{ "id": 8551617, "name": "DONALD DAVIS v. HUFF AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., and RICHARD KENT HUFF, SR.", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Huff Ambulance Service, Inc.", "decision_date": "1979-12-04", "docket_number": "No. 7923DC224", "first_page": "177", "last_page": "180", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 N.C. App. 177" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "577 F. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 879400 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/577/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 S.Ct. 76", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 303907 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/317/0595-02" ] }, { "cite": "87 L.Ed. 563", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 U.S. 706", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 304065, 303779, 304164, 304325, 304039, 304208, 304090, 304252 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/317/0706-04", "/us/317/0706-02", "/us/317/0706-08", "/us/317/0706-03", "/us/317/0706-01", "/us/317/0706-07", "/us/317/0706-05", "/us/317/0706-06" ] }, { "cite": "316 U.S. 572", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 368141 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/316/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 207", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567027 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 C.F.R. \u00a7 778.114", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 354, "char_count": 6992, "ocr_confidence": 0.826, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20592011348924202 }, "sha256": "a0c029ae1f58daca6e833f107e46a61ac236dcddb66a1c794d44b037c954bb91", "simhash": "1:c6e881a07e7ddb64", "word_count": 1150 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:31.887789+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Arnold and Webb concur." ], "parties": [ "DONALD DAVIS v. HUFF AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., and RICHARD KENT HUFF, SR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nDefendants first assign as error the trial court\u2019s finding that when plaintiff was first employed by defendants the understanding between the parties was that plaintiff would work a regular shift and a forty-hour week. While the trial court, consistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 201 et seq. (1938), could have found that plaintiff had contracted to work an \u201cirregular\u201d workshift or weekly hours in excess of forty, 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 778.114 (1968), he was not required to do so here. Plaintiff testified, \u201cWhen I took the job, I thought I would be working 40 hours in 8 hour shifts.\u201d Despite defendant Huff\u2019s evidence to the contrary, this statement is a sufficient basis for the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the employment contract between plaintiff and defendants contemplated a \u201cregular\u201d eight-hour workshift and forty-hour workweek. Henderson County v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 254 S.E. 2d 160 (1979).\nDefendants also assign as error the trial court\u2019s finding with respect to the number of overtime hours worked by plaintiff, plaintiff\u2019s regular and overtime rates of pay, and the total overtime wages due plaintiff. The parties concede that the Fair Labor Standards Act governs defendants\u2019 liability, if any, for overtime wages. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 207:\n(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.\nSince the trial court properly concluded that the employment contract between plaintiff and defendants was for a regular workweek of forty hours, the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s regular rate under the Act was $3.12 per hour and overtime rate was $4.68 must be sustained. The term \u201cregular rate\u201d is not defined in the Act. Where, as found by the trial court in the present case, the parties have agreed that the employee is to work a regular forty-hour week at a specified weekly salary, the regular hourly rate is determined by dividing that salary by forty hours, and the amount of overtime is determined by multiplying that hourly wage by one and one-half as to each hour worked in excess of forty. Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 86 L.Ed. 1682, 62 S.Ct. 1216 (1942), reh. denied, 317 U.S. 706, 87 L.Ed. 563, 63 S.Ct. 76 (1942); Marshall v. Shirt Corp., 577 F. 2d 444 (8th Cir. 1978).\nThe trial court concluded that plaintiff worked seventy-two hours one week and ninety-six hours the next week on an alternating basis. Since the parties agree that under the Act, nine hours of each twenty-four hour shift were allotted to sleeping and eating and were not compensable, plaintiff had alternating com-pensable hours of employement of forty-five and sixty hours per week. Thus, plaintiff accumulated overtime of five hours one week and twenty hours the following week throughout his employment with defendants. The trial court correctly calculated defendants\u2019 liability to plaintiff for overtime pay in the amount of $1,637.\nAffirmed.\nJudges Arnold and Webb concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Zachary, Zachary & Harding, by Lee Zachary, for the plaintiff appellee.", "Randleman, Randleman & Randleman, P.A., by J. Michael Randleman, for the defendant appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD DAVIS v. HUFF AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., and RICHARD KENT HUFF, SR.\nNo. 7923DC224\n(Filed 4 December 1979)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 8\u2014 employment contract \u2014 hours per week \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn an action by an employee to recover overtime pay from his employer, testimony by plaintiff that at the time he took the job he thought he \u201cwould be working 40 hours in 8 hour shifts\u201d was a sufficient basis for the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the employment contract between the parties contemplated a \u201cregular\u201d eight hour shift and forty hour work week.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 9\u2014 overtime wages claimed by plaintiff \u2014 Fair Labor Standards Act applicable\nThe Fair Labor Standards Act governed defendants\u2019 liability, if any, for overtime wages claimed by plaintiff ambulance driver.\n3. Master and Servant \u00a7 9\u2014 overtime wages claimed \u2014 method of computation\nWhere the parties have agreed that the employee is to work a regular forty hour week at a specified weekly salary, the regular hourly rate is determined by dividing that salary by forty hours, and the amount of overtime is determined by multiplying that hourly wage by one and one-half as to each hour worked in excess of forty; therefore, plaintiff, who was paid $125 weekly and who accumulated overtime of five hours one week and twenty hours the following week throughout his employment with defendants, was entitled to collect overtime pay of $1637 from defendant.\nAPPEAL by defendants from Osborne, Judge. Judgment entered 6 October 1978 in District Court, YADKIN County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 October 1979.\nPlaintiff employee sued the defendant corporate ambulance service and its principal director and stockholder for overtime pay allegedly owing. The parties stipulated before trial that plaintiff was employed by the ambulance service at a gross salary of $125 per week and that he was employed on a shift in which he actually worked twenty-four hours on and twenty-four hours off. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was employed by the ambulance service during the period between September 1974 through 3 April 1975 and as the result of his work schedule he was required to work five hours overtime one week and twenty hours overtime the following week as computed under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff demanded $1,637 in overtime wages, court costs, and $500 for his attorney\u2019s fees. Defendants answered, denying the operative allegations of the complaint.\nAt trial, plaintiff testified in his own behalf and the president of the ambulance service testified in behalf of the defendants. The court, sitting in the absence of a jury, found that plaintiff was employed by the defendants from early October 1974 through the beginning of April 1975 at a salary of $125 per week on a \u201cregular\u201d workshift and that plaintiff was unaware that he would be required to work the lengthy hours which he in fact did work until after he took the job. The court further determined that during the course of plaintiffs employment with the defendants he worked five hours overtime one week and twenty hours the next week on an alternating basis. The court calculated plaintiff\u2019s regular hourly rate at $3.12 per hour and overtime rate at $4.68 per hour, and found the defendants jointly liable to the plaintiff in the amount of $1,637 for overtime pay, $500 for plaintiff\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees, and court costs. From this judgment the defendants appeal.\nZachary, Zachary & Harding, by Lee Zachary, for the plaintiff appellee.\nRandleman, Randleman & Randleman, P.A., by J. Michael Randleman, for the defendant appellants." }, "file_name": "0177-01", "first_page_order": 205, "last_page_order": 208 }