{ "id": 8549038, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD FRED LOCKLEAR", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Locklear", "decision_date": "1979-05-15", "docket_number": "No. 7916SC167", "first_page": "292", "last_page": "296", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "41 N.C. App. 292" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "233 S.E. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569735 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.E. 2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573979 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566359 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558933 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565214 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0482-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 448, "char_count": 7541, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.617636533166678e-07, "percentile": 0.8210082904447324 }, "sha256": "87542df1af3802e3496cc88ea106e18b36f833300cfe747744467136e32b0cac", "simhash": "1:85a7248e105460c5", "word_count": 1261 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:40.540741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN (Robert M.) and ARNOLD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD FRED LOCKLEAR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERWIN, Judge.\nDefendant has brought forward on appeal six assignments of error. We have considered each of them and find no error in the trial of defendant.\nUpon direct examination of Deputy Sheriff Solomon Sander-son, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cQ. All right. What, if anything, did you see him do or say there in the area of the morgue?\nA. When he was taken to the morgue to see her, I was standing at the door and he [defendant] fell over Annie Sue and went to crying and said T didn\u2019t mean to do it.\u2019\nMr. Locklear: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\u201d\nUpon the direct examination of emergency medical technician, Craig Rich, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cQ. Do you know whether she was living or dead at the time she arrived at the hospital?\nA. More than likely she had passed away.\nMR. LOCKLEAR: Objection. Move to strike.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\u201d\nDefendant contends that merely sustaining his objections to these questions did not dispel the prejudice engendered by asking them. Defendant argues that the trial judge should have given a limiting instruction without his request.\nThe defendant\u2019s objections were sustained without request for any instruction. Defendant has not shown error, nor has he shown any prejudice. State v. Greene, 285 N.C. 482, 206 S.E. 2d 229 (1974). This assignment of error is overruled.\nAs grounds for his second assignment of error, defendant brings forth Exceptions Nos. 2, 3, 6, 10, and 11. In our opinion, we deem it necessary to treat each exception individually.\nDefendant\u2019s Exception No. 2 relates to Deputy Sheriff Sanderson\u2019s observations concerning the wiped up blood stains. These observations were but a \u201cshorthand\u201d statement of facts and were clearly admissible. See State v. Jones, 291 N.C. 681, 231 S.E. 2d 252 (1977), and State v. Mason, 295 N.C. 584, 248 S.E. 2d 241 (1978). For the same reasons, we hold that Sanderson\u2019s observation that the towel \u201cappeared to be saturated with blood\u201d was also properly admitted. Thus, we find Exceptions Nos. 2 and 6 to be without merit.\nDefendant\u2019s Exception No. 3 is based on Sanderson\u2019s statement that there was about a one-inch scar or stab wound about the center of the deceased\u2019s chest. As a lay witness, Sanderson was not competent to testify as to the nature of the wound. He could properly state that the wound was a scar, but he could not state that it was the result of a stabbing. Thus, admission of his testimony to that effect was error. However, in our opinion, any harm caused by the admission of this testimony was cured by Dr. Andrews\u2019 testimony that, \u201cIt is my.opinion that she [the victim] died as a result of bleeding from a stab wound to the chest and heart.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant\u2019s Exception No. 10 is based on Dr. Andrews\u2019 testimony as to the alcoholic content in the victim\u2019s blood. In view of the court\u2019s later instructions to the jury to disregard the evidence with respect to this matter, we find no prejudicial error.\nDefendant\u2019s final exception is Exception No. 11, which relates to Dr. Andrews\u2019 expert medical opinion that, \u201c|I]f she had received immediate medical attention, it\u2019s possible that her life could have been saved.\u201d This opinion was clearly relevant on the issue of malice. State v. Braxton, 294 N.C. 446, 242 S.E. 2d 769 (1978).\nWe find defendant\u2019s second assignment of error to be without merit.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of certain witnesses for the prosecution, the substance of which had not been disclosed to the defendant. Defendant infers that the court should have excluded the evidence in question pursuant to G.S. 15A-910(3). We do not agree. The record does not reveal any motions or orders of discovery nor does the record reveal the reasons the defendant was objecting to the questions. Defendant did not request a continuance or recess to prepare himself for cross-examination. The trial court has broad and flexible powers to rectify the events if a party fails to comply with discovery orders or provisions of G.S., Chap. 15A, Art. 48. The exclusion of evidence as a remedy is strictly within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Dollar, 292 N.C. 344, 233 S.E. 2d 521 (1977). Here, we find no abuse of discretion.\nWe have considered all other errors assigned by the defendant and find them to be without merit.\nIn the trial of the defendant, we find\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN (Robert M.) and ARNOLD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERWIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas F. Moffitt, for the State.", "Locklear, Brooks & Jacobs, by Arnold Locklear, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD FRED LOCKLEAR\nNo. 7916SC167\n(Filed 15 May 1979)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 162.5\u2014 objections to testimony sustained \u2014 failure to give limiting instructions\nDefendant was not prejudiced when the court sustained his objections to testimony without giving limiting instructions where defendant made no request for limiting instructions.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 71\u2014 observations concerning bloodstains \u2014shorthand statement of fact\nAn officer\u2019s observations that certain bloodstains appeared to have been wiped up and that a towel appeared to have been saturated with blood were admissible as shorthand statements of fact.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 15.5\u2014 lay testimony as to \u201cstab wound\u201d \u2014harmless error\nThe trial court\u2019s erroneous admission of an officer\u2019s testimony that there was a \u201cstab wound\u201d in the center of deceased\u2019s chest was not prejudicial where an expert medical witness testified that deceased died as a result of bleeding from a stab wound to the chest and heart.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 15.2\u2014 absence of immediate medical attention \u2014 relevancy to show malice\nA medical expert\u2019s opinion testimony in a second degree murder case that deceased\u2019s life might have been saved if she had received immediate medical attention after she was stabbed was relevant on the issue of malice.\n5. Constitutional Law \u00a7 30; Bills of Discovery \u00a7 6\u2014 testimony not disclosed to defendant \u2014 absence of motions for discovery, continuance or recess\nThe trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of prosecution witnesses which had not been disclosed to defendant where the record does not reveal any motions or orders for discovery, and defendant made no request for a continuance or recess to prepare for cross-examination. G.S. 15A-910(3).\nAPPEAL by defendant from McKinnon, Judge. Judgment entered 7 September 1978 in Superior Court, ROBESON County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 May 1979.\nDefendant was charged in a bill of indictment, proper in form, with the offense of murder in the first degree. He was tried and convicted of the offense of murder in the second degree. From judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for a term of not less then 20 nor more than 25 years, defendant appealed.\nAt trial, the State presented evidence tending to show that Annie Sue Anderson was stabbed in the early morning hours of 18 September 1977 while in the company of defendant and that she expired as a result of excessive bleeding from the stab wound. Testimony indicated that on the morning in question, a call was placed for ambulance service, and thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Sanderson came in contact with the defendant and the deceased, who were in a truck. Ms. Anderson was later removed from the truck and taken to Southeastern General Hospital by ambulance. The evidence also tended to show that the deceased had suffered other bruises and cuts on her body and that defendant stated, \u201cShe\u2019s dead and I didn\u2019t mean to do it.\u201d\nDefendant did not offer any evidence.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas F. Moffitt, for the State.\nLocklear, Brooks & Jacobs, by Arnold Locklear, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0292-01", "first_page_order": 320, "last_page_order": 324 }