{
  "id": 8551448,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY GENE BROWN",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Brown",
  "decision_date": "1978-09-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 785SC314",
  "first_page": "22",
  "last_page": "25",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "38 N.C. App. 22"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "94 S.E. 2d 821",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1956,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "244 N.C. 666",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        2219553
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      "year": 1956,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/nc/244/0666-01"
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    {
      "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 327",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1955,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "241 N.C. 321",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8609699
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      "year": 1955,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/241/0321-01"
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    {
      "cite": "153 S.E. 2d 352",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "269 N.C. 656",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8565433
      ],
      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/269/0656-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "134 S.E. 2d 110",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "261 N.C. 59",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8571682
      ],
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/261/0059-01"
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    },
    {
      "cite": "197 S.E. 2d 505",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "283 N.C. 604",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559669
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      "year": 1973,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 7589,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.84,
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    "simhash": "1:b330b7ce5caf442b",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:33.594298+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Chief Judge BROCK and Judge ARNOLD concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY GENE BROWN"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThe defendant\u2019s two assignments of error focus on the trial court\u2019s admission of testimony regarding the speed at which he was driving at the time of the accident, and the court\u2019s instruction thereon. The defendant recognizes the general rule that a \u201c \u2018person of ordinary intelligence, who has had an opportunity for observation, is competent to testify as to the rate of speed\u2019 of a motor vehicle.\u201d 1 Stansbury\u2019s N.C. Evidence \u00a7 131, at 420 (Brandis rev. 1973) and cases cited thereunder. He argues that the witness, Alphonso Braggs, did not have sufficient opportunity to observe the defendant\u2019s moving vehicle and ascertain its speed at the time of the accident.\nBraggs first testified that he was in his upstairs apartment at the northeast corner of 8th and Meares Streets when he heard \u201cthe loud sound of a car coming down going south on 8th Street\u201d; that he immediately went to his window facing south and observed the defendant\u2019s car heading south on 8th Street; that he watched as the defendant turned east on Meares Street, drove onto the sidewalk on the southeast corner of the intersection, and then crossed Meares Street and came to rest in the yard where the children had been playing. The district attorney then asked the witness what he had noticed about the defendant\u2019s automobile when he first observed it, and Braggs replied that \u201c[i]t was going fast.\u201d The defendant\u2019s objection and motion to strike this testimony was overruled.\nIn our opinion Braggs had an adequate opportunity to observe the defendant\u2019s automobile in travel, and thus, he was competent to testify as to its fast rate of speed immediately prior to the accident. See Brown v. Neal, 283 N.C. 604, 197 S.E. 2d 505 (1973); Honeycutt v. Strube, 261 N.C. 59, 134 S.E. 2d 110 (1964). The witness\u2019 admission that he has never driven an automobile bears not on the competency of the evidence, but on its probative force. Murchison v. Powell, 269 N.C. 656, 153 S.E. 2d 352 (1967). Furthermore, we find the cases upon which the defendant relies, State v. Becker, 241 N.C. 321, 85 S.E. 2d 327 (1955), and Fleming v. Twiggs, 244 N.C. 666, 94 S.E. 2d 821 (1956), distinguishable since in each of these cases the witness, whose testimony as to speed was excluded, had been distracted in his observation or had observed the vehicle only a few feet before impact.\nThe defendant also excepted to Braggs\u2019 testimony that in his opinion the defendant\u2019s automobile was travelling in excess of the speed limit. He argues that there was no indication in the record that the witness knew the speed limit in the vicinity in which the accident occurred. Prior to Braggs\u2019 testimony Officer Robert Lee Harris, Jr. of the Wilmington Police Department testified that the \u201cposted speed limit in the area of 8th and Mears [sic] on . . . [28 May 1977] was thirty-five miles an hour.\u201d Braggs testified on cross-examination that he thought the speed limit in the vicinity was thirty-five miles per hour. We think this evidence provided an adequate foundation upon which Braggs could testify that the defendant was driving in excess of the speed limit.\nOur disposition of the foregoing assignment is likewise dispositive of the defendant\u2019s assignment regarding the trial court\u2019s instruction on the speed at which the defendant was driving his automobile. In the pertinent portion of the charge the trial judge instructed the jury that it should find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter if, among other things, it found that he \u201cintentionally or recklessly violated the law by either operating a vehicle in excess of the speed limit,\u201d or by driving under the influence of an intoxicating beverage. Clearly, Braggs\u2019 testimony that the defendant was travelling at an excessive rate of speed was sufficient to support the quoted instruction. The defendant\u2019s assignments of error challenging the admission of Braggs\u2019 testimony of speed and the instruction thereon are overruled.\nWe hold that the defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nChief Judge BROCK and Judge ARNOLD concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Thomas H. Davis, Jr., for the State.",
      "Ernest B. Fullwood for the defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY GENE BROWN\nNo. 785SC314\n(Filed 5 September 1978)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 46\u2014 opinion testimony as to speed \u2014 opportunity for observation\nIn this prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and driving under the influence, a witness had an adequate opportunity to observe defendant\u2019s automobile in travel so that he was competent to testify that the automobile was \u201cgoing fast\u201d immediately prior to the accident where the witness testified that he was in an upstairs apartment on a corner of the intersection where the accident occurred; he heard the loud sound of a car coming down the street toward the intersection and immediately went to a window and observed defendant\u2019s car coming toward the intersection; and he watched as defendant attempted to turn at the intersection and drove his automobile into a yard where two children were playing. The witness\u2019s admission that he had never driven an automobile did not bear on the competency of his testimony but only on its probative force.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 46\u2014 opinion that defendant exceeded speed limit \u2014 knowledge of speed limit\nThere was sufficient evidence that a witness knew the speed limit in the area in question to permit him to testify that defendant\u2019s automobile was traveling in excess of the speed limit where an officer had previously testified that the posted speed limit in the area was 35 mph, and the witness testified on cross-examination that he thought the speed limit in the area was 35 mph.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 27.2\u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 exceeding speed limit \u2014 sufficient evidence to support instruction\nA witness\u2019s testimony that defendant was traveling at an excessive rate of speed was sufficient to support the court\u2019s instruction that the jury should find defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter if, among other things, it found he \u201cintentionally or recklessly violated the law by . . . operating a vehicle in excess of the speed limit.\u201d\nAPPEAL by defendant from Webb, Judge. Judgment entered 7 October 1977 in Superior Court, New HANOVER County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 August 1978.\nDefendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage. The defendant pled not guilty to each charge, and the State presented evidence tending to show the following:\nAt about 6:40 p.m. on 28 May 1977 the defendant was travel-ling at a fast rate of speed in a southerly direction on 8th Street in Wilmington, North Carolina. When he reached the intersection at Meares Street the defendant attempted to turn left, hit the southeast curb, continued across Meares Street and jumped the north curb, hitting two children who were playing in the yard. Phillip Devone was injured and Richard Nixon was killed in the accident. Later the defendant submitted to a breathalyzer test and was determined to have a .16 percent blood alcohol content.\nThe defendant presented evidence tending to show that the accident was the result of faulty brakes.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of both offenses. Pursuant to the defendant\u2019s motion the trial court arrested judgment in the case in which defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicating beverage. From a judgment imposing a 5 year prison sentence for his conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Thomas H. Davis, Jr., for the State.\nErnest B. Fullwood for the defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0022-01",
  "first_page_order": 50,
  "last_page_order": 53
}