{ "id": 8548362, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE JOSEPH WATKINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Watkins", "decision_date": "1979-02-20", "docket_number": "No. 7828SC900", "first_page": "17", "last_page": "21", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "40 N.C. App. 17" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "409 U.S. 188", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173155 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 U.S. 98", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/432/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168076 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.Ct. 2424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 L.Ed. 2d 685", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 1016", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541729, 541506, 541035, 541238, 541624, 541752, 541370 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/1016-01", "/us/421/1016-02", "/us/421/1016-06", "/us/421/1016-03", "/us/421/1016-05", "/us/421/1016-07", "/us/421/1016-04" ] }, { "cite": "510 F. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 147070 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/510/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168284 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "1206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0293-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 566, "char_count": 9668, "ocr_confidence": 0.828, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1077193646190259e-07, "percentile": 0.7627334643834448 }, "sha256": "5ca6ee51fe72fc9844855cee0ca0b16c593a510f0e0fbdfe89f61d97fd12f181", "simhash": "1:3bb5c43f657099e0", "word_count": 1623 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:01:10.825727+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Vaughn and Hedrick concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE JOSEPH WATKINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "CLARK, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the admission of the identification testimony of Sue Boyd, contending that his constitutional rights were violated by (1) the pre-arrest viewing of defendant by Ms. Boyd with policeman Kelley in the waiting room on the seventh floor of the courthouse, and by (2) the post-arrest one-on-one confrontation by Ms. Boyd in an office at police headquarters.\nBoth before and after adversary judicial criminal proceedings have begun an accused has a Fifth Amendment protection against an identification procedure \u201cso unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification\u201d as to amount to denial of due process of law. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 at 302, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1199 at 1206, 87 S.Ct. 1967 (1967).\nThe pre-arrest identification of the defendant by Sue Boyd took place on 30 November 1977 in a waiting room on the seventh floor of the courthouse. The elevator opened in this area. During voir dire evidence was presented which tended to show that Ms. Boyd was advised by Officer Kelley that a person had been arrested for exposing his privates in a public place, that this person could be the one who had robbed her, that the man was scheduled for trial on that day, and that he would take her to a waiting room on the seventh floor of the courthouse. There were 25 to 30 people in the waiting room. People were moving about near the elevator. Ms. Boyd saw a man whose back was turned to her; when he turned so she could see his face she immediately pointed out defendant as the robber.\nThe post-arrest identification was a one-on-one confrontation after defendant was arrested under a warrant and taken by Officer Kelley to an office in the police station. Such confrontation is necessarily suggestive. United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F. 2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1016, 44 L.Ed. 2d 685, 95 S.Ct. 2424 (1975). The defendant does not contend that the procedure violated defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967).\nA suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure does not violate due process if the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability under the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d test of Stovall, supra. An unnecessarily suggestive procedure is not per se conducive to mistaken identification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 53 L.Ed. 2d 140, 97 S.Ct. 2243 (1977). The Manson case approved the factors bearing on reliability which were set out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 34 L.Ed. 2d 401, 93 S.Ct. 375 (1972), as follows:\n(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,\n(2) the witness\u2019 degree of attention,\n(3) the accuracy of the witness\u2019 prior description of the criminal,\n(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and\n(5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.\nAfter voir dire the court made findings of fact which included the following: Ms. Boyd saw defendant in the store which was well-lighted when he came in first for a cup of coffee; that when he returned and committed the robbery she saw him at a distance of a few feet for ten minutes; soon after he left she described him accurately to the police; she identified him immediately and positively when she saw him in the waiting room at the courthouse six days after the robbery.\nThe trial court concluded that Ms. Boyd\u2019s in-court identification was based on her observation of defendant at the store when the robbery was committed. The conclusion of the court that her in-court identification was not tinged by any improper identification is fully supported by the evidence, even though the one-on-one confrontation at the police station, a short time after the identification at the waiting room of the courthouse, was necessarily suggestive. It did not violate due process because her identification possessed sufficient aspects of reliability under the totality of the circumstances. We find no error in admitting in evidence the in-court identification of the defendant by Ms. Boyd.\nDefendant next contends that the court erred in admitting the testimony of State\u2019s witness Carol Freeman relative to indecent exposure by defendant on 4 November 1977 at Dunkin Donuts, and the testimony of Deputy Sheriff Davis relative to indecent exposure by defendant on 12 November 1977. The person who committed the charged robbery entered the store with his privates exposed, and he forced Ms. Boyd at gunpoint to fondle his privates. Obviously the perpetrator was a sexual deviate who was sexually gratified by exposing his private parts in public. The identity of the defendant was questioned. It was relevant on this question to offer evidence that defendant had exposed his private parts on two prior occasions, the first time 20 days and the second time 12 days before the day in question. The trial court properly instructed the jury that this evidence was admitted only for the purpose of identity.\nEvidence of other offenses is inadmissible on the issue of guilt if its only relevancy is to show the character of the accused or his disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the one charged; but if it tends to prove any other relevant fact it will not be excluded merely because it also shows him to have been guilty of an independent crime. 1 Stansbury\u2019s N. C. Evidence, \u00a7 91 (Brandis rev. 1973). Although the North Carolina Court has not expressly recognized a separate category for sex offenses, the decisions are markedly liberal in holding evidence of similar sex offenses admissible, especially when the sex impulse manifested is of an unusual or unnatural character. \u201cIt may be that a special rule for cases of this sort will ultimately develop.\u201d 1 Stansbury\u2019s N. C. Evidence, supra, \u00a7 92 at 299. We find no merit in this assignment of error.\nWe have carefully examined and considered defendant\u2019s other assignments of error and arguments, and we find that discussion is not warranted. The defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Vaughn and Hedrick concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "CLARK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis and Associate Attorney Norman M. York, Jr. for the State.", "Long, McClure, Hunt & Trull by Robert B. Long, Jr. and Jeff B. Hunt for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GEORGE JOSEPH WATKINS\nNo. 7828SC900\n(Filed 20 February 1979)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 66.3, 66.14\u2014 confrontation at courthouse \u2014 one-on-one confrontation at police station \u2014 in-court identification not tainted\nThe trial court in an armed robbery prosecution did not err in admitting identification testimony by the victim since the pre-arrest viewing of defendant by the victim in a waiting room of the courthouse was not suggestive, as the victim without prompting singled defendant out from 25 or 30 other people as the robber, and since a post-arrest one-on-one confrontation between defendant and the victim at the police station, though suggestive, did not taint the victim\u2019s in-court identification of defendant which was based on her observation of him at the well lighted crime scene for 10 minutes.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 34.5\u2014 armed robbery charged \u2014 prior occasions of exposing private parts \u2014 admissibility to show identity\nIn a prosecution for armed robbery where the evidence tended to show that the robber entered a store with his private parts exposed and forced the robbery victim to fondle his private parts, the trial court properly allowed two witnesses to testify concerning defendant\u2019s exposure of his private parts on two prior occasions since such evidence was admissible to show the identity of defendant.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Snepp, Judge. Judgment entered 26 April 1978 in Superior Court, BUNCOMBE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 January 1979.\nDefendant was found guilty as charged in the indictment of armed robbery, taking $30.00 from the person and possession of Sue Boyd, an employee of Hop-In Food Store, and appeals from the judgment imposing imprisonment.\nThe evidence for the State tends to show that on 24 November 1977, about 1:00 a.m., Sue Boyd observed defendant enter the store and get a cup of coffee, then leave and drive away in a red and white truck. About 5:00 a.m. defendant again entered the store, approaching Ms. Boyd with his privates exposed, pulled a gun from his pants, and told her to put the money in the cash register in a bag. Defendant walked up to the counter and forced her at gunpoint to fondle his privates. Defendant was there 5 to 10 minutes and left when a customer drove in the parking lot. Ms. Boyd telephoned the Asheville police.\nCarol Freeman testified that on 4 November 1977 about 2:00 a.m. while working at Dunkin Donuts, located on Tunnel Road near the Hop-In Food Store, she saw defendant standing outside the window naked; he was masturbating. She watched him for three or four minutes, then walked to the phone at the back of the store. Defendant ran.\nRobert N. Davis, a deputy sheriff, testified that on 12 November 1977 about 1:00 a.m., he was parked on a hill observing the Hop-In Store. He saw a man approach the store dressed in a coat but no trousers. Davis drove toward the store, reaching the parking lot when the man got to the door. The man ran to the woods. Davis and other officers gave chase and apprehended defendant in the woods.\nDefendant did not testify but offered evidence which tended to show that during the night in question he, his brother, and his girl friend were at his brother\u2019s home which was about 6.1 miles from the Hop-In Food Store.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis and Associate Attorney Norman M. York, Jr. for the State.\nLong, McClure, Hunt & Trull by Robert B. Long, Jr. and Jeff B. Hunt for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0017-01", "first_page_order": 45, "last_page_order": 49 }