{ "id": 8548239, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLYDE C. FORREST", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Forrest", "decision_date": "1979-05-01", "docket_number": "No. 7929SC19", "first_page": "160", "last_page": "164", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "41 N.C. App. 160" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570976 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "1630" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565770 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559246 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8594957 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559994 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 S.E. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571372 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570180 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0709-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 443, "char_count": 9425, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.340633952018052 }, "sha256": "6fa9965322510e39b7c4fb813ef6903aeaa2ddcc29d256ef03dc021f0da309bd", "simhash": "1:81a5d22e4822a0d3", "word_count": 1534 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:40.540741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Parker and Carlton concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLYDE C. FORREST" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HEDRICK, Judge.\nAppellate review is permitted by G.S. \u00a7 15A-979(b). The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The defendant contends that the written confession given by him in the Sheriff\u2019s office was the product of a prior involuntary confession, and thus the trial court erred in determining that his second confession was \u201cfreely, understandingly and voluntarily\u201d made. The rule in North Carolina is as follows:\n[When] a confession has been obtained under circumstances rendering it involuntary, a presumption arises which imputes the same prior influence to any subsequent confession, and this presumption must be overcome before the subsequent confession can be received in evidence. The burden is upon the State to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. [Citations omitted.]\nState v. Silver, 286 N.C. 709, 718, 213 S.E. 2d 247, 253 (1975). See also State v. Siler, 292 N.C. 543, 234 S.E. 2d 733 (1977). This rule \u201carises out of a concern that where the first confession is procured through promises or threats rendering it involuntary as a matter of law, these influences may continue to operate on the free will of the defendant in subsequent confessions.\u201d State v. Siler, 292 N.C. at 551, 234 S.E. 2d at 739; State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E. 2d 492 (1968); State v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 81 S.E. 2d 193 (1954).\nThe evidence adduced at voir dire clearly discloses that the defendant made inculpatory statements at the time of his arrest in response to the officers\u2019 questioning, and that such statements amounted to a confession. \u201cAny extra judicial statement of an accused is a confession if it admits defendant\u2019s guilt of an essential part of the offense charged.\u201d State v. Williford, 275 N.C. 575, 582, 169 S.E. 2d 851, 857 (1969); State v. Hamer, supra. In the present case, defendant was arrested for breaking and entering and larceny, the arresting officer recognized a television as being one of the stolen items, accused the defendant specifically of stealing the television and then told him that if he and Officer Thomas could obtain more of the stolen property, he would make a recommendation that defendant sign his own appearance bond. According to Deputy Case\u2019s testimony, the defendant \u201csaid he could take us to where more of the property was.\u201d This statement by the defendant amounted to a confession since it, in effect, disclosed that the defendant had taken part in the offenses charged. See State v. Fletcher, 279 N.C. 85, 89, 181 S.E. 2d 405, 409 (1971). Furthermore, the evidence adduced on voir dire clearly shows that the defendant\u2019s first confession was inadmissible because the defendant was not informed of his rights under the Miranda decision. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 726 (1966); State v. Siler, supra; State v. Biggs, 289 N.C. 522, 223 S.E. 2d 371 (1976).\nThus, the question for our determination is whether the trial judge\u2019s finding and conclusion that the defendant\u2019s second confession was \u201cfreely, understandingly and voluntarily\u201d made is supported by the evidence adduced on voir dire. In this regard, the State had the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant\u2019s second confession was not the product of the prior invalid confession and that any influences rendering the prior confession involuntary did not also render the subsequent confession inadmissible. There is no evidence in this record as to what effect the defendant\u2019s first confession had on his second, or that the circumstances rendering the first inculpatory statements of the defendant inadmissible had abated so that his subsequent confession was in fact voluntarily made. The trial judge\u2019s Order contains no findings whatsoever with regard to the effect of defendant\u2019s first confession. Thus the trial judge\u2019s finding and conclusion that the defendant\u2019s second confession was \u201cfreely, understandingly and voluntarily\u201d made is not supported by the evidence adduced on voir dire, or the findings of fact, and therefore the Order denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress is reversed. The defendant\u2019s plea of guilty is stricken; the judgment entered is vacated; and the cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudges Parker and Carlton concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HEDRICK, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Amos C. Dawson III, for the State.", "Stepp, Groce, Pi\u00f1ales & Cosgrove, by Timithy R. Cosgrove, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CLYDE C. FORREST\nNo. 7929SC19\n(Filed 1 May 1979)\nCriminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 75.7, 76\u2014 inadmissible confession \u2014 effect on subsequent confession-failure to make findings\nWhere defendant was arrested for breaking and entering and larceny, the arresting officer recognized a television set in defendant\u2019s residence as one of the stolen items and told defendant that he would recommend that defendant be allowed to sign his own appearance bond if he could obtain more of the stolen property, and defendant \u201csaid he could take us to where more of the property was,\u201d this statement by defendant amounted to a confession and was inadmissible because defendant had not been given the Miranda warnings. Furthermore, the trial judge\u2019s determination that a subsequent written confession made by defendant after he had been given the Miranda warnings was admissible in evidence was not supported by the court\u2019s findings where the court made no findings that defendant\u2019s second confession was not the product of the prior invalid confession and that any influences rendering the prior confession involuntary did not also render the second confession inadmissible.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Seay, Judge. Judgment entered 16 November 1978 in Superior Court, HENDERSON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 3 April 1979.\nDefendant was charged in a proper indictment with felonious breaking and entry and felonious larceny. Upon entering a plea of not guilty, the defendant was advised by the assistant district attorney that the State intended to offer into evidence an alleged confession made by him. Defendant then filed a written motion to suppress and requested a voir dire hearing prior to trial on the motion. The evidence adduced at the hearing tended to show the following:\nRandy Case, a Deputy Sheriff for Henderson County went to the defendant\u2019s residence on 20 June 1978 with an arrest warrant for the defendant for a breaking and entering and larceny that occurred at David Unwin\u2019s residence in Zirconia on 10 May 1978. When the defendant opened the door, Deputy Case observed a television and a throw rug matching the descriptions of items taken from the Unwin residence, and placed the defendant under arrest. No Miranda warnings were given to the defendant at this time. Deputy Case next proceeded to examine the television and rug more closely and determined them to be the items taken from Unwin\u2019s residence. Defendant was led to a police vehicle in which he was to be taken to Hendersonville. Bill Thomas, another officer with the Sheriff\u2019s department was also present. While in the police vehicle, Deputy Case told the defendant that if they could obtain more of the stolen property, he would make a recommendation that the defendant sign his own appearance bond. Defendant agreed to take the two deputies to where more of the property was located. After first going to the magistrate\u2019s office and signing his own bond, defendant took the officers to more of the stolen property. Thereafter he accompanied the deputies to the Sheriff\u2019s department where he was advised of his constitutional rights. Defendant signed a waiver of rights form in the presence of Deputy Case and Officer Thomas. After signing the form, defendant made a confession which Deputy Case reduced to writing.\nAt the conclusion of the voir dire hearing, the trial judge made findings and conclusions which, except where quoted, are summarized below:\nOn 19 June 1978, Deputy Sheriff Randy Case went to the defendant\u2019s residence and arrested the defendant pursuant to an arrest warrant. The deputy observed a television set and a throw rug that were the subject of the arrest. \u201cOfficer Case told the defendant that if he would assist in the recovery of the additional property taken from the Unwin residence, he would recommend that he be allowed to sign his own appearance bond.\u201d Defendant was then taken to the Magistrate\u2019s Office, \u201c[W]hen the defendant left the Magistrate\u2019s Office, he was asked to go into the Sheriff\u2019s Office, but was not, at that time, in custody, the defendant having been released on bond.\u201d While in the Sheriff\u2019s Office, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form. The court concluded \u201cthat the defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights\u201d in the Sheriff\u2019s Office; \u201cthat the defendant did, thereupon, freely, understandingly and voluntarily make a statement to the officers;\u201d and \u201cthat no threats or promises were made to him to induce him to answer any of the questions.\u201d\nUpon the judge\u2019s ruling on his motion to suppress, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged in the indictment, and received a sentence of two to four years on the breaking and entering charge, and a sentence of two to four years on the larceny charge, to run at the conclusion of the first sentence. Defendant appealed.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Amos C. Dawson III, for the State.\nStepp, Groce, Pi\u00f1ales & Cosgrove, by Timithy R. Cosgrove, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0160-01", "first_page_order": 188, "last_page_order": 192 }