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  "name": "RUBY BUIE PARRIS v. GARNER COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL, INC., WILLIAM D. KING, and AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, INC",
  "name_abbreviation": "Parris v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc.",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges MARTIN (Robert M.) and MITCHELL concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "RUBY BUIE PARRIS v. GARNER COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL, INC., WILLIAM D. KING, and AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ERWIN, Judge.\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court committed error in dismissing his complaint against defendant Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc. We agree with plaintiff.\nAssuming arguendo that plaintiff\u2019s original service of summons on defendant was pursuant to G.S. 58-153 or G.S. 58-153.1, such service would be defective. To serve legal process under G.S. 58-153, an insurance company must be licensed or admitted and authorized to do business in this State. See G.S. 58-153.\nG.S. 58453.1(a) allows service of process on insurance companies subject to our courts\u2019 jurisdiction in suits by or on behalf of insured or beneficiaries under insurance contracts. See G.S. 58453.1(a). Since neither circumstance prevails here, service or summons upon John Ingram, Commissioner of Insurance, as defendant\u2019s statutory process agent pursuant to G.S. 58-153 or G.S. 58453.1(a) is ineffective. However, plaintiff\u2019s service of process by serving the alias and pluries summons on defendant was an effective service of summons.\nG.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(d)(2) allows for the issuance of alias and pluries summons in the same manner as the original summons. Issuance of the original summons is to be in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(b).\nG.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(b) provides:\n\u201c(b) Summons \u2014 contents.\u2014The summons shall run in the name of the State and be dated and signed by the clerk, assistant clerk, or deputy clerk of the court in the county in which the action is commenced. It shall contain the title of the cause and the name of the court and county wherein the action has been commenced. It shall be directed to the defendant or defendants and shall notify each defendant to appear and answer within 30 days after its service upon him and further that if he fails so to appear, the plaintiff will apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint. It shall set forth the name and address of plaintiff\u2019s attorney, or if there be none, the name and address of plaintiff.\u201d\nThe summons in question provides:\n\u201cRuby Buie Parris\nAgainst\nGarner Commercial Disposal, Inc., William D. King, and Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc.\u201d\nThe summons was directed to:\n\u201cWilliam Oliver Bailey, President Aetna Life and Casualty Company 151 Farrington Avenue Hartford, Connecticut 06156\u201d\nIn Wiles v. Construction Co., 295 N.C. 81, 84, 243 S.E. 2d 756, 758 (1978), our Supreme Court held a similarly directed service of summons a sufficient service of process:\n\u201cIn the instant case, Welparnel Construction Company, Inc. was properly named as the defendant in the complaint, as well as in the caption of the summons. The sole ground upon which the process here is asserted to be defective is the direction of the summons to the corporation\u2019s registered agent rather than to the corporation. While our Rule 4(b) does require that the summons be directed to the defendant, we feel constrained to agree with the statement of Judge John J. Parker in a similar context that \u2018A suit at law is not a children\u2019s game, but a serious effort on the part of adult human beings to administer justice; and the purpose of process is to bring parties into court. If it names them in such terms that every intelligent person understands who is meant, ... it has fullfilled its purpose; and courts should not put themselves in the position of failing to recognize what is apparent to everyone else.\u2019 United States v. A. H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 F. 2d 872, 873 (4th Cir., 1947).\u201d\nThe Court further noted:\n\u201c[W]e feel that the better rule in cases such as this is that when the name of the defendant is sufficiently stated in the caption of the summons and in the complaint, such that it is clear that the corporation, rather than the officer or agent receiving service, is the entity being sued, the summons, when properly served upon an officer, director or agent specified in the N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(6), is adequate to bring the corporate defendant within the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction.\u201d (Citations omitted.)\nId. at 85, 243 S.E. 2d at 758 (1978).\nThe record shows that defendant\u2019s statutory agent for service of process in Connecticut was served with a copy of the summons. We hold that service of process was sufficient in this case to apprise defendant that it was the party being sued. Thus, if the court had jurisdiction over the defendant, the service of process was sufficient under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6).\nThe absence of proof of return on defendant\u2019s copy did not affect the validity of the service of process. The sheriff\u2019s return showing service was prima facie proof of service, Harrington v. Rice, 245 N.C. 640, 97 S.E. 2d 239 (1957), and Lumber Co. v. Sewing Machine Corp., 233 N.C. 407, 64 S.E. 2d 415 (1951), and placed the burden on the party claiming that service had not in fact been made to repel the prima facie case. Tyndall v. Homes, 264 N.C. 467, 142 S.E. 2d 21 (1965); 10 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index 3d, Process, \u00a7 4, p. 395. It is the service of process and not the return of the officer which confers jurisdiction on the court. 10 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index 3d, Process, \u00a7 4, pp. 395-96.\nThe resolution of the question of in personam jurisdiction involves a two-fold determination: (1) do the statutes of North Carolina permit the courts of the jurisdiction to entertain this action against defendant, and (2) does the exercise of this power by the North Carolina courts violate due process of law. Dillon v. Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E. 2d 629 (1977).\nThe grounds on which a court may assert personal jurisdiction over a person are set forth in G.S. 1-75.4.\nG.S. l-75.4(l)(d) provides:\n\u201c\u00a7 1-75.4. Personal jurisdiction, grounds for generally. \u2014A court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to Rule 4(j) of the Rules of Civil Procedure under any of the following circumstances:\n(1) Local Presence or Status. \u2014 In any action, whether the claim arises within or without this State, in which a claim is asserted against a party who when service of process is made upon such party:\nd. Is engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.\u201d\nIn the enactment of G.S. 1-75.4(1)(d), our Legislature intended to make available to our courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible under federal due process. Dillon v. Funding Corp., supra. Thus, the essential question is: Does the exercise of in per-sonam jurisdiction in the present case comport with due process? We answer, \u201cYes.\u201d\nDue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, that he have certain minimal contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend the \u201ctraditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945); Dillon v. Funding Corp., supra; Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 208 S.E. 2d 676 (1974).\nApplication of the minimum contacts rule varies with the quality and nature of defendant\u2019s activities, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S.Ct. 1228 (1958); Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, supra; Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E. 2d 279 (1978).\nThe existence of minimal contacts is a question of fact. Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, supra. Here, the evidence shows: that defendant was listed in telephone directories in various North Carolina cities; that the directories indicated a toll-free number to call in Hartford, Connecticut in the event of an accident; that the directories indicated general agents to contact within various North Carolina cities; that defendant or its agent had sent a letter to plaintiff\u2019s counsel regarding renewal of a term insurance policy; and that an insurance policy was mailed to Daphne Weems in an envelope bearing defendant\u2019s tradename and a note was attached informing her to call defendant for immediate help in the event of an accident. These contacts are not \u201cde minimis. \u201d We hold that sufficient \u201cminimal contacts\u201d exist to justify the court\u2019s assertion of jurisdiction in the present case. See Bard v. Steele, 28 A.D. 2d 193, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 930 (1967).\nDefendant contends that assertion of jurisdiction over it is precluded, because it placed its advertisements through an independent advertising agency.\nIn Putnam v. Publications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E. 2d 445 (1957), our Supreme Court held that our courts could not assert jurisdiction over the publisher, because no \u201cminimal contacts\u201d existed. Since we hold that sufficient contacts existed so as to assert jurisdiction over defendant, we find Putnam v. Publications, supra, distinguishable. However, we note that the reason courts refuse to uphold the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident publishers is because of fear of undue burdens imposed upon multi-state publishers of defending suits in distant states when weighed against a need to provide plaintiffs with a convenient forum. Comment, Long Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 342 (1967). This same rationale is not applicable where foreign corporations launch massive campaigns seeking to influence jury verdicts in our State.\nCourts generally exclude evidence of insurance, because it has no probative value on proving the two issues prevalent in every negligence case \u2014negligence and damages. Lyerly, Evidence: Revealing the Existence of Defendants\u2019 Liability Insurance to the Jury, 6 Cum. L. Rev. 123 (1975). This is the rule in North Carolina. Luttrell v. Hardin, 193 N.C. 266, 136 S.E. 726 (1927); 1 Stansbury\u2019s N.C. Evidence (Brandis Rev.), \u00a7 88. Prevention of introduction of evidence is for the benefit of defendants and their insurers. See 1 Stansbury\u2019s N. C. Evidence (Brandis Rev.), \u00a7 88. Thus, all insurers receive the benefit and protection of our laws, directly or indirectly.\nDefendant would have us allow it the benefit and protection of our laws; but deny us the right to assert jurisdiction to prevent contravention of our laws. We may properly consider our legitimate interest in protecting our plaintiff residents\u2019 rights to have a jury reach a verdict free of outside influence. See Byham v. House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E. 2d 225 (1965); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E. 2d 279 (1978). Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not violated.\nThe order below is\nReversed and remanded for entry of order consistent with this opinion.\nJudges MARTIN (Robert M.) and MITCHELL concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ERWIN, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Burke, Donaldson & Holshouser, by Arthur J. Donaldson, for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Jones, Hewson & Woolard, by Harry C. Hewson, for defendant appellee Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "RUBY BUIE PARRIS v. GARNER COMMERCIAL DISPOSAL, INC., WILLIAM D. KING, and AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, INC.\nNo. 7819SC416\n(Filed 20 March 1979)\n1. Process \u00a7\u00a7 13, 15\u2014 out-of-state insurance company \u2014 service of process on insurance commissioner insufficient \u2014service of process on agent in Connecticut sufficient\nService of summons upon John Ingram, Commissioner of Insurance, as defendant insurance company\u2019s statutory process agent pursuant to G.S. 58-153 or G.S. 58453.1(a) was ineffective, since defendant was not licensed to do business in this State and since defendant was not involved in suits by or on behalf of insureds or beneficiaries under insurance contracts in this State; however, plaintiff\u2019s service of process by serving alias and pluries summons on defendant\u2019s statutory agent for service of process in Connecticut was sufficient to apprise defendant that it was the party being sued and therefore was sufficient under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6), if the Court had jurisdiction over defendant.\n2. Process \u00a7 13; Constitutional Law \u00a7 24.7\u2014 out-of-state insurance company-minimum contacts\nDefendant insurance company which was not licensed to do business in this State had sufficient \u201cminimal contacts\u201d with this State to justify the court\u2019s assertion of in personam jurisdiction over defendant where the evidence tended to show that defendant was listed in telephone directories in various N. C. cities; the directories indicated a toll-free number to call in Hartford, Connecticut in the event of an accident; the directories indicated general agents to contact within various N. C. cities; defendant or its agent had sent a letter to plaintiff\u2019s counsel regarding renewal of a term insurance policy; and an insurance policy was mailed to a named person in an envelope bearing defendant\u2019s tradename and a note was attached informing her to call defendant for immediate help in the event of an accident.\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 24.7\u2014 out-of-state insurance company \u2014 advertisement through independent agency \u2014 jurisdiction over insurer\nIn an action to recover for damages sustained in an automobile accident where plaintiff sought an injunction directing defendant\u2019s out-of-state liability insurance carrier from continuing advertisements in national magazines which, plaintiff alleged, amounted to massive jury tampering, there was no merit to the insurer\u2019s contention that assertion of jurisdiction over it was precluded because it placed its advertisements through an independent advertising agency.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from Seay, Judge. Judgment entered 22 March 1978 in Superior Court, ROWAN County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 February 1979.\nPlaintiff was injured in a two car automobile accident on 15 November 1974. On 21 October 1977, she filed suit against defendant William D. King, the driver of the other vehicle, and Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc., owner of the vehicle. Plaintiff alleged defendant King negligently operated the car he was driving while in the scope of his employment with Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc.\nOn 18 November 1977, plaintiff amended her complaint and alleged that: Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc. has a pecuniary interest in the lawsuit as liability insurance carrier for defendant Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc.; Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc. was purposefully engaged in massive jury tampering through advertisements in the print media, Newsweek and Time Magazines; North Carolina laws prohibit all parties from imparting to the jury or prospective jurors the existence of or lack of insurance; and Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc. was aware of this prohibition. Plaintiff sought an injunction directing Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc. from continuing such advertisements.\nThe advertisements in question provided:\n\u201c \u2018When awarding damages in liability cases, the jury is cautioned to be fair and to bear in mind that money does not grow on trees. It must be paid through insurance premiums from uninvolved parties, such as yourselves.\u2019\nToo bad judges can\u2019t read this to a jury.\nIn a small Florida town, a decorative boulder rests on the median of a road. A man with three drinks in him and no sleep for 18 hours smashes his car headlong into it. A jury orders the town to pay him $k. 7 million in damages-\nA truck without brake lights is hit from behind. For \u2018psychic damages\u2019 to the driver, because his pride was hurt when his wife had to work, a jury awards $480,000 above and beyond his medical bills and wage losses.\nThen there\u2019s the one . . . but you can probably provide the next example. Most of us know hair-raising stories of windfall awards won in a court. Justified claims should be compensated, of course. Aetna\u2019s point is that it is time to look hard at what windfall awards are costing.\nWhat can we do? Several things:\nWe can stop assessing \u2018liability\u2019 where there really was no fault \u2014 and express our sympathy for victims through other means.\nWe can ask juries to take into account a victim\u2019s own responsibility for his losses. And we can urge that awards realistically reflect the actual loss suffered \u2014 that they be a fair compensation, but not a reward.\nInsurers, lawyers, judges \u2014 each of us shares some blame for this mess. But it is you, the public, who can best begin to clean it up. Don\u2019t underestimate your own influence. Use it, as we are trying to use ours.\nAetna wants insurance to be affordable.\n(tradename)\nAetna Life & Casualty. 151 Farmington Avenue. Hartford, CT 06156\u201d\nPlaintiff served process on John Ingram, Commissioner of Insurance, as defendant\u2019s statutory process agent. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that it had no contacts sufficient to subject it to the court\u2019s jurisdiction and that service of process on John Ingram as its statutory agent was improper. Plaintiff then served process on defendant by alias and pluries summons by delivering it to defendant\u2019s statutory process agent in Connecticut.\nThe alias and pluries summons stated:\n\u201cRuby Buie Parris\nAgainst\nGarner Commercial Disposal, Inc., William D. King, and Aenta Life and Casualty Company, Inc.\u201d\nThe summons was directed to:\n\u201cWilliam Oliver Bailey, President Aetna Life and Casualty Company 151 Farrington Avenue. Hartford, Connecticut 06156\u201d\nDefendant renewed its motion for dismissal on the foregoing grounds and on the ground that the alias and pluries summons was defective.\nAt a hearing on the motion to dismiss, defendant offered evidence in an affidavit tending to show that, \u201cAetna Life and Casualty Company is not licensed to do business in North Carolina.\u201d Defendant\u2019s further evidence indicated that it had not done business in North Carolina for the past five years; owned no real property in North Carolina; did not maintain a telephone within the State; had not engaged in litigation within the State in the past five years; and the advertisements in question were placed through and controlled by an independent contractor.\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show defendant had telephone listings in Charlotte, Greensboro, Raleigh, Salisbury, and Wilmington; the telephone listings indicated a toll-free number to call in Hartford, Connecticut; defendant had sent a letter to plaintiff\u2019s counsel regarding renewal of a term insurance policy; the letter was received in an envelope bearing defendant\u2019s tradename; an insurance policy was mailed to one Daphne Weems in an envelope bearing defendant\u2019s tradename and informing her to call defendant for immediate help in the event of an accident; and that approximately 800 issues of Time Magazine and 600 issues of Newsweek Magazine are received weekly in Salisbury and delivered to residents of Rowan County.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds that defendant was not amenable to process in North Carolina and that the attempted service of process was void.\nPlaintiff appealed.\nBurke, Donaldson & Holshouser, by Arthur J. Donaldson, for plaintiff appellant.\nJones, Hewson & Woolard, by Harry C. Hewson, for defendant appellee Aetna Life and Casualty Company, Inc.\n. This case is being appealed by the town in addition to the court-awarded damages, two other defendants {the contractor and the county) settled out of court for an additional $1.15 million. This illustrates how extravagant jury-awarded damages set a standard for extravagant out-of-court settlements \u2014the real problem, since most liability cases are settled out of court.\n. A by-product of such awards has been a quantum leap in the number of ail kinds of suits filed. Products liability cases alone have increased from 50,000 a year in the 1960\u2019s to almost a million a year now.\n. Most awards are paid by insurance, and insurance companies spend millions more defending policyholders against lawsuits. The direct result is rising premiums for automobile and other liability coverages. The indirect result is higher prices for goods and services \u2014 prices which are boosted to cover the skyrocketing insurance premiums of manufacturers, doctors, hospitals, and others who are targets for windfall awards.\n. For example, it would help if juries were simply required to take into account payments the claimant has already received for medical bills and lost wages. Under the present system, these bills may be paid all over again."
  },
  "file_name": "0282-01",
  "first_page_order": 310,
  "last_page_order": 319
}
