{ "id": 8555180, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EUGENE WILLARD ENSLIN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Enslin", "decision_date": "1979-08", "docket_number": "No. 794SC220", "first_page": "565", "last_page": "569", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "42 N.C. App. 565" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575113 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 U.S. 451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6140919 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/306/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L.Ed. 989", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 612", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11302068 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 L.Ed. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 S.Ct. 1011", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 961", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765304, 1765267, 1765516, 1765486 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0961-01", "/us/372/0961-03", "/us/372/0961-04", "/us/372/0961-02" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 29", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765606 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 L.Ed. 2d 659", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 S.Ct. 612", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 156", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11721589 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0156-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 517, "char_count": 8966, "ocr_confidence": 0.839, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7531002772748527 }, "sha256": "215e39064afc803f164a322d50f4f45c8ba6d45cc30b1e9a672ec61521dd9ad0", "simhash": "1:abe3f99fab029ddb", "word_count": 1378 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:00:09.609845+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges PARKER and MARTIN (Harry C.) concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EUGENE WILLARD ENSLIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Chief Judge.\nDefendant challenges the rulings of the trial court and the applicable ordinance on two grounds. First, defendant contends Jacksonville\u2019s massage business licensing laws are unconstitutionally vague because two different ordinances purport to cover the same conduct. Defendant does not argue that the statute under which he is charged is vague in itself, but he argues that having two ordinances in effect, neither of which has been repealed or expressly superseded, violates due process by failing to provide fair warning of the prohibited acts and leaving impermissible discretion to law enforcement officers. See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed. 2d 110 (1972).\nThe ordinance under consideration operates in the field of business regulation, although it is in some respects a penal act. The courts recognize greater leeway in the sweep of statutory language in the regulation of business. Id. Furthermore, since the statute does not involve First Amendment freedoms, the ordinance will be considered in light of the specific facts of this case, and the specificity of the ordinance will be less strictly scrutinized. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1976); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed. 2d 561 (1963), reh. denied, 372 U.S. 961, 83 S.Ct. 1011, 10 L.Ed. 2d 13 (1963). Therefore, we consider the fundamental due process question whether the ordinance \u201cfails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.\u201d United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989, 996 (1954); see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed 888 (1939).\nIn our opinion, the ordinance under which defendant was convicted provided defendant with abundant fair notice that operating a massage business without a privilege license was prohibited. The applicable provisions of the \u201cnew\u201d statute quoted above clearly requires a privilege license. Similarly, the \u201cold\u201d ordinance, even if it also were applicable, requires that:\n\u201cSection 1-2. Application for License.\nAny person desiring to engage in the business, trade or profession of masseur or masseuse or the operation or carrying on of any of the businesses, trades, professions, occupations or callings mentioned in Section 1-1 shall, before engaging in such business, trade, profession, occupation or calling, file an application for a license addressed to the City Council of the City of Jacksonville. Such application shall be in writing and shall set forth the following.\n(a) Name and address of applicant. If such applicant be a corporation, the address or addresses of such corporation.\n(b) Qualifications must be plainly stated and must be submitted together with required exhibits annexed to said application.\u201d\nThe fact that there were two ordinances which might apply did not deny this defendant notice that a privilege license was required. Under either ordinance, defendant knew that he must have a license and that he should apply to the City Council for it. This he did not do, in violation of both ordinances.\nDefendant also argues that the ordinance is so vague as to permit arbitrary enforcement. We need not address the question concerning whether the standards for granting the privilege license are sufficient and whether the procedures satisfy procedural due process requirements. There is no indication that this defendant has ever applied for a license. The only infirmity of which this defendant may complain is that concerning whether the ordinance requires that he apply for a privilege license. In this respect, as we noted above, the ordinance is plain and unambiguous.\nDefendant also attacks the ordinance on equal protection grounds asserting that the ordinance improperly granted immunity to businesses similarly situated. The ordinance specifically exempts from the licensing requirements a \u201cregularly established and licensed hospital, sanitarium, nursing home or medical clinic\u201d or an \u201coffice or clinic operated by a duly qualified and licensed medical practitioner, osteopath or chiropractor in connection with his practice . . In the first section of the ordinance defining the law\u2019s purpose, the specific target for licensing was \u201cthe privilege of carrying on the business, trade or profession of masseur or masseuse and for the operation or carrying on of the businesses, . . . commonly known as massage parlors, health salons, physical culture studios, ... or similar establishments by whatever name designated . . .\u201d To satisfy the requirements of equal protection, it is only necessary that the classifications established by the ordinance be based upon reasonable, non-arbitrary standards. Check v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E. 2d 18 (1968). The ordinance exempts already licensed health care facilities from the further requirement of obtaining a privilege license from the city. Qualifications for the privilege license simply require that each applicant show proof of good moral character and furnish a health certificate from a medical doctor. Such requirements are far below the qualifications necessary to establish a licensed health care facility or to obtain a license to practice in one of the enumerated schools of medicine. In our opinion, the exclusion of licensed health care facilities and the enumerated professional health care providers from the additional requirements of the privilege license is reasonable.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find in the trial below\nNo error.\nJudges PARKER and MARTIN (Harry C.) concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Joan H. Byers, for the State.", "Fred W. Harrison for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EUGENE WILLARD ENSLIN\nNo. 794SC220\n(Filed 7 August 1979)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 12.1; Municipal Corporations \u00a7 37.2\u2014 privilege license for massage business \u2014two ordinances \u2014notice of prohibited conduct\nThe fact that a city had two ordinances requiring a privilege license for a massage business did not render the ordinance under which defendant was charged for failure to obtain such a license void for vagueness, since such ordinance provided defendant with abundant fair notice that operating a massage business without a privilege license was prohibited\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 12.1; Municipal Corporations \u00a7 37.2\u2014 privilege license for massage business \u2014equal protection\nA city ordinance requiring a privilege license lor the operation of a massage business did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it exempted regularly established and licensed medical clinics and offices or clinics operated by a licensed medical practitioner, osteopath or chiropractor in connection with his practice, since such exemptions were reasonable.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Stevens, Judge. Judgment entered 12 December 1978 in Superior Court, ONSLOW County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 1979.\nDefendant was charged with operating a massage business known as \u201cInternational Massage\u201d without first having applied for and received a privilege license from the Jacksonville City Tax Collector in violation of Jacksonville City Ordinance, Chapter 14A, Section 1-1, subsection (c)(1), which provides as follows:\n\u201cNo person, partnership, corporation or association shall operate a massage business as herein defined unless such person, partnership, corporation or association shall first have applied for and received a privilege license from the City Tax Collector.\u201d\nSection l-l(b)(3) defining massage business provides that:\n\u201cMASSAGE business means any establishment or business wherein massage is practiced, including establishments, commonly known as health clubs, physical culture studios and massage parlors.\u201d\nDefendant was found guilty as charged in district court and sentenced, suspended on condition that a fine of $50 and costs be paid, and that defendant obtain a license under Chapter 14A of the Jacksonville City Ordinance. The conviction was appealed to Superior Court.\nDefendant filed in Superior Court a motion seeking to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the ordinance denies defendant the equal protection of the laws. Defendant\u2019s motion also pointed out that the City of Jacksonville\u2019s city ordinances contained in Chapter 17-15 another ordinance regulating the same conduct, and he alleged that having two applicable ordinances rendered the ordinance under which he was charged void for vagueness. The motion was heard and denied after the trial court considered counsel\u2019s briefs and documents. Defendant was brought for trial de novo in the Superior Court. His trial motion for a directed verdict was denied, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.\nDefendant appeals assigning error to the denial of his motion to dismiss the charges, and appeals the denial of his motion for directed verdict at trial.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Joan H. Byers, for the State.\nFred W. Harrison for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0565-01", "first_page_order": 593, "last_page_order": 597 }