decision of the trial court is reversed and the ruling of the Division of Motor Vehicles is reinstated.\nReversed.\nJudges Vaughn and Martin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Mary I. Murrill and Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray, for respondent appellant.", "James, Hite, Cavendish & Blount, by Dallas Clark, Jr., for petitioner appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF THE REVOCATION OF THE LICENSE OF MARVIN JESSE HARRIS, LICENSE NO. 2842781\nNo. 772SC785\n(Filed 15 August 1978)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 1.1\u2014 revocation of driver\u2019s license for violation of liquor laws \u2014liquor laws not vague or overbroad term\nThe phrase \u201cliquor laws\u201d as contained in G.S. 20-19(e), the statute providing for permanent revocation of a driver\u2019s license, is not unconstitutionally vague since men of common intelligence can understand it and is not over-broad since no conduct within the purview of the phrase is a constitutionally protected activity.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 1.1; Disorderly Conduct and Public Drunkenness \u00a7 1\u2014 public drunkenness as violation of liquor laws\nThe crime of public drunkenness is a violation of the liquor laws of N. C. as that term is used in G.S. 2049(e).\nAPPEAL by respondent from Small, Judge. Judgment entered 9 May 1977, Superior Court, BEAUFORT County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 June 1978.\nPetitioner commenced this action on 22 July 1976 pursuant to G.S. 20-25, seeking a review of the ruling of the Division of Motor Vehicles that petitioner was ineligible for the issuance of a new license pursuant to G.S. 20-19. The essential facts are these: Petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence on 3 December 1969, and his license was revoked for one year \u2014 from January 1970 to January 1971. On 10 April 1972, petitioner was convicted of aiding and abetting while driving under the influence, and his license was revoked for four years \u2014 from May 1972 to May 1976. On 22 May 1972 petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence, and his license was permanently revoked on 22 May 1972. Petitioner requested and received hearings at which he sought reinstatement of his license in May 1975 and November 1975. On 17 March 1976, petitioner was convicted of public drunkenness.\nPetitioner sought and received another hearing on 12 June 1976 seeking reinstatement of his license. The Division ruled that he was ineligible for reinstatement and would remain ineligible until 17 March 1979, three years after the date of his conviction of public drunkenness. Petitioner appealed to the Superior Court.\nThe trial court concluded that \u201cthe phrase . . . \u2018liquor laws\u2019 ... as contained in G.S. 2049(e) is unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad . . .\u201d and that \u201cpetitioner\u2019s conviction of public drunkenness is not a violation of the \u2018liquor laws\u2019. . . .\u201d The court ordered the Division to grant petitioner a hearing and ruled that it could not \u201cdeny reinstatement of petitioner\u2019s driving privilege for three years because of petitioner\u2019s conviction of public drunkenness. . . .\u201d\nFrom that judgment, respondent appeals.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Mary I. Murrill and Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray, for respondent appellant.\nJames, Hite, Cavendish & Blount, by Dallas Clark, Jr., for petitioner appellee." }, "file_name": "0590-01", "first_page_order": 618, "last_page_order": 623 }