{
  "id": 8554966,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BILLY RAY REID",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Reid",
  "decision_date": "1978-11-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 788SC286",
  "first_page": "547",
  "last_page": "550",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "234 S.E. 2d 587",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "292 N.C. 567",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8571452
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      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "216 S.E. 2d 466",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "26 N.C. App. 359",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8552618
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      "year": 1975,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 560",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1968,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "274 N.C. 62",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559380
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      "year": 1968,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/274/0062-01"
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    {
      "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 23",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "290 N.C. 220",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8560817
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      "year": 1976,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:33.594298+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges MORRIS and WEBB concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BILLY RAY REID"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nBy his first assignment of error the defendant maintains that the trial court erred in its pre-trial finding that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial.\nIt is mandated by statute that \u201c[n]o person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.\u201d G.S. 15A-1001(a). The courts of this State have frequently cited the factors in the quoted statute as determinative of a defendant\u2019s mental capacity to proceed to trial. See, e.g. State v. Taylor, 290 N.C. 220, 226 S.E. 2d 23 (1976); State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E. 2d 560 (1968); State v. Baldwin, 26 N.C. App. 359, 216 S.E. 2d 466 (1975). The question of defendant\u2019s capacity is within the trial judge\u2019s discretion and his determination thereof, if supported by the evidence, is conclusive on appeal. State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E. 2d 587 (1977); State v. Taylor, supra.\nPursuant to the defendant\u2019s motion in the present case, the trial court conducted a voir dire hearing prior to trial to determine the defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed with trial. At the hearing the defendant presented exhibits tending to show that the defendant was involuntarily committed to Cherry Hospital on 29 June 1977; that he remained there until after the robbery; and that he suffers from a mental illness known as paranoid schizophrenia for which he has taken medication. We do not agree with the defendant that this evidence dictates a determination that he was mentally incapable of proceeding with trial as a matter of law.\nOn the other hand, the State relied totally on the testimony and psychiatric report of Dr. Bob Rollins, a psychiatrist at the Dorothea Dix Hospital in Raleigh. Rollins testified that he had examined the defendant on three occasions in August, 1977; that the defendant suffers from a chronic mental illness known as paranoid schizophrenia; and that due to medication the defendant was in a state of partial remission at the time of his examinations. Rollins further testified as follows: \u201cBased on [the examination of the defendant] ... I formed an opinion that Mr. Reid was capable of proceeding to trial. I formed that opinion on August 23rd, 1977 and I have had no contact with Mr. Reid since that date.\u201d On cross-examination Rollins added:\nAs of August 23rd, I believe Mr. Reid understood his situation, and understood the legal issues involved and in my opinion was able to cooperate with counsel . . . That is, on the 23rd, I felt Mr. Reid could tell to his attorney what took place and felt that he was able to cooperate with his attorney in order to do this. Yet, as of now, I have no opinion as to whether he can do that.\nIn our opinion Dr. Rollins\u2019 testimony and evaluation is not sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s determination in light of his admission that he had no current opinion as to the defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed. Obviously, the most critical time with which we should be concerned in this determination is the time of trial. The fact that two to three months prior thereto the defendant was determined to be mentally capable to proceed to trial cannot be determinative in itself when the examining psychiatrist casts doubt on his own testimony. In this connection we also find it significant that Dr. Rollins diagnosed the defendant\u2019s mental illness as chronic paranoid schizophrenia with which a patient typically experiences sporadic changes in condition; that at the time of his examination the defendant was in a state of partial remission which meant that some symptoms had diminished but could recur at any time; and that if he were not treated with medication on a regular basis \u201chis condition might worsen.\u201d No evidence was presented as to whether the defendant continued to receive treatment in the interim between Dr. Rollins\u2019 examination and trial. Under these circumstances Dr. Rollins\u2019 admission comprehends more than a slight possibility that the defendant might have regressed in his disease, and neither we nor the trial court can assume the stability of his mental condition over a two to three month period. In short, when Dr. Rollins candidly stated that he could render no current opinion as to the defendant\u2019s mental capacity to proceed with trial, he nullified his earlier evaluation and left the State without any evidence to contest the defendant\u2019s motion. We hold that the trial court\u2019s determination that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial is not supported by the evidence. Defendant\u2019s trial, therefore, was a nullity, and the verdict and judgment must be vacated, and the cause remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings against the defendant if the district attorney shall elect to bring the defendant to trial on the charge set out in the bill of indictment.\nThe verdict and judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for a new hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion.\nVacated and remanded.\nJudges MORRIS and WEBB concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Archie W. Anders, for the State.",
      "Hulse and Hulse, by H. Bruce Hulse, Jr., for the defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BILLY RAY REID\nNo. 788SC286\n(Filed 7 November 1978)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 29\u2014 mental capacity to stand trial\nEvidence that defendant was a patient in a mental hospital at the time of a robbery and that he suffers from a mental illness known as paranoid schizophrenia for which he has taken medication did not show as a matter of law that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial for the robbery. However, the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant was mentally competent to stand trial was not supported by the evidence where the State\u2019s expert in psychiatry testified that defendant was competent to stand trial on a date two to three months prior to the trial, that defendant\u2019s condition was subject to sporadic changes, and that he could render no opinion at the time of trial as to defendant\u2019s mental capacity to proceed with trial.\nAppeal by defendant from Fountain, Judge. Judgment entered 17 November 1977 in Superior Court, WAYNE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 August 1978.\nDefendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment with common law robbery. Upon his plea of not guilty, the State offered evidence tending to show the following:\nOn 3 August 1977 at approximately 1 p.m., the defendant entered Wachovia Bank and Trust Company in Goldsboro, North Carolina, and approached Kay Gunnett who was working as a teller. With his left hand on the counter and his right hand concealed, the defendant said, \u201cThis is a stick-up; give me all your money.\u201d Gunnett gave the defendant $997.00, and the defendant fled from the bank. Responding to pleas for help from a bank official, Officer Pearson of the Goldsboro Police Department apprehended the defendant two blocks from the bank. At the police station the defendant signed a waiver of his constitutional rights and divulged to Sergeant R. K. Whaley the details of the robbery.\nThe defendant offered evidence tending to show that at the time of the robbery he was a patient at Cherry Hospital suffering from a mental illness known as paranoid schizophrenia, and that when he committed the robbery he could not distinguish between right and wrong.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of common law robbery. From a judgment imposing a prison sentence of five to seven years, the defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Archie W. Anders, for the State.\nHulse and Hulse, by H. Bruce Hulse, Jr., for the defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0547-01",
  "first_page_order": 575,
  "last_page_order": 578
}