{ "id": 8550291, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VANDORANCE TROLLA McQUEEN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McQueen", "decision_date": "1978-12-05", "docket_number": "No. 7821SC598", "first_page": "64", "last_page": "67", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "39 N.C. App. 64" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181032 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "2245" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0610-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 394, "char_count": 6384, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2058932779478649 }, "sha256": "503b94cb837c70e8b2b12c21e64c0f35d686b6412f9bc953f0022975f229a967", "simhash": "1:99ffb2af7fc11497", "word_count": 1065 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.834910+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Clark and Webb concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VANDORANCE TROLLA McQUEEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Judge.\nThe defendant\u2019s sole assignment of error is that the trial court erred in allowing the district attorney to question him concerning his failure to make a statement at the time of his arrest and after he had been warned of his consitutional right to silence. During the cross-examination of the defendant by the district attorney, the following exchange took place:\nQ. And when you were arrested, you were advised of your Miranda rights, were you not?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And chose to make no statement?\nA. Did I make a statement?\nQ. Um-Iium.\nA. Hun-uh.\nQ. Why not?\nMr. FRIENDE: Objection, Your Honor.\nMR. COLE: He opened the door.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nA. Because I hadn\u2019t did anything. He asked me to confess and I said, \u201cConfess to what?\u201d and he said, \u201cArmed Robbery.\u201d\nQ. You didn\u2019t make a statement to anything?\nA. I told him I was at home with the flu that day. That is what I told Officer Patterson.\nQ. Were you at home with the flu?\nA. Yes, I was. I had stayed out of work.\nWhen the defendant was arrested, he was advised of his Miranda rights. Although those rights contain no express assurance that a defendant\u2019s silence will not be used against him, such assurance is implied therein. Therefore, \u201c[I]t would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person\u2019s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.\u201d Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 49 L.Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976).\nThe defendant\u2019s testimony that he stayed at home on the day of the armed robbery constituted an exculpatory statement in the form of an alibi. The district attorney sought to impeach the defendant\u2019s statement by showing that he did not give the same statement at the time he was arrested but, instead, chose to remain silent. Had the district attorney been successful in his attempt to use the defendant\u2019s silence at the time of his arrest, and after receiving the Miranda warnings, for purposes of impeaching the exculpatory statement rather than for purposes of challenging the defendant\u2019s testimony as to the content of his statement, the defendant\u2019s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States would have been violated. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 49 L.Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245 & n. 11 (1976). Such error would require reversal \u201cunless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d G.S. 15A-1443(b); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967).\nIn the present case, however, the district attorney\u2019s efforts to impeach by presenting evidence of the defendant\u2019s \u201cprior silence\u201d was manifestly unsuccessul. Although the defendant\u2019s original answer of \u201chun-uh\u201d must be taken as an indication that he exercised his right to remain silent after being advised of his Miranda rights, he immediately thereafter testified that he had in fact made a statement and recited the contents of that statement. The defendant\u2019s testimony clearly indicated that he made a statement to the officer concerning his presence on the date of the armed robbery which in no way differed from his testimony at trial on that subject. The district attorney\u2019s questions did not, therefore, serve his apparent purposes of impeachment. Instead, the questions and the defendant\u2019s answers tended to corroborate the defendant\u2019s testimony at trial concerning his whereabouts and activities at the time of the commission of the crime charged. This was neither erroneous nor harmful to the defendant.\nThe defendant having received a fair trial free from prejudicial error, we find\nNo error.\nJudges Clark and Webb concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Rudolph A. Ashton III and Associate Attorney John R. Wallace, for the State.", "Billy D. Friende for the defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VANDORANCE TROLLA McQUEEN\nNo. 7821SC598\n(Filed 5 December 1978)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 48\u2014 defendant\u2019s silence at time of arrest \u2014questions not impeaching \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in allowing the district attorney to question defendant concerning his failure to make a statement at the time of his arrest and after he had been warned of his constitutional right to silence, since the district attorney\u2019s questions did not serve his apparent purpose of impeachment, but the questions and defendant\u2019s answers instead tended to corroborate defendant\u2019s testimony at trial concerning his whereabouts and activities at the time of the commission of the crime charged, and this was neither erroneous nor harmful to defendant.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Rousseau, Judge. Judgment entered 29 March 1978 in Superior Court, FORSYTH County. Heard in the Court of Appeals sitting in Winston-Salem 14 November 1978.\nThe defendant, Vandorance Trolla McQueen, was indicted for armed robbery and entered a plea of not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. From judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for a term of forty years, the defendant appealed.\nThe State\u2019s evidence consisted of the testimony of W. K. Patterson, the arresting officer. Patterson testified that he arrested one Larry Richardson in connection with an investigation of an armed robbery occurring in Arby\u2019s Roast Beef Restaurant on 28 December 1977. Richardson voluntarily made a statement to Patterson indicating that he and the defendant had gone for a ride in Richardson\u2019s car on 28 December 1977 and had stopped on Knollwood Street near the Little General Store. The defendant got out there and left the car, but Richardson could not see where he went. The defendant soon returned to the car and told Richardson to \u201cpull off easy.\u201d The defendant then pulled out a pistol and laid it on the seat of the car. They then returned to the defendant\u2019s house, where the defendant pulled out a lot of money and threw it on the bed saying, \u201cI have got me some money now.\u201d The defendant gave Richardson approximately fifty dollars of the money and said, \u201cDon\u2019t say anything about this to anyone.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s evidence consisted solely of his own testimony. He testified that he had been employed at Arby\u2019s Roast Beef on Knollwood Street for seven months during 1971. Richardson had come by his house on the day in question, but he never went riding with Richardson and had nothing to do with the armed robbery.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Rudolph A. Ashton III and Associate Attorney John R. Wallace, for the State.\nBilly D. Friende for the defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0064-01", "first_page_order": 92, "last_page_order": 95 }