{ "id": 8547194, "name": "NANNIE RUTH GREENHILL, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of WILLIAM NORWOOD CRABTREE v. LANIE N. CRABTREE, Executrix of the Estate of RAYMOND E. CRABTREE, LANIE N. CRABTREE and RICHARD S. CRABTREE", "name_abbreviation": "Greenhill v. Crabtree", "decision_date": "1980-02-05", "docket_number": "No. 7915SC473", "first_page": "49", "last_page": "53", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 N.C. App. 49" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 S.E. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565242 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553383 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560322 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 A.L.R. 2d 1290", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1295-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565348 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E. 471", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11252763 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/174/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.E. 2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626659 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E. 2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625781 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S.E. 955", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "957" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11253076 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/172/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546948 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E. 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630097 ], "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/206/0323-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 508, "char_count": 8562, "ocr_confidence": 0.817, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.304306604330015e-07, "percentile": 0.9424279176121851 }, "sha256": "4a0e0d607b2bb0b64dfbe00716eda685e3c392e0982ac812efebc27498667199", "simhash": "1:0fe9453c8606eefb", "word_count": 1441 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:38.339487+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges VAUGHN and WEBB concur." ], "parties": [ "NANNIE RUTH GREENHILL, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of WILLIAM NORWOOD CRABTREE v. LANIE N. CRABTREE, Executrix of the Estate of RAYMOND E. CRABTREE, LANIE N. CRABTREE and RICHARD S. CRABTREE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN (Harry C.), Judge.\nPlaintiff\u2019s sole assignment of error on appeal is the trial court\u2019s denial of her motion to set aside the notice of dismissal. She argues that in North Carolina an attorney may not surrender or waive the substantive rights of his client without the client\u2019s express authority, that the second voluntary dismissal of her claim operated as a final adjudication of her substantive rights, and that her attorney, William Blue, entered the dismissal without her authority. For the following reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court denying plaintiff relief.\nIn this jurisdiction there is a presumption in favor of an attorney\u2019s authority to act for the client he professes to represent. Bank v. Penland, 206 N.C. 323, 173 S.E. 345 (1934); Alexander v. Board of Education, 6 N.C. App. 92, 169 S.E. 2d 549 (1969). This presumption arises not only with regard to technical or procedural aspects of a case; it extends as well to the arena of the client\u2019s substantive rights. In Gardiner v. May, 172 N.C. 192, 89 S.E. 955 (1916), is found this pronouncement:\nA judgment entered of record, whether in invitum or by consent, is presumed to be regular, and an attorney who consented to it is presumed to have acted in good faith and to have had the necessary authority from his client, and not to have betrayed his confidence or to have sacrificed his right.\nId. at 196, 89 S.E. at 957. See also Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 118 S.E. 2d 897 (1961); Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E. 2d 826 (1961); Chavis v. Brown, 174 N.C. 122, 93 S.E. 471 (1917). Even in the criminal law area, when an attorney enters a guilty plea for his client:\n[I]t is to be presumed that no honorable lawyer would enter such a plea in behalf of his client unless the client authorized him to do so. Generally speaking, the legal profession is composed of honorable men who are fair and candid in their dealings with the court.\nState v. Woody, 271 N.C. 544, 548, 157 S.E. 2d 108, 111 (1967).\nNo one would quibble with the fact that a dismissal which terminates a case on its merits affects a client\u2019s substantive rights. Authorities agree that as a general rule, an attorney can enter a dismissal which will terminate the case on its merits only with special authorization from his client to do so. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client \u00a7 87 (1937); 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law \u00a7 125 (1963). However, just as in the cases previously cited involving consent or compromise judgments, undoubtedly affecting the substantive rights of a client, the presumption arises as well that the client has given the attorney special authorization for entry of a dismissal:\nWhere special authorization is necessary in order to make a dismissal or other termination of an action by an attorney binding on the client, the decisions are generally to the effect that it will be presumed, prima facie, that the attorney acted under and pursuant to such authorization.\nAnnot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 1290, 1295-96 (1957).\nIt then becomes the burden of the client to rebut this presumption and to prove lack of authority to the satisfaction of the court. Howard v. Boyce, supra; Bank v. Penland, supra. In Bank v. Penland, the client was successful in rebutting the presumption that her attorney was authorized to sign a consent judgment in her behalf. The court found as facts that the attorney who signed had not been authorized by her to do so, that she neither agreed nor authorized anyone to agree to the consent judgment, and that she had not employed counsel to represent her in the matter under adjudication.\nIn the instant case, however, the client failed to meet this burden; she was unsuccessful in proving to Judge McKinnon\u2019s satisfaction that William Blue lacked the authority to enter the dismissal which terminated her case. With conflicting evidence before him, Judge McKinnon made the following finding of fact:\n16. At no time during the course of plaintiff\u2019s representation in the matter by attorneys J. William Blue and Barry T. Winston, was any limitation placed by the plaintiff on the aforesaid attorneys\u2019 authority to represent the plaintiff and the aforesaid attorneys or members of their law firm represented the plaintiff in all matters pertaining to this litigation from the inception of 74 CvS 1476 until a record on appeal was prepared in the present action.\nAppellant made no exception to this finding; therefore, it is conclusive on appeal. Schloss v. Jamison, 258 N.C. 271, 128 S.E. 2d 590 (1962); Ply-Marts, Inc. v. Phileman, 40 N.C. App. 767, 253 S.E. 2d 494 (1979). In making this finding, the trial court reveals that it was not convinced to its satisfaction that William Blue lacked the requisite authority to act for his client in entering the notice of dismissal. In other words, his client failed to carry the burden of rebutting the presumption of authority.\nThe foregoing amply supports appellees\u2019 position that the trial court acted within its sound discretion in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion. Appellate review of the trial court\u2019s decision on a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is limited to determining whether the court abused its discretion. Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 217 S.E. 2d 532 (1975). The court\u2019s action in denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is\nAffirmed.\nJudges VAUGHN and WEBB concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN (Harry C.), Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Grover C. McCain, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.", "Manning, Jackson, Osborn & Frankstone, by Frank B. Jackson, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NANNIE RUTH GREENHILL, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of WILLIAM NORWOOD CRABTREE v. LANIE N. CRABTREE, Executrix of the Estate of RAYMOND E. CRABTREE, LANIE N. CRABTREE and RICHARD S. CRABTREE\nNo. 7915SC473\n(Filed 5 February 1980)\nAttorneys at Law \u00a7 3\u2014 presumption as to scope oi authority \u2014 failure to rebut\nIn this jurisdiction there is a presumption in favor of an attorney\u2019s authority to act for the client he professes to represent, and this presumption arises not only with regard to technical or procedural aspects of a case but extends as well to the client\u2019s substantive rights; plaintiff in this action failed to rebut this presumption and to prove lack of authority of her counsel to enter a second voluntary dismissal of her claim, arid she made no exception to the trial court\u2019s finding that no limitation was placed on her attorney.\nAppeal by plaintiff from McKinnon, Judge. Order entered 15 March 1979 in Superior Court, ORANGE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 1980.\nOn 17 November 1975 plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, members of her family, alleging that they had improperly influenced her father to grant them a deed to certain property before he died and that one defendant had improperly influenced her father to create a joint banking account from which the defendant had withdrawn $1,073. Plaintiff sought to have the deed declared void and to have the $1,073 returned to her father\u2019s estate. Three days before the action was filed, plaintiff had taken a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) in an identical cause of action, originally filed 24 October 1974. The present action was calendared for trial on 14 September 1977. In an order dated 12 September 1977, Judge McKinnon, having considered both defendants\u2019 motion for early trial and plaintiff\u2019s motion for continuance, denied the motion for continuance and ordered that the case be calendared for trial on 19 September 1977.\nWhen the case was called, plaintiff\u2019s counsel again moved for a continuance; the motion was denied by Judge Snepp. On 22 September 1977 plaintiff\u2019s counsel filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a). Plaintiff, employing the same counsel, J. William Blue Jr., appealed from the order denying the motion to continue to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. The appeal was dismissed by this Court on 7 March 1978.\nOn 2 November 1978, plaintiff employing different counsel, filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) to set aside the notice of dismissal filed 22 September 1977 by William Blue \u201cfor the reason that said dismissal was filed without any authority, expressed or implied, from the plaintiff or anyone representing the plaintiff.\u201d The motion was accompanied by affidavits of plaintiff and her husband. Hearing was held on the motion 20 February 1979; plaintiff\u2019s former attorneys presented evidence. The court then made findings of fact, concluded that plaintiff\u2019s evidence did not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(4) or (6), and ordered that plaintiff\u2019s motion be denied. Plaintiff appeals from this order.\nGrover C. McCain, Jr., for plaintiff appellant.\nManning, Jackson, Osborn & Frankstone, by Frank B. Jackson, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0049-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 81 }