{
  "id": 8552159,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOYCE BARNHILL VIETTO",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Vietto",
  "decision_date": "1978-09-19",
  "docket_number": "No. 785SC391",
  "first_page": "99",
  "last_page": "102",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:33.594298+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Parker and Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOYCE BARNHILL VIETTO"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ERWIN, Judge.\nDefendant presents several questions on this appeal. We have carefully considered them all and conclude that defendant had a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nFirst, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that \u201cLearning Foundations\u201d was not an \u201capproved\u201d nonpublic school. The testimony complained of was that of George Talley, Principal of Tileston School, the public school from which defendant removed her daughter; Hilda Worth, Attendance Counselor of the New Hanover County Schools; and Heyward Bellamy, New Hanover County Superintendent of Schools. These witnesses were all public school officials and, we feel, competent to testify as to whether or not \u201cLearning Foundations\u201d was an \u201capproved\u201d nonpublic school under N.C.G.S. 115-166. The evidence was also sufficient as to \u201cLearning Foundations\u201d failure to meet statutory requirements.\nNext, defendant earnestly argues that she should have been allowed to present evidence as to whether or not she had willfully violated G.S. 115-166. Essentially, she asserts that she acted in good faith, with just cause, and in her child\u2019s best interests by withdrawing her child from the public schools. We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding such evidence.\nThe record clearly shows that defendant was fully aware that her actions in withdrawing her child from public school and in placing her in \u201cLearning Foundations\u201d might subject her to criminal prosecution. In fact, the record reveals that public school officials offered to place her child in another public school for the remainder of the 1976-77 school year. Defendant had this and other alternatives. She could have placed her child in an \u201capproved\u201d nonpublic school, or she could perhaps have secured tutorial assistance for her child to supplement the instruction she was receiving in the public schools. Instead, she elected to place her daughter in a nonpublic learning environment which did not meet the mandate of the statute. This she chose to do in lieu of public, \u201capproved\u201d nonpublic, or supplemental instruction, and it is this which the statute proscribes.\nWe note that G.S. 115-166 does not compel every child to attend public schools exclusively for the prescribed period. Such a law would be invalid. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925). Here there is no doubt that defendant was aware of the attendance laws and yet deliberately removed her child from the public schools. We find that State v. Miday, 263 N.C. 747, 140 S.E. 2d 325 (1965), is not controlling, as that case involved an unintentional violation of G.S. 115-166 in which defendant was asserting what he perceived his rights to be under another statute.\nIn any event, willfulness is not contained in G.S. 115-166 as an element of the offense, and we decline to engraft such an element on the statute. Counsel for defendant have very ably and sincerely presented her case, but we must note that many parents from time to time become dissatisfied with the quality of instruction in our public schools, and such concern may to them be justified. As noted above, however, there are permissible alternatives to public school instruction. Few convictions, if any, could be obtained under G.S. 115-166 and 169 if parents could merely assert justification for noncompliance in order to avoid criminal liability.\nDefendant contends that the following portion of the court\u2019s charge improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant:\n\u201cThe State contends that even by the testimony of the faculty of the Learning Foundations that they did not testify that they were a school whose teachers and curricula had been approved by the State Board of Education.\u201d\nThe trial court was merely stating contentions and in its charge, clearly placed the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense, including \u201cthat she did not attend any school, either a public school\u201d or \u201ca school which had been approved by the State Board of Education.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error have been carefully considered and are overruled.\nIn the trial below, we find\nNo error.\nJudges Parker and Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ERWIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Patricia B. Hodulik, for the State.",
      "Prickett & Scott, by Carlton S. Prickett, Jr., and James K. Larrick, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JOYCE BARNHILL VIETTO\nNo. 785SC391\n(Filed 19 September 1978)\n1. Schools \u00a7 14\u2014 compulsory school attendance law \u2014nonpublic school-teachers and curricula not \u201capproved\u201d\nIn a prosecution of defendant for violation of the compulsory school attendance law, G.S. 115-166, by placing her child in a nonpublic school not having teachers and curricula approved by the State Board of Education, the trial court properly permitted school officials to testify that the school in which the child was placed was not an \u201capproved\u201d nonpublic school.\n2. Schools \u00a7 14\u2014 compulsory school attendance law \u2014willfulness\nIn a prosecution of defendant for a violation of G.S. 115-166 by placing her child in a nonpublic school not having properly approved teachers and curricula, the trial court did not err in excluding defendant\u2019s evidence that she did not willfully violate the statute but acted in good faith in withdrawing her child from public schools, since willfulness is not an element of the crime charged.\n3. Schools \u00a7 14\u2014 violation of school attendance law \u2014 instructions \u2014contentions of State \u2014burden of proof\nIn a prosecution for a violation of the compulsory school attendance law, the court did not shift the burden of proof to defendant in instructing that the State contended that defendant\u2019s witnesses did not testify that the nonpublic school defendant\u2019s child attended had been approved by the State Board of Education.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Webb, Judge. Judgment entered 29 November 1977 in Superior Court, New HANOVER County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 August 1978.\nDefendant was charged under N.C.G.S. 115-166 with violating the \u201cGeneral Compulsory Attendance Law.\u201d The evidence tended to show that in April 1977, defendant removed her 12-year-old daughter from the public schools. Defendant placed her daughter, a sixth-grade student, in \u201cLearning Foundations,\u201d which the State\u2019s evidence tended to show was not a nonpublic school having teachers and curricula approved by the State Board of Education.\nDefendant offered evidence tending to show that she removed her child from the public schools because of her concern over the quality of education the child was receiving, the child\u2019s emotional state, and her belief that the child was in need of private tutorial assistance in order to better prepare her academically as her education continued.\nThe jury found defendant guilty, and she received a suspended sentence and was fined $50.00. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Patricia B. Hodulik, for the State.\nPrickett & Scott, by Carlton S. Prickett, Jr., and James K. Larrick, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0099-01",
  "first_page_order": 127,
  "last_page_order": 130
}