{ "id": 8554085, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: FRANK SCARINGELLI, Claimant and UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL, Employer and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA", "name_abbreviation": "In re Scaringelli", "decision_date": "1979-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 7810SC247", "first_page": "648", "last_page": "651", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "39 N.C. App. 648" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "26 A. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Conn. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 1609353 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/129/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.Y.S. 2d 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 A.D. 2d 837", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3059780 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/9/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568579, 8568676, 8568622, 8568499, 8568541 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0265-03", "/nc/292/0265-05", "/nc/292/0265-04", "/nc/292/0265-01", "/nc/292/0265-02" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552298 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575910 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0629-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 7935, "ocr_confidence": 0.797, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.636122320932634e-08, "percentile": 0.52763230597614 }, "sha256": "af803cab407c9bef2234f22dad88ec0c000f5949d83a872c513c246f7ef84c92", "simhash": "1:7d61d16344bdcbad", "word_count": 1264 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:00.834910+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN (Robert M.) and MITCHELL concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: FRANK SCARINGELLI, Claimant and UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL, Employer and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERWIN, Judge.\nAppellant presents only one question for our determination:\n\u201cDid the Superior Court err in finding as a matter of law that the appellant\u2019s work as a teaching assistant was not \u2018employment\u2019 pursuant to G.S. 96-8 (6)g.l5., and therefore G.S. 96-14(1) is not applicable and no disqualification thereunder shall be imposed?\u201d\nWe agree with appellee that his employment did not constitute \u201cwork\u201d within the meaning of the statute. We find no error in the order entered by the Superior Court.\nOur Legislature\u2019s purpose in enacting the Employment Security Act is set forth in G.S. 96-2:\n\u201c\u00a7 96-2. Declaration of State public policy. \u2014 As a guide to the interpretation and application of this Chapter, the public policy of this State is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment.to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.\u201d\nOur Legislature sought to provide aid to those out of \u201cwork\u201d through no fault of their own. In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E. 2d 1 (1968). Nowhere in the act is the word, \u201cwork,\u201d defined. Appellant concedes that appellee\u2019s services at the University were not employment. It argues that \u201cwork\u201d should be given its natural and ordinary meaning and that appellee\u2019s claim is consequently disqualified under G.S. 96-14(1). G.S. 96-14(1), at the time the claim was filed, provided:\n\u201c\u00a7 96-14. Disqualification for benefits. \u2014 An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:\n(1) For not less than four, nor more than 12 consecutive weeks of unemployment, which occur within a benefit year, beginning with the first day of the first week after the disqualifying act occurs with respect to which week an individual files a claim for benefits if it is determined by the Commission that such individual is', at the time such claim is filed, unemployed because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer, and the maximum benefits due said individual during his then current benefit year shall be reduced by an amount determined by multiplying the number of such consecutive weeks of unemployment by the weekly benefit amount.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe recent amendment by the Legislature has no bearing on this case. G.S. 96-14(l)\u2019s specific ground for disqualification of benefits when applicable prevails over the general policy provisions of G.S. 96-2. See In re Usery, 31 N.C. App. 703, 230 S.E. 2d 585 (1976), dis. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 265, 233 S.E. 2d 396 (1977). Sections imposing disqualifications for unemployment benefits should be strictly construed in favor of the claimant and should not be enlarged by implication. In re Watson, supra. Where, as here, the context requires a different construction, a word may be construed so as to effectuate legislative intent. In re Watson, supra.\nIn Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged, 1976), \u201cwork\u201d is defined as \u201cthe labor, task, or duty that affords one his accustomed means of livelihood.\u201d This is the type of \u201cwork\u201d to which G.S. 96-14(1) applies. Appellee\u2019s services are not covered therein. His services are not \u201cemployment\u201d within the meaning of the act, see G.S. 96-8(6)k.l3 [originally enacted as G.S. 96-8(6)g.l5], nor do they constitute work within the meaning of G.S. 96-14(1). It is common knowledge that many of our universities\u2019 graduate students receive financial aid. Oftentimes, they are required to work as research assistants to qualify for aid. Upon completion or termination of their studies, these students are ineligible for such aid. The aid is not a permanent method of earning a livelihood, but only a temporary job taken on and performed along with normal school work and subordinate thereto. See In re Augustine, 9 A.D. 2d 837, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 801 (1959). If an applicant successfully completes his studies, he is again eligible for unemployment benefits and is to be treated like any other applicant. Wyka v. Colt\u2019s Patent Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 129 Conn. 71, 26 A. 2d 465 (1942).\nWe hold that appellee\u2019s termination of his studies and subsequently his research assistantship did not constitute a voluntary abandonment of \u201cwork\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 96-14(1).\nAffirmed.\nJudges MARTIN (Robert M.) and MITCHELL concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERWIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chief Counsel Howard G. Doyle, Garland D. Crenshaw, and Thomas S. Whitaker, by V. Henry Gransee, Jr., for appellant, Employment Security Commission of North Carolina.", "Frank P. Scaringelli, pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: FRANK SCARINGELLI, Claimant and UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL, Employer and EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION OF NORTH CAROLINA\nNo. 7810SC247\n(Filed 6 February 1979)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 108\u2014 unemployment compensation \u2014abandonment of research assistantship \u2014 no abandonment of \u201cwork\u201d\nAppellee\u2019s termination of his studies at the University of North Carolina and subsequently his research assistantship did not constitute a voluntary abandonment of \u201cwork\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 96-14(1) so that appellee was disqualified for unemployment benefits.\nAPPEAL from McLelland, Judge. Judgment entered 3 January 1978 in Superior Court, WAKE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 1979.\nClaimant last worked on 10 September 1976 for the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill as a teaching assistant on a fellowship granted by the University to students. Claimant\u2019s teaching was not part of the curricular requirement for him. The teaching required about twelve hours\u2019 work per week, and he was paid $100.00 per month.\nClaimant quit his studies at the University, thereby terminating his work as a teaching assistant. He felt that driving daily to Chapel Hill from Cary to study and teach was too great a burden. Mr. Scaringelli\u2019s claim for unemployment benefits was denied by John Swiggett, Claims Deputy. Mr. Swiggett stated: \u201c \u2018. . . I have determined that you voluntarily quit your last job but without good cause attributable to the employer, therefore, you will be disqualified five weeks from September 19, 1976, through October 23, 1976, because of separation from U.N.C., Section 96-14(1) of the Law applies.\u2019 \u201d\nMr. Scarengelli appealed. Ultimately, the Employment Security Commission affirmed Mr. Swiggett\u2019s decision. On 9 September 1977, claimant appealed to the Superior Court, Wake County. On 3 January 1978, Judge McLelland heard evidence and entered the following order:\n\u201cIt Now, Therefore, Is Ordered, Adjudged And DECREED that the decision of the Employment Security Commission under Docket No. 5478 be and the same is reversed and the appellant, Frank Scaringelli, shall not be disqualified pursuant to G.S. 96-14(1) and is eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits for the period beginning September 19, 1976 and continuing through October 16, 1976.\nDone at Raleigh, North Carolina, this the 3rd day of January, 1978.\nsi D. M. McLELLAND\nJudge Presiding\u201d\nThe Employment Security Commission appealed.\nChief Counsel Howard G. Doyle, Garland D. Crenshaw, and Thomas S. Whitaker, by V. Henry Gransee, Jr., for appellant, Employment Security Commission of North Carolina.\nFrank P. Scaringelli, pro se." }, "file_name": "0648-01", "first_page_order": 676, "last_page_order": 679 }