{
  "id": 8548473,
  "name": "BETTY JEAN SEBASTIAN, Employee v. MONA WATKINS HAIR STYLING, Employer; NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier",
  "name_abbreviation": "Sebastian v. Mona Watkins Hair Styling",
  "decision_date": "1979-02-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 7810IC235",
  "first_page": "30",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "cite": "234 N.C. 126",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:01:10.825727+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Vaughn and Clark concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "BETTY JEAN SEBASTIAN, Employee v. MONA WATKINS HAIR STYLING, Employer; NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nThe Industrial Commission found that plaintiff\u2019s skin condition was compensable as an occupational disease under G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) and awarded her medical expenses plus temporary total disability benefits for a period of thirty days. Defendants did not challenge this conclusion or award and thus no question is presented with respect to it. The Commission, in its Order, stated that \u201cplaintiff has failed to show that her disability after January 31, 1977, was caused by her occupational disease.\u201d Plaintiff has excepted to the conclusion based thereon that \u201c[p]laintiff has no compensable disability after January 30, 1977.\u201d Plaintiff argues that the \u201cterm \u2018disability\u2019 signifies an impairment of wage earning capacity rather than a physical impairment\u201d and that she \u201chas not been able to work [as a hair stylist] or to earn the equivalent wage;\u201d consequently, she continues to have a compensable disability. We disagree.\nPlaintiff asserts that the issue is \u201chow to compute damages accruing to a skilled employee who, as a result of an occupational disease, is not able to work at her skill, but is otherwise healthy and able to work at a non-skilled job.\u201d This formulation erroneously assumes the crucial question to be determined: whether plaintiff\u2019s incapacity to earn wages is the \u201cresult of an occupational disease.\u201d\nPursuant to G.S. \u00a7 97-53, only certain specifically enumerated \u201cdiseases and conditions . . . shall be deemed to be occupational diseases,\u201d among which is \u201c(13) Any disease . . . which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment . . .\u201d By virtue of G.S. \u00a7 97-52, \u201c[disablement ... of an employee resulting from an occupational disease described in G.S. \u00a7 97-53 shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident\u201d and is compen-sable under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. (Emphasis added.) G.S. \u00a7 97-54 provides that in \u201ccases of occupational disease \u2018disablement\u2019 shall be equivalent to \u2018disability\u2019 as defined in G.S. 97-2(9).\u201d The definition of \u201cdisability\u201d in G.S. \u00a7 97-2(9) is \u201cincapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nFrom the above it is clear that in order to be compensable, plaintiff\u2019s \u201cdisability\u201d must result from an occupational disease. In the present case, there is no evidence whatsoever that subsequent to 31 January 1977 plaintiff\u2019s incapacity to earn wages was the result of an occupational disease; rather, it was the result of her personal sensitivity to chemicals used in her work. We do not believe that the purpose of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is to provide benefits for inability to perform a particular type of work due to an individual\u2019s susceptibility to disease from that work. The underlying purpose of the Act \u201cis to provide compensation for workmen who suffer disability by accident arising out of and in the course of their employment [or from] those diseases or abnormal conditions . . . the causative origin of which is occupational in nature.\u201d Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 127-28, 66 S.E. 2d 693, 694 (1951).\nPlaintiff relies heavily on Mabe v. N.C. Granite Corp., 15 N.C. App. 253, 189 S.E. 2d 804 (1972). In that case, the claimant had worked as a stonecutter with thirty to thirty-five years of experience and was forced to quit because he contracted silicosis from his exposure to silica during his employment. Although he had only a forty percent medical disability, the Commission found him \u201cfully incapacitated because of silicosis to earn wages through work at hard labor, which is the only work he is qualified to do by reason of his age and education.\u201d 15 N.C. App. at 255, 189 S.E. 2d at 806. In that case, it was clear that plaintiff\u2019s incapacity to earn wages was the result of his having silicosis, which in turn was a result of his work. Furthermore, there is a radical difference between silicosis and the skin condition of plaintiff in the present case. In Singleton v. D. T. Vance Mica Co., 235 N.C. 315, 324, 69 S.E. 2d 707, 713 (1952), the Court stated:\nSilicosis is an inflammatory disease of the lungs due to the inhalation of particles of silicon dioxide. It is incurable and is one of the most disabling occupational diseases because it makes the lungs susceptable to other infection, particularly tuberculosis. According to the textbook writers, it has been definitely determined that the removal of a man, who has silicosis, from silica exposure, does not stop the progress of the disease at once, but that fibrotic changes continue to develop for another one or two years.\nIn contrast, plaintiff\u2019s skin condition had completely cleared up within one month of her terminating her employment as a hair stylist. While it may be true that plaintiff\u2019s skin disease could recur if she returned to her previous job, there is no evidence of any continuing disability as a result of a disease contracted in the course of employment as is the case with silicosis. Therefore, she is not entitled to disability compensation payments for her susceptibility to the skin disease.\nFor the reasons stated above, the Order appealed from is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Vaughn and Clark concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HEDRICK, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Blanchard, Tucker, Twiggs & Denson, by R. Paxton Badham, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Young, Moore, Henderson & Alvis, by Charles H. Young, Jr., for defendant appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BETTY JEAN SEBASTIAN, Employee v. MONA WATKINS HAIR STYLING, Employer; NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier\nNo. 7810IC235\n(Filed 20 February 1979)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 68\u2014 hair stylist \u2014sensitivity to chemicals \u2014 no compensable disability\nPlaintiff hair stylist did not have a compensable disability where her incapacity to earn wages was the result of her personal sensitivity to chemicals used in her work rather than an occupational disease.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Order of North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 22 November 1977. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 9 January 1979.\nPlaintiff filed a claim for workmen\u2019s compensation benefits for an occupational disease. A hearing was held before Commissioner William H. Stephenson and on 4 August 1977 an opinion and award was entered in which Commissioner Stephenson made findings of fact which are summarized and quoted below:\nPlaintiff is a forty-two year old woman who has been a hair stylist for more than twenty years and has been employed by Mona Watkins Hair Styling for three years as a hair stylist. In December of 1975, plaintiff began to experience a \u201cbreaking-out on her hands,\u201d and saw Dr. A. M. Alderman, \u201cwho diagnosed her condition as \u2018contact dermatitis due to strong and various chemicals used in (her) occupation as a beautician.\u2019 \u201d Plaintiff was also treated by Dr. W. Stacy Miller, a medical expert specializing in dermatology who \u201cdiagnosed her condition as \u2018hand eczema secondary to chemicals used in hairdressing.\u2019 \u201d During the latter part of 1976, plaintiff was exposed to chemicals in her work and sustained a skin disease as a result. On 31 December 1976, plaintiff\u2019s skin disease became so acute that she was forced to quit her job as a hair stylist. Thereafter, plaintiff\u2019s skin condition \u201ccompletely cleared up and within thirty days, or on or about January 31, 1977 she was able to return to any type of employment which did not subject her to the handling of chemicals.\u201d Since 31 January 1977, plaintiff has applied for several other jobs but she \u201cknows no trade or occupation other than hair styling\u201d and has been unable to find other work. Since 31 January 1977, \u201cplaintiff has been able to work and earn wages and has not been disabled.\u201d\nBased on the foregoing, Commissioner Stephenson concluded:\n1. In the way and manner set out in the Findings of Fact, plaintiff sustained a compensable occupational disease. G.S. 97-53(13).\n2. Plaintiff was temporarily totally disabled by reason of her occupational disease from January 1, 1977 through January 30, 1977 and she is entitled to compensation during said period as by law provided. G.S. 97-29.\n3. Plaintiff has no compensable disability after January 30, 1977. G.S. 97-2(9); G.S. 97-31.\nOn 22 November 1977, the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered an Order adopting as its own the findings of fact and award of Commissioner Stephenson. Plaintiff appealed.\nBlanchard, Tucker, Twiggs & Denson, by R. Paxton Badham, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nYoung, Moore, Henderson & Alvis, by Charles H. Young, Jr., for defendant appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0030-01",
  "first_page_order": 58,
  "last_page_order": 61
}
