{ "id": 8550486, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HILBERT WALTER HARRIS, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harris", "decision_date": "1979-10-02", "docket_number": "No. 791SC355", "first_page": "184", "last_page": "189", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "43 N.C. App. 184" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "573 S.W. 2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9946559 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/573/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 A.L.R. 2d 605", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 463", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179008 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "2747, n. 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560734 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.C. App. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548753 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/18/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548181 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027357 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" }, { "page": "734" }, { "page": "2082" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11317375 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "644" }, { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557944 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165107 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "1514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 A.L.R. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 S.Ct. 725", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6163485, 6163782 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0257-01", "/us/362/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163485 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E. 2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562900 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128-129" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0125-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 654, "char_count": 11970, "ocr_confidence": 0.832, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.669500340943079e-08, "percentile": 0.45231073317401904 }, "sha256": "98c38ab495c95664c64a637b6f505269b3b8664996e43adcc58a2fddfa9d6571", "simhash": "1:6b81b2da46cff1cb", "word_count": 1945 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:38.047576+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN (Robert M.) and WEBB concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HILBERT WALTER HARRIS, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Chief Judge.\nThe sole issue presented on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence before the magistrate from which he could find probable cause to issue the search warrant challenged in this case. \u201cProbable cause, as used in the Fourth Amendment and G.S. 15-25(a) [now see G.S. 15A-244(2) and G.S. 15A-245], means a reasonable ground to believe that the proposed search will reveal the presence upon the premises to be searched of the objects sought and that those objects will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the offender.\u201d State v Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 128-129, 191 S.E. 2d 752, 755 (1972).\nA judicial determination upholding the constitutional validity of a search warrant will be sustained so long as a substantial basis exists for the issuing magistrate to conclude contraband is probably present. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L.Ed. 2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725, 78 A.L.R. 2d 233 (1960). In the case before us the issuing magistrate had the following affidavit of Elizabeth City police officers Curtis Moore and J. C. Spear before him when he authorized the search of defendant\u2019s residence.\nAffiants Curtis Moore and J. C. Spear have this date, 10/6/78 arrested Vinton B. Turnburke, a white male, age 17, who resides with his parents at 1504 Rochelle Drive, Elizabeth City, N.C., upon charges of possession of marijuana and sale of marijuana; after advising said Turnburke of his rights under the Miranda decision, affiants asked Turnburke where he had obtained the marijuana which they had just confiscated during a search of his home and vehicle and Turn-burke replied that on Monday, October 2, 1978, at approximately 3:30 p.m. he (Turnburke) went to the residence of \u201cHank\u201d Harris, at 1707 Crescent Drive, and met \u201cHank\u201d inside of the house, going in through the garage entrance; Turnburke further stated that he at that time purchased a V2 pound quantity of marijuana from \u201cHank\u201d Harris for a price of $220.00, with \u201cHank\u201d leaving Turnburke standing in one of the front or living rooms of the house while \u201cHank\u201d went to another room of the house and shortly returned with the marijuana contained in a brown paper bag in a loose fashion; Turnburke delivered to affiants the brown paper bag which contained the marijuana delivered to him by \u201cHank\u201d; Turn-burke further stated that he had previously purchased marijuana from \u201cHank\u201d Harris on 3 or 4 prior occasions in smaller quanties [sic]; Turnburke described \u201cHank\u201d Harris as a young white male who is a student at the College of the Albemarle; affiant Spears talked with Elizabeth City Police Officer, W. G. Williams, Jr., who said that he is personally acquainted with \u201cHank\u201d Harris and that his full and correct name is Hilbert Walter Harris, Jr.; Moore is acquainted with \u201cHank\u2019s\u201d father, Hilbert W. Harris, Sr., who is employed as a postman; both Turnburke and Officer Williams independently told affiant Spears that \u201cHank\u201d customarily drove a 1976 or 1977 baige [sic] or light tan Jeep; Vinton B. Turnburke also gave affaints information concerning 6 marijuana sales which Turnburke had made to other people out of the V2 pound of marijuana purchased at the Harris house on 10/2/78, with your affaint\u2019s being unaware of these transactions until Turn-burke told them about same; that affaint Spears has caused a \u201cPIN\u201d computer check run on \u201cHank\u201d Harris and found that N.C. driver\u2019s license #5147583 was issued on 1/30/76 to Hilbert Walter Harris, Jr., with a residence of 1707 Crescent Drive in Elizabeth City, N. C., and a date of birth of 10/28/59.\nDefendant argues that the information before the magistrate was insufficient to satisfy the two-pronged test expounded by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723, 729, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964):\nAlthough an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was \u201ccredible\u201d or his information \u201creliable\u201d.\nAccord, State v. Hayes, 291 N.C. 293, 230 S.E. 2d 146 (1976). See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969).\nThere is no question in the present case that the first prong of the Aguilar test has been met. The magistrate was told that the basis of informant Turnburke\u2019s knowledge was Turnburke\u2019s own purchase of one-half pound of marijuana which Turnburke alleged occurred at the house owned by defendant\u2019s parents and in which defendant lived.\nHere, the informant was identified, so there is not the \u201cconfidential informant\u201d situation of Aguilar and Spinelli. Even so, the magistrate in the case at bar had before him circumstances from which he could reasonably conclude that the informant was credible and his information reliable. The statements of Turnburke admitting his own guilt and telling police officers where his supplier could be found and thus where additional evidence against him might be uncovered were against Turnburke\u2019s penal interest. The statements of Turnburke which implicate defendant involve the same crimes or transactions adversely affecting Turnburke\u2019s penal interest.\nThe Supreme Court of the United States recognized the value of such statements in determining the credibility and reliability of their source:\nThese statements were against the informant\u2019s penal interest, for he thereby admitted major elements of an offense.\nCommon sense in the important daily affairs of life would induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit these statements. People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility \u2014 sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search.\nUnited States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 29 L.Ed. 2d 723, 734, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082 (1971). Accord, State v. Beddard, 35 N.C. App. 212, 241 S.E. 2d 83 (1978). Defendant points out that hearsay statements against penal interest, as opposed to proprietary interest, are inadmissible in evidence, and urges that they should also be held to be too unreliable to serve as a basis for finding probable cause to issue a search warrant. The fact that the defendant\u2019s out-of-court declarations against penal interest may not be admissible at trial where the State must prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, does not preclude magistrates from considering such declarations in determining whether there is probable cause to believe contraband is present. U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 29 L.Ed. 2d 723, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971).\nThe degree of detail with which an informant reports illegal activities may also be telling about the informant\u2019s reliability. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969); State v. Ellington, 18 N.C. App. 273, 196 S.E. 2d 629 (1973), aff\u2019d, 284 N.C. 198, 200 S.E. 2d 177 (1973). The informant\u2019s ability to recall detail is an indication that he actually has firsthand information about the crimes or transactions of which he claims knowledge, particularly where there is police corroboration of at least some of the informant\u2019s statements.\nIn the present case the affidavit revealed that informant Turnburke had stated he knew defendant was a young white male who lived at 1707 Crescent Drive in Elizabeth City, who was a student at the College of the Albemarle, and who customarily drove a 1976 or 1977 beige or light tan Jeep. The police later corroborated these observations. Turnburke also stated the details of purchasing marijuana from the defendant at the defendant\u2019s residence in the afternoon of 2 October 1978, stating the quantity and purchase price of the contraband and describing the container in which it was packaged. Turnburke knew that the house had a garage entrance. It must be concluded that a \u201cmagistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way.\" Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417, 21 L.Ed. 2d 637, 644, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589 (1969).\nAn additional fact which could have been relied upon by the magistrate in evaluating the credibility of Turnburke\u2019s statements was that Turnburke was identified by name in the affidavit and was not a confidential informer. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 478, 49 L.Ed. 2d 627, 641, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2747, n. 9 (1976). The general rule in other jurisdictions is that an affidavit for a search warrant based on information furnished by a named individual is ordinarily sufficient to support the warrant. Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 605, 608 (1950); See Edwards v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 573 S.W. 2d 640 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 1978). That an informant is willing to give his name on the face of the affidavit demonstrates his willingness to stand behind his story, thus raising the probability his information is correct.\nThe importance of protecting the homes of citizens of our State from the unauthorized and arbitrary intrusion of illegal searches cannot be overstressed. However, we are satisfied that in the case before us the magistrate had sufficient information before him reasonably to conclude that the informant\u2019s information was reliable and, based on this information, to issue a search warrant. This would be true even had the informant been a confidential informant.\nNo error.\nJudges MARTIN (Robert M.) and WEBB concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Sarah C. Young, for the State.", "Twiford, Trimpi & Thompson, by C. Everett Thompson, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HILBERT WALTER HARRIS, JR.\nNo. 791SC355\n(Filed 2 October 1979)\nSearches and Seizures \u00a7 24\u2014 validity of warrant \u2014 probable cause \u2014 identified informant \u2014credibility\nEvidence before a magistrate was sufficient for him to find probable cause to issue a search warrant where the magistrate was told that the basis of the informant\u2019s knowledge was his own purchase of one-half pound marijuana which he alleged occurred at the house owned by defendant\u2019s parents and in which defendant lived; and the magistrate had before him facts from which he could reasonably conclude that the informant was credible and his information reliable, including (1) statements by the informant admitting his own guilt of dealing in contraband and telling officers where his supplier could be found and thus where additional evidence against him might be uncovered, (2) a great degree of detail which the informant revealed with respect to defendant, who was his supplier, defendant\u2019s home, and defendant\u2019s vehicle which observations were later corroborated by police, and (3) the informant\u2019s willingness to be identified by name in the affidavit and not to remain a confidential informant.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Small and Strickland, Judges. Order entered 7 November 1978, and judgment entered 1 March 1979 in Superior Court, PASQUOTANK County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 August 1979.\nDefendant was charged with felonious possession of marijuana in violation of G.S. 90-95(a)(3). Pursuant to G.S. 15A-974 defendant moved the trial court to suppress evidence seized on 7 October 1978 during a search by the police of the dwelling in which he resided. The motion was based on defendant\u2019s contention that the search violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Upon the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion, defendant excepted, entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged, and gave notice of appeal. The appeal, under the provisions of G.S. 15A-979(b), raises the single question of the validity of the search warrant.\nAttorney General Edmisten by Associate Attorney Sarah C. Young, for the State.\nTwiford, Trimpi & Thompson, by C. Everett Thompson, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0184-01", "first_page_order": 212, "last_page_order": 217 }