{ "id": 8554596, "name": "F. LEONA BAXTER v. WILLIAM E. POE, individually and as Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, THOMAS B. HARRIS, PHILLIP O. BERRY, C. D. SPANGLER, JR., MARILYN HUFF, JOHN B. McLAUGHLIN, individually and as members of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, a public body corporate, DR. ROLLAND W. JONES, Superintendent of Schools for Charlotte-Mecklenburg, JOHN J. DOYLE, JR., and KATHLEEN R. CROSBY", "name_abbreviation": "Baxter v. Poe", "decision_date": "1979-07-31", "docket_number": "No. 7826SC204", "first_page": "404", "last_page": "416", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "42 N.C. App. 404" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "45 N.C.L. Rev. 816", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816-819" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C.L. Rev. 635", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561214 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 L.Ed. 456", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 U.S. 474", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6931620 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/340/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E. 2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569880 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550007 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0401-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1033, "char_count": 25535, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.3178652113075903e-07, "percentile": 0.917264867565638 }, "sha256": "088a473fff77e61bd90053572b993c0aff8c392e559cd32f69504341f4eb45f6", "simhash": "1:9b66508315ba244b", "word_count": 4146 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:00:09.609845+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Hedrick and Erwin concur." ], "parties": [ "F. LEONA BAXTER v. WILLIAM E. POE, individually and as Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, THOMAS B. HARRIS, PHILLIP O. BERRY, C. D. SPANGLER, JR., MARILYN HUFF, JOHN B. McLAUGHLIN, individually and as members of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, a public body corporate, DR. ROLLAND W. JONES, Superintendent of Schools for Charlotte-Mecklenburg, JOHN J. DOYLE, JR., and KATHLEEN R. CROSBY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Judge.\nThe scope of the Superior Court\u2019s review of the Board\u2019s decision in this case and the power of that court in disposing of the case were governed by former G.S. 143-315 (now G.S. 150A-51), which was in effect at the time of the Board hearings in this matter. That statute provided:\nThe court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:\n(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or\n(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or\n(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or\n(4) Affected by other error of law; or\n(5) Unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or\n(6) Arbitrary or capricious.\nDue process\nThe petitioner\u2019s first group of contentions concerns due process. In addressing these contentions, we rely in large measure on the opinion of this Court by Judge (now Chief Judge) Morris in Thompson v. Board of Education, 31 N.C. App. 401, 230 S.E. 2d 164 (1976), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E. 2d 538 (1977). The Supreme Court reversed only that part of the decision of this Court in Thompson which held that the evidence of neglect of duty on the part of the teacher-petitioner in that case was substantial, and the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion left standing that portion of Judge Morris\u2019s opinion in which she dealt with the due process issues raised in Thompson.\nPetitioner in the present case, as did the petitioner in Thompson, contends that she has been denied due process. We do not agree. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education scrupulously followed the elaborate dismissal procedures mandated by G.S. 115-142. After giving petitioner the required notice, the Board held hearings which extended over three evenings in which the petitioner was represented by counsel, was given the opportunity to cross-examine the Superintendent\u2019s witnesses, and was permitted to present her own evidence.\nPetitioner\u2019s contentions regarding due process are largely based on a fundamental misconception of the procedures involved in a case of this nature. The procedures prescribed by G.S. 115-142 for the dismissal of a career teacher are essentially administrative rather than judicial. As was pointed out in this Court\u2019s opinion in Thompson, supra, the Board is not bound by the formal rules of evidence which would ordinarily obtain in a proceeding in a trial court. Nor are the Rules of Civil Procedure applicable. G.S. 1A-1. While a Board of Education conducting a hearing under G.S. 115-142 must provide all essential elements of due process, it is permitted to operate under a more relaxed set of rules than is a court of law. Boards of Education, normally composed in large part of non-lawyers, are vested with \u201cgeneral control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective administrative units,\u201d G.S. 115-35(b), a responsibility differing greatly from that of a court. The carrying out of such a responsibility requires a wider latitude in procedure and in the reception of evidence than is allowed a court.\nThe Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education employed at petitioner\u2019s hearing the same rule of evidence promulgated by the State Board of Education and used by the Wake County Board of Education in Thompson. The rule permits boards of education to admit and give probative effect to \u201cevidence that is of a kind commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of serious affairs.\u201d Petitioner contends that this rule is constitutionally invalid both per se and as applied at the hearing in this case in that it violated her due process rights. We do not agree. This rule of evidence was approved in Thompson. It is not constitutionally invalid per se. It allows the boards of education to consider a wide range of evidence, as they properly should, in reaching their decisions. Petitioner\u2019s protection lies in the provision in G.S. 143-315(5) which gives to the Superior Court power to reverse or modify the Board\u2019s decision if petitioner\u2019s substantial rights have been prejudiced because the administrative decision was \u201c[unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record.\u201d\nPetitioner points to the admission at the hearing of hearsay evidence and contends erroneously that this was reversible error. The Board very properly heard such evidence in this case in order to complete its investigation. Evidence of the sort complained of can, and in this case did, provide the necessary background for understanding the matter into which the Board was inquiring.\nPetitioner objects to the admission of evidence of events which occurred more than three years before 30 April 1974 and bases her objection on G.S. 115-142(e)(4). We need here only point out that G.S. 115-142(e)(4) prohibits a Board of Education from basing dismissal \u201con conduct or actions which occurred more than three years before the written notice of the superintendent\u2019s intention to recommend dismissal is mailed to the teacher.\u201d There is no prohibition against the Board hearing evidence of this nature. Petitioner has made no showing that the Board based her dismissal on conduct of petitioner beyond the three year limit. It was proper for the Board to hear this type of evidence in order to learn of the background of the case before it.\nPetitioner further argues, under the rubric of due process, that the Board did not have the requisite degree of impartiality and that this lack of impartiality is shown by the manner in which the hearing was conducted. We have examined the transcript of the hearing in detail and find no evidence of actual bias on the part of any Board member. Petitioner lays stress, in arguing that the Board lacked impartiality, on the following admission made by one of the Board members, Marilyn Huff, at the hearing before Judge Griffin in the Superior Court:\n\u201cAs to whether I understood there was some question of physical abuse of children before the hearing began, I knew, I think most people in the community knew the reasons for Mrs. Baxter\u2019s, the recommendation by the Superintendent that she be terminated.\u201d\nAs above noted, the Board of Education is vested by G.S. 115-35(b) with general supervisory authority over the schools within its administrative unit. In the exercise of this authority Board members have a duty to keep themselves apprised of situations such as the one the evidence presented at the hearing in this case discloses. As Judge Morris pointed out in this Court\u2019s opinion in Thompson v. Board of Education, supra, \u201cmere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory duties does not disqualify it as a decisionmaker.\u201d 31 N.C. App. at 412, 230 S.E. 2d at 170.\nAfter a thorough examination of the transcript of the hearing before the Board we affirm the finding of the Superior Court that \u201cthe procedures adopted by the board and rulings made with reference to the admission of evidence were fair and without error.\u201d\nSubstantial Evidence In View Of The Entire Record\nThe petitioner\u2019s second and final major contention is that the Superior Court erred in its finding that \u201c[e]ach of the findings of fact by the Board is supported by substantial, competent evidence.\u201d The required standard of review is defined by G.S. 143-315(5), supra. It was described by Justice Copeland in the Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Thompson v. Board of Education, supra, as follows:\nThis standard of judicial review is known as the \u201cwhole record\u201d test and must be distinguished from both de novo review and the \u201cany competent evidence\u201d standard of review. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 95 L.Ed. 456, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951); Underwood v. Board of Alcoholic Control, 278 N.C. 623, 181 S.E. 2d 1 (1971); Hanft, Some Aspects of Evidence in Adjudications by Administrative Agencies in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. Rev. 635, 668-74 (1971); Hanft, Administrative Law, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 816, 816-819 (1967). The \u201cwhole record\u201d test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board\u2019s judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. Universal Camera Corp., supra. On the other hand, the \u201cwhole record\u201d rule requires the court, in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the Board\u2019s decision to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Board\u2019s evidence. Under the whole evidence rule, the court, may not consider the evidence which in and of itself justifies the Board\u2019s result, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn. Universal Camera Corp., supra.\n292 N.C. at 410, 233 S.E. 2d at 541.\nThe grounds on which the Board based its order that petitioner be dismissed are set forth in G.S. 115-142(e):\n(1) No career teacher shall be dismissed or demoted or employed on a part-time basis except for:\na. Inadequate performance;\n* * *\nc. Insubordination;\nd. Neglect of duty;\n* * *\nj. Failure to comply with such reasonable requirements as the board may prescribe;\nOur task on this appeal is, by application of the \u201cwhole record\u201d test to the record of the hearings before the Charlotte-.Mecklenburg Board of Education held on 1, 2 and 7 October 1974, to determine whether there is substantial evidence, looking at the record as a whole, of any one of the four grounds which formed the basis of the Board\u2019s 14 October 1974 dismissal order.\nEach finding of fact was made with regard to petitioner\u2019s employment during the 1971-72, 1972-73, and 1973-74 school years. The second finding of fact was that the petitioner was guilty of insubordination. The Board found that petitioner\u2019s insubordination consisted of her continued administration of corporal punishment to her handicapped students after being specifically instructed by her principal, Mrs. Crosby, not to do so without the principal\u2019s prior approval and the presence of an adult witness. This finding is amply supported by substantial evidence in the record.\nMrs. Crosby, the principal of Billingsville Elementary School, testified that during the 1971-72 school year she received a complaint from the parents of Susan Chapman that petitioner \u201chad been hitting Susan in the head.\u201d Petitioner admitted at the time of the incident and also at the hearing that she had \u201ctapped\u201d Susan Chapman. Petitioner\u2019s classroom aide, Virginia Wallace, testified at the hearing that she had seen petitioner whip Susan Chapman \u201cseveral times.\u201d Mrs. Crosby called in petitioner and the other three orthopedic teachers at this time and asked them:\n[PJease, do not strike these children anywhere. I asked them specifically not to even punish them at all. \u201cIf there\u2019s a child in your class\u201d \u2014 I didn\u2019t tell the total staff this, but I told those three teachers. \u201cDo not whip any of these children. If you feel you have to whip them, I would like to know who they are and I would like to witness it. I would like for you to tell me why and I would like not to have them whipped at all. I would like for you not to thump them.\u201d I had gotten messages that she had thumped, hit, and all these kind of things. I said, \u201cdon\u2019t hit them at all.\u201d\nBillingsville orthopedic teachers Catherine Erlandson and Ann Boiter both confirmed that Crosby had forbidden corporal punishment of orthopedically handicapped children, and petitioner admitted at the hearing that such an order had been given by the principal.\nIn October 1972, Principal Crosby received a complaint from the mother of Michael Sinclair that petitioner had hit her son on the head, producing a \u201cbig knot,\u201d and that the boy had gone home and cried all night. The complaint was made by Mrs. Sinclair both orally and in a letter introduced into evidence. Personnel in the principal\u2019s office managed to persuade the mother not to carry out her threat of beating petitioner, but the mother remained at school all day \u201cbody-guarding\u201d the boy. At the time, petitioner admitted striking the boy, but said, \u201cI just tapped him.\u201d\nPetitioner at the hearing admitted:\nMichael was another chair victim and a dystrophy victim. ... I did do, this, (Witness indicates with hands), and asked him to get to his work. . . . He cried some.\nSubsequent to the Michael Sinclair incident, Principal Crosby wrote a letter dated 31 October 1972 to petitioner in which she detailed the incident, as well as other incidents which had been brought to her attention by parental complaints, and asked petitioner once again \u201cto refrain from this sort of practice.\u201d\nIn the spring of 1973, petitioner came up for consideration for tenure. Principal Crosby expressed to petitioner orally and in person her reservations about giving petitioner tenure because, \u201cLeona, you have a tendency to hit children.\u201d Crosby stated that she agreed to give petitioner tenure upon her word that she would not strike the children any more, and petitioner told Crosby two or three times, \u201cI\u2019m not going to hit anybody else no more, no more.\u201d\nIn the April 1973 evaluation of petitioner, Crosby wrote:\nMiss Baxter was experiencing difficulty in classroom management and was employing the use of physical punishment in an improper manner. She has made improvement in this area. It is understood, by her, that this type punishment is not acceptable.\nPetitioner\u2019s receipt of this evaluation was acknowledged in writing.\nCrosby testified at the hearing concerning the above-quoted remarks on the evaluation sheet:\nI just hated to write down, if you do this again, this is it. But, I told her in very plain English; I said, \u201cLeona, if you whip another child in an improper manner, I\u2019m not going to recommend your reemployment.\u201d And, she understood this.\nPrincipal Crosby explained that by \u201cimproper manner\u201d she meant that she expected petitioner to bring the child to the principal\u2019s office and whip it there, if petitioner had to whip it, so that at least the whipping would be in the principal\u2019s presence. Crosby testified that petitioner never brought a child to her office for paddling.\nDuring the 1973-74 school year, Crosby received a complaint from the mother of Cheryl Springs that petitioner had whipped the girl for not doing her homework, making her afraid to come to school. Crosby called Cheryl Springs into her office and asked her about the incident. According to Crosby\u2019s account, the girl, a victim of cerebral palsy, said that when she arrived at school without her homework after her mother had said she had accidentally thrown the homework away,\n\u201cMrs. Baxter said, \u2018Cheryl\u2019, and she shoved me\u201d and she said, \u201cshe knocked me out of the chair, when she said, \u2018Cheryl, where is your homework.\u2019 And I was trying to tell her that (sic) my mama said and then she whipped me.\u201d And I said, \u201cwell, how did she whip you.\u201d She said, \u201cshe took this big stick and just hit me, whop, whop, whop.\u201d\nCheryl Springs\u2019 mother, Dorothy Butler, testified about this incident and said Cheryl told her that \u201cshe hit her while she was down.\u201d Irene Walker, a teacher\u2019s aide, testified that she had found Cheryl Springs crying in the bathroom. When asked, the child told her that petitioner had whipped her for not bringing homework to school.\nPetitioner testified \u201cI took a ruler and gave her a few spanks across the buttocks.\u201d Petitioner denied knocking Cheryl Springs out of her chair and said that she had punished the girl because, \u201cI couldn\u2019t get any work out of her in any way, shape or form. Neither calls to the home, notes to the home, talking with her or anything like that hadn\u2019t (sic) done any good.\u201d\nFollowing the Cheryl Springs incident, Crosby called in petitioner\u2019s classroom aide, Virginia Wallace, and asked if she had seen petitioner hit any one that year. Crosby testified that Wallace said she had seen petitioner hitting children in the head or shaking them. Virginia Wallace testified that she saw petitioner whip Bobby Baker \u201cseveral times\u201d in the period of time up through the year before the hearing and that she saw petitioner during several years \u201crap\u201d children in the classroom.\nIrene Walker testified that during the 1973-74 school year, Annette Rush told her in the bathroom that petitioner had whipped her for not bringing homework. Frieda Maxwell, Catherine Erlandson\u2019s aide, testified that during the 1973-74 school year Annette Rush complained to her on the bus that her head hurt where petitioner hit her with a pencil.\nIn summary, by petitioner\u2019s own admission she struck Michael Sinclair and Cheryl Springs in violation of her principal\u2019s orders. Petitioner\u2019s classroom aide testified that petitioner whipped Bobby Baker in violation of her principal\u2019s orders. Hearsay evidence from two independent .sources, which was not impeached, indicates that Annette Rush was also subjected to corporal punishment in violation of Principal Crosby\u2019s orders. We find that the Superior Court was correct in concluding that the Board\u2019s finding of insubordination was based on substantial evidence. We need not pass on the question whether the evidence of the other three grounds was substantial. A finding that the evidence of any of the grounds listed under G.S. 115-142(e)(l) was substantial justifies dismissal where, as here, the teacher was notified that dismissal was based on that ground. We note, however, that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board\u2019s findings that, in addition to insubordination, petitioner was guilty of inadequate performance, neglect of duty, and failure to comply with requirements of the Board.\nThe Superior Court\u2019s 27 September 1977 order affirming the order of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education\u2019s 14 October 1974 order terminating petitioner\u2019s employment is\nAffirmed.\nJudges Hedrick and Erwin concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "James, McElroy & Diehl, by William K. Diehl, Jr., and Gary S. Hemric for the appellant.", "John G. Golding and Harvey L. Gosper, Jr., for the appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "F. LEONA BAXTER v. WILLIAM E. POE, individually and as Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, THOMAS B. HARRIS, PHILLIP O. BERRY, C. D. SPANGLER, JR., MARILYN HUFF, JOHN B. McLAUGHLIN, individually and as members of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, a public body corporate, DR. ROLLAND W. JONES, Superintendent of Schools for Charlotte-Mecklenburg, JOHN J. DOYLE, JR., and KATHLEEN R. CROSBY\nNo. 7826SC204\n(Filed 31 July 1979)\n1. Schools \u00a7 13.2\u2014 dismissal of teacher \u2014 no denial of due process\nA school teacher who was dismissed for inadequate performance, insubordination, neglect of duty, and failure to comply with requirements of the board of education was not denied due process where (1) the board of education scrupulously followed the elaborate dismissal procedures mandated by G.S. 115-142; (2) the board admitted and gave probative effect to evidence \u201cof a kind commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of serious affairs\u201d; (3) the board properly heard hearsay evidence in order to complete its investigation; (4) the board heard but did not base its decision on evidence of events occurring more than three years before the superintendent\u2019s letter recommending the teacher\u2019s dismissal; and (5) a board member\u2019s knowledge of the situation involving the teacher prior to the hearing did not indicate a lack of impartiality on the part of the board member.\n2. Schools \u00a7 13.2\u2014 teacher\u2019s dismissal \u2014 corporal punishment \u2014 insubordination\u2014 substantial evidence\nThe trial court properly concluded the board of education\u2019s finding of insubordination by a teacher was based on substantial evidence where the evidence, including testimony by the teacher herself, the principal, classroom aides and a student\u2019s mother, tended to show that the teacher repeatedly used corporal punishment on her handicapped students in violation of her principal\u2019s orders, and a finding that the evidence of any one of the grounds listed under G.S. 115-142(e)(l) was substantial justified dismissal where the teacher was notified that dismissal was based on that ground.\nAPPEAL by petitioner from Griffin, Judge. Order dated 27 September 1977 entered in Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 December 1978.\nF. Leona Baxter (hereinafter \u201cpetitioner\u201d) was employed during the 1973-74 school year by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (hereinafter \u201cthe Board\u201d) as a teacher of orthopedically handicapped children in the Ortho II class of the Billingsville Elementary School. She had attained status as a career teacher as defined by G.S. 115-142(a)(3). The Ortho II class contained children, most of whom were between the ages of nine and eleven, who would otherwise have been in the third and fourth grades. The handicaps from which they suffered were physically disabling ones and included cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy, fragile bones, and malformed limbs. Some children were able to walk with the aid of crutches and braces; others were completely confined to wheel chairs. The psychologically tested mental abilities of the children spanned all levels up from educable mentally retarded.\nOn 30 April 1974 Superintendent Holland W. Jones sent a letter to petitioner by certified mail in which he said:\nI am writing to advise you pursuant to North Carolina General Statute 115-142(h)(2) that I intend to recommend to the Board of Education that you be dismissed effective at the close of the 1973-74 school year. The grounds for my recommendation include, but are not limited to, inadequate performance, insubordination, neglect of duty, and failure to comply with requirements of the board.\nPetitioner notified Jones on 21 May 1974 that she requested a review of his recommendation by a panel of the Professional Review Committee, pursuant to G.S. 115-142(h)(3)(i). On 9 August 1974 the Board voted to suspend petitioner without pay pending final determination of the proceeding, and Jones notified petitioner of this decision by letter dated 14 August 1974.\nThe five-member panel of the Professional Review Committee, after conducting a hearing at which both petitioner and Superintendent Jones were represented by counsel, issued a report dated 26 August 1974. The majority report recommended that petitioner be reinstated with back pay and retention of tenure and that petitioner be transferred to another school and allowed to teach normal children. A minority report, issued by one of the two professional members of the panel, stated that petitioner \u201cis guilty of inadequate performance, \u2018gross\u2019 insubordination, neglect of duty, and failure to comply with Board requirements.\u201d\nOn 9 September 1974 Jones submitted, pursuant to G.S. 115-142(i)(5), his written recommendation to the Board that petitioner be dismissed \u201cfor reasons set forth in a letter from me to her dated April 30, 1974.\u201d\nWilliam E. Poe, Chairman of the Board, informed petitioner pursuant to G.S. 115-142(i)(6) that the Superintendent\u2019s recommendation had been received, that she was entitled to a hearing, and that the hearing if requested would be held on 1 October 1974.\nPetitioner\u2019s attorney requested the hearing, and the hearing was held on 1, 2, and 7 October 1974. On 14 October 1974 the Board voted unanimously to terminate petitioner\u2019s employment and to dismiss her on the grounds of inadequate performance, insubordination, neglect of duty, and failure to comply with Board guidelines and policy. The Board entered this order after making findings of fact and concluding that \u201call four (4) grounds for dismissal upon which the Superintendent has based his recommendation of dismissal are true and substantiated upon the basis of competent evidence adduced at these hearings.\u201d\nA copy of the Board\u2019s findings of fact and order were sent to petitioner by Chairman Poe under cover of letter dated 14 October 1974.\nBy complaint filed 14 November 1974 petitioner appealed from the decision of the Board to the Superior Court of Mecklen-burg County pursuant to G.S. 115-142(n). She alleged that the board had violated both the provisions of G.S. 115-142 and petitioner\u2019s constitutional due process rights and that the Board\u2019s findings of fact and order were unsupported by any competent evidence.\nBy answer filed 18 December 1974 defendants denied petitioner\u2019s allegations. Upon defendants\u2019 motion Judge Snepp on 15 December 1976 filed an order that petitioner\u2019s appeal be presented to the Superior Court in accordance with G.S. Ch. 143, Art. 33.\nThe hearing was held during the 15 August 1977 Civil Non-Jury Session of Mecklenburg Superior Court. By order filed 28 September 1977 the trial court made detailed findings of fact concerning all prior proceedings in this matter and made the following conclusions:\n1. The procedures adopted by the Board and rulings made with reference to the admission of evidence were fair and without error.\n* * *\n2. Each of the findings of fact by the Board is supported by substantial, competent evidence.\n* * *\n3. The findings of fact by the Board support and justify the Board\u2019s conclusion that the grounds upon which Superintendent Jones recommended petitioner\u2019s dismissal were true and substantiated.\nOn these findings and conclusions, the court affirmed the Board\u2019s order. Petitioner appeals.\nJames, McElroy & Diehl, by William K. Diehl, Jr., and Gary S. Hemric for the appellant.\nJohn G. Golding and Harvey L. Gosper, Jr., for the appellees." }, "file_name": "0404-01", "first_page_order": 432, "last_page_order": 444 }