{
  "id": 8555292,
  "name": "KENNETH R. BUCHANAN, Employee; Plaintiff v. MITCHELL COUNTY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Employer; HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY, Carrier; Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Buchanan v. Mitchell County",
  "decision_date": "1978-11-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 7710IC1002",
  "first_page": "596",
  "last_page": "600",
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      "cite": "38 N.C. App. 596"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "232 S.E. 2d 449",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
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      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "292 N.C. 210",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "32 N.C. App. 488",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
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        8551659
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      "year": 1977,
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    {
      "cite": "130 S.E. 2d 39",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1963,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "259 N.C. 163",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8559609
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      "year": 1963,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/259/0163-01"
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    {
      "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 355",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "289 N.C. 254",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8567848
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      "year": 1976,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:33.594298+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges PARKER and MARTIN (Robert M.) concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "KENNETH R. BUCHANAN, Employee; Plaintiff v. MITCHELL COUNTY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Employer; HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY, Carrier; Defendants"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nAn agreement between the employer and workmen\u2019s compensation carrier and the employee for the payment of compensation benefits, when approved by the Industrial Commission, is binding on the parties thereto. Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254, 221 S.E. 2d 355 (1976); Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163, 130 S.E. 2d 39 (1963). Such an agreement, however, may be set aside when \u201cthere has been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake.\u201d G.S. \u00a7 97-17.\nThe Commission correctly treated defendants\u2019 request to be allowed to discontinue compensation payments to plaintiff as a motion to set aside the agreement on I. C. Form 21 dated 5 January 1976 for the payment of compensation benefits. There is no allegation that the agreement to pay compensation was entered into through \u201cfraud, misrepresentation, [or] undue influence.\u201d Consequently, the sole issue before the Commission was whether the agreement to pay compensation was entered into as a result of \u201cmutual mistake.\u201d\nBy their first assignment of error, based on exceptions 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14, defendants contend that the Commission erred \u201cin failing to find as a fact and conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff-appellee was intoxicated at the time of his injury by accident, that the intoxicants consumed by the plaintiffappellee were not supplied by his employer, that said intoxication was the proximate cause of his injury, and that plaintiff-appellee\u2019s claim for workmen\u2019s compensation benefits should be denied.\u201d\nWe note at the outset that the exceptions upon which this assignment of error is based relate primarily to the conclusions of law and the award and bear little or no relation to the Industrial Commission\u2019s failure to find facts. The issue before the Commission was whether the agreement to pay compensation was entered into as a result of \u201cmutual mistake;\u201d it was not whether the employee was intoxicated at the time of his injury. Thus, there was no necessity for the commission to make any findings of fact with respect to the employee\u2019s intoxication at the time of the accident or for the Commission to draw any conclusions based on such findings. This assignment of error has no merit.\nBy their second assignment of error, based on exceptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14, defendants contend the Industrial Commission erred \u201cin awarding workmen\u2019s compensation benefits to the plaintiff-appellee and in ordering the defendant-appellants to pay the same, and erred in failing to find as a fact and conclude as a matter of law that the agreement for compensation of January 5, 1976 was entered into through mutual mistake and should be set aside.\u201d Exceptions 1, 2, and 3 challenge certain gratuitous legal opinions of the Commission and do not support the assignment of error. We therefore refrain from entering into an esoteric discussion of these exceptions.\nThe remaining exceptions upon which this assignment of error is based challenge the conclusions of law drawn by the Commission from the facts found and challenge the order requiring defendants to pay compensation to the plaintiff. In essence, defendants\u2019 second assignment of error raises the single question whether the facts found support the order entered.\nThe Commission has the duty to make specific findings of fact necessary to determine all questions relevant to the issues raised in a proceeding before it. G.S. \u00a7 97-91; Spivey v. Oakley\u2019s General Contractors, 32 N.C. App. 488, 232 S.E. 2d 454 (1977). On appeal, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive and the role of the reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether there was any competent evidence before the Commission to support its findings of fact and whether the findings of fact justify its legal conclusions and decision. Inscoe v. DeRose Industries, Inc., 292 N.C. 210, 232 S.E. 2d 449 (1977).\nDefendants have not challenged any of the facts found by the Commission. We hold that the findings of fact made by the Commission support its award. Defendants\u2019 contention that the Commission erred by failing to find and conclude that the agreement to pay compensation was entered into through mutual mistake is wholly without merit. There is no evidence in the record whatsoever that the agreement was entered into through a mutual mistake. Thus, the Commission had no duty to make any findings or conclusions relative thereto.\nDefendants have shown only that they signed the agreement believing the claimant\u2019s injuries to be compensable. To permit an employer and carrier to enter into an agreement with an employee and then later contest the agreement solely on the ground that the parties mistakenly believed the injuries to be compensable would seriously undermine the efficacy of the statutory provisions authorizing voluntary settlements by the parties.\nWe hold that the defendant carrier is bound by the Commission approved written agreement dated 5 January 1976 in which defendants agreed to pay and plaintiff agreed to accept monthly compensation payments.\nAffirmed.\nJudges PARKER and MARTIN (Robert M.) concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Teague, Johnson, Patterson, Dilthey & Clay, by C. Woodrow Teague and George W. Dennis III, for defendant appellants.",
      "Pritchard, Hise & Peterson, by Lloyd Plise, Jr., for plaintiff appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "KENNETH R. BUCHANAN, Employee; Plaintiff v. MITCHELL COUNTY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Employer; HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY, Carrier; Defendants\nNo. 7710IC1002\n(Filed 7 November 1978)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 94.2\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 agreement for compensation approved by Industrial Commission \u2014 binding effect\nAn agreement between the employer and workmen\u2019s compensation carrier and the employee for the payment of compensation benefits, when approved by the Industrial Commission, is binding on the parties thereto, but such agreement may be set aside when there has been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 94\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 findings of fact by Industrial Commission unnecessary\nIn a hearing upon defendants\u2019 request to be allowed to discontinue compensation payments to plaintiff, the Industrial Commission was not required to make any findings of fact with respect to the employee\u2019s intoxication at the time of the accident or to draw any conclusions based on such findings, since the issue before the Commission was whether the agreement to pay compensation was entered into as a result of mutual mistake and was not whether the employee was intoxicated at the time of his injury.\n3. Master and Servant \u00a7 94\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014 agreement for compensation \u2014 no mutual mistake \u2014 findings of fact unnecessary\nDefendants\u2019 contention that the Industrial Commission erred by failing to find and conclude that the agreement to pay compensation to plaintiff was entered into through mutual mistake is wholly without merit, since there was no evidence in the record whatsoever that the agreement was entered into through a mutual mistake, and defendants showed only that they signed the agreement believing the claimant\u2019s injuries to be compensable.\nAPPEAL by defendants from order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 13 September 1977. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 September 1978.\nOn 5 January 1976, plaintiff Kenneth R. Buchanan, employee, entered into an agreement on I. C. Form 21 with defendants Mitchell County, employer, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, the workman\u2019s compensation carrier, wherein the defendants agreed to make disability compensation payments to the plaintiff for an injury \u201carising out of and in the course of said employment.\u201d This agreement was approved by the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 16 January 1976.\nDefendants thereafter made compensation payments to plaintiff totalling $2,169.29 as of 6 April 1976, when defendants applied to the North Carolina Industrial Commission for authorization \u201cto stop payment of compensation to Kenneth Roy Buchanan on the grounds that at time of accident claimant was intoxicated and charged by investigating officer with DUI and discharge summary indicated acute alcoholic intoxication.\u201d Subsequently, a hearing was held and Chief Deputy Commissioner Forrest H. Shuford, II, by order filed 5 April 1977, concluded that \u201c[t]he agreement for compensation under which certain benefits have been paid to and on behalf of plaintiff was entered into through mutual mistake and should be set aside.\u201d\nOn appeal the North Carolina Industrial Commission set aside the order of Chief Deputy Commissioner Shuford and ordered defendants to make payments in compliance with the terms of the original agreement.\nTeague, Johnson, Patterson, Dilthey & Clay, by C. Woodrow Teague and George W. Dennis III, for defendant appellants.\nPritchard, Hise & Peterson, by Lloyd Plise, Jr., for plaintiff appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0596-01",
  "first_page_order": 624,
  "last_page_order": 628
}