{
  "id": 8554563,
  "name": "CHARLES R. BLAIR v. CORA JO H. BLAIR",
  "name_abbreviation": "Blair v. Blair",
  "decision_date": "1980-01-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 7915DC752",
  "first_page": "605",
  "last_page": "607",
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
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    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1974,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "21 N.C. App. 674",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1974,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:31.887789+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges CLARK and ERWIN concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "CHARLES R. BLAIR v. CORA JO H. BLAIR"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nPlaintiff contends that there appears in the record no evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that plaintiff abandoned defendant. In this he is correct. By defendant\u2019s own testimony she \u201cfully agreed\u201d that the parties would purchase a condominium and plaintiff would move there and live separately from her. However, since there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that plaintiff committed indignities making defendant\u2019s condition intolerable, an adequate ground to support an award of alimony pendente lite, G.S. 50-16.3(a)(l) and G.S. 50-7(4), the error as to abandonment is harmless.\nPlaintiff argues that the award of alimony pendente lite must be reversed because the trial court made no findings as to the amount needed by plaintiff to subsist during the pendency of this action. Plaintiff relies on Briggs v. Briggs, 21 N.C. App. 674, 205 S.E. 2d 547 (1974), but that case is distinguishable upon its facts. In Briggs, the court found the husband to have a monthly income of $1533, and ordered that he pay more than $1000 per month for the wife and two minor children. Under those circumstances, we observed that the trial court had appeared to ignore the fact that the husband must also exist during the pendente lite period. Here, however, the court found that plaintiff has a gross annual income in excess of $45,000, and awarded defendant $8,500 per year as alimony pendente lite. Plaintiff does not argue that he has actually been left with an amount insufficient for his needs. We find no merit in this assignment of error.\nPlaintiff bases his attack upon the amount of alimony pendente lite awarded on the fact that the document detailing defendant\u2019s living expenses was never formally offered into evidence. However, the document was clearly before the trial court, the trier of fact, since defendant\u2019s expenses are set out in detail in his order. And it is clear from plaintiff\u2019s cross-examination of defendant that plaintiff\u2019s counsel had the document before him. We find no prejudice to plaintiff from the technical error of defendant\u2019s failing to enter the document into evidence, and we decline to reverse upon that ground. Furthermore, the amount of alimony pendente lite is to be determined by the trial court, G.S. 50-16.3(b) and 5046.5(a), and we find no abuse of discretion here.\nPlaintiff is correct that the award of $750 attorney fees is insufficiently based. G.S. 50-16.4 provides for the awarding of \u201creasonable\u201d counsel fees. Here, as in Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 296, 183 S.E. 2d 420, 427 (1971), the order \u201ccontains no findings of fact, such as the nature and scope of the legal services rendered, the skill and time required, et cetera, upon which a determination of the requisite reasonableness could be based.\u201d For this reason, this portion of the award must be reversed and remanded for further hearing.\nWe need not discuss plaintiff\u2019s further assignments of error. The order of the trial court is\nAffirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.\nJudges CLARK and ERWIN concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ARNOLD, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Haywood, Denny & Miller, by James H. Johnson III, for plaintiff appellant.",
      "Nye, Mitchell, Jarvis & Bugg, by R. Roy Mitchell, Jr., for defendant appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CHARLES R. BLAIR v. CORA JO H. BLAIR\nNo. 7915DC752\n(Filed 15 January 1980)\n1. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 18.12\u2014 alimony pendente lite \u2014 right to relief \u2014 abandonment \u2014 findings unsupported by evidence\nThe trial court\u2019s error in finding that plaintiff abandoned defendant was harmless, since there was sufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s finding that plaintiff committed indignities making defendant\u2019s condition intolerable, and there was thus an adequate ground to support an award of alimony pendente lite.\n2. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 18.13\u2014 alimony pendente lite \u2014 amount\u2014no findings as to plaintiff\u2019s needs\nThere was no merit to plaintiff\u2019s argument that an award of alimony pendente lite should be reversed because the trial court made no findings as to the amount needed by plaintiff to subsist during the pendency of this action, since the court found that plaintiff had a gross annual income in excess of $45,000 and awarded defendant $8500 per year as alimony pendente lite, and plaintiff did not argue that he was actually left with an amount insufficient for his needs.\n3. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 18.8\u2014 alimony pendente lite \u2014 defendant\u2019s living expenses \u2014 document not entered in evidence \u2014 technical error harmless\nPlaintiff in an action for alimony pendente lite was not prejudiced by the technical error of defendant\u2019s failing to enter into evidence a document detailing her living expenses since the document was before the trial court and plaintiff\u2019s counsel had the document before him.\n4. Divorce and Alimony \u00a7 18.16\u2014 alimony pendente lite \u2014 attorney\u2019s fee \u2014 no finding of reasonableness\nIn an action for alimony pendente lite an award of $750 for attorney fees was improperly entered where the court made no finding as to the reasonableness of the fee.\nAppeal by plaintiff from Paschall, Judge. Judgment entered 12 March 1979 in District Court, ORANGE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 December 1979.\nPlaintiff seeks an absolute divorce on the ground of one year\u2019s separation. Defendant answered, alleging that plaintiff abandoned her and subjected her to indignities, and cross claiming for a divorce from bed and board, possession of the homeplace, alimony both pendente lite and permanent, and attorney\u2019s fees. Plaintiff in his reply alleged constructive abandonment as a bar to an award of alimony. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, which was granted for him on the issue of divorce, with all defendant\u2019s rights with respect to her cross-claim preserved. Subsequently, upon motion, defendant was awarded $708.33 per month as alimony pendente lite, possession of the parties\u2019 home on Churchill Drive, and $750 attorney\u2019s fees. Plaintiff appeals.\nHaywood, Denny & Miller, by James H. Johnson III, for plaintiff appellant.\nNye, Mitchell, Jarvis & Bugg, by R. Roy Mitchell, Jr., for defendant appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0605-01",
  "first_page_order": 633,
  "last_page_order": 635
}