{ "id": 8548517, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMMY M. STAFFORD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stafford", "decision_date": "1980-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 7929SC730", "first_page": "297", "last_page": "301", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 N.C. App. 297" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "201 S.E. 2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562720 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558710 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E. 2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562829 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547075 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/14/0110-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 433, "char_count": 7521, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.679404706838565e-07, "percentile": 0.6972597630209328 }, "sha256": "1746dffa2b9fefea05df0557119a4afc19db321422fe770e97d279b6716e373e", "simhash": "1:d27ac2e3608337c1", "word_count": 1257 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:38.339487+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CLARK and ERWIN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMMY M. STAFFORD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARNOLD, Judge.\nWe find no error in the denial of defendant\u2019s motions to suppress and to dismiss. Ample evidence appears to support the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s statement to the police was \u201cvoluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.\u201d Any doubts the investigating officers may have had as to defendant\u2019s guilt are irrelevant. Moreover, there is no contention that an unreasonable time elapsed between defendant\u2019s being advised of his rights and his giving the statement. The State presented evidence of each essential element of the crime.\nDefendant argues that Curtis Forester should not have been allowed to testify that the value of the items stolen was $1,070, since he further testified that this was the replacement cost of the items. Defendant is correct that in determining whether a crime is felonious or nonfelonious the proper measure of value is the price the stolen items in their condition at the time they were stolen would bring on the open market. State v. Dees, 14 N.C. App. 110, 187 S.E. 2d 433 (1972). However, we find any error in the admission of Forester\u2019s testimony to be harmless, since the larceny in the present case is a felony without regard to the value of the property taken. See G.S. 14-72(b)(2) and G.S. 14-54. We reject defendant\u2019s argument that the purportedly inflated valuation \u201cinflamed\u201d the jury.\nThe trial court, apparently upon its own motion, arrested judgment on the conviction of felonious larceny. Defendant argues, therefore, that at the most he can be guilty of misdemeanor breaking or entering. Generally, a judgment is arrested because of insufficiency in the indictment or some fatal defect appearing on the face of the record. State v. Davis, 282 N.C. 107, 191 S.E. 2d 664 (1972). Assuming that such was the case here (no reason for the arrest of judgment appears in the record on appeal), the arrest of judgment on the conviction for felonious larceny has no effect on the conviction for felonious breaking or entering. The essential elements of felonious breaking or entering are (1) breaking or entering (2) any building (3) with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein. G.S. 14-54(a) (emphasis added). It is not necessary for conviction under this statute that a felony or larceny actually be committed in the building. It is merely the intent at the time of the breaking or entering to commit the felony or larceny within the building that is required. State v. Sawyer, 283 N.C. 289, 196 S.E. 2d 250 (1973). This assignment of error is without merit.\nFinally, defendant assigns error to the entry of judgment against him for attorney\u2019s fees without notice or an opportunity to be heard. G.S. 7A-455(b) allows the court to enter a civil judgment against a convicted indigent for attorney\u2019s fees and costs. Such a judgment was entered against defendant in this case. In State v. Crews, 284 N.C. 427, 442, 201 S.E. 2d 840, 849-50 (1974), our Supreme Court vacated such a judgment \u201cwithout prejudice to the State\u2019s right to apply for a judgment in accordance with G.S. 7A-455 after due notice to defendant and a hearing.\u201d The State argues here that defendant was given sufficient notice of the possibility of such a civil judgment by the \u201cAffidavit of Indigency\u201d which he was required to complete before counsel was appointed for him. On this form, near the top, in italicized type appears the following: \u201cNOTE: If you are convicted the value of services rendered by the lawyer furnished you will be recorded as a judgment and will be a lien against you.\u201d We question the sufficiency of this notice, and we note further that even if it were sufficient, there appears no indication that defendant received any opportunity to be heard on the matter. Guided by the decision in State v. Crews, supra, we vacate this civil judgment and remand for a hearing upon proper notice.\nIn the criminal conviction we find no error.\nThe civil judgment is vacated and remanded.\nJudges CLARK and ERWIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARNOLD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Grayson G. Kelley, for the State.", "J. Christopher Callahan for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMMY M. STAFFORD\nNo. 7929SC730\n(Filed 19 February 1980)\n1. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings \u00a7 4; Larceny \u00a7 6.1\u2014 value of property taken overstated \u2014 harmless error\nIn a prosecution for breaking and entering and felonious larceny, any error in the admission of testimony that the value of the items stolen was $1070, based on replacement cost, was harmless since the larceny in this case was a felony without regard to the value of the property taken.\n2. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings g 5.9\u2014 judgment arrested on larceny conviction-felonious breaking or entering conviction unaffected\nThe trial court\u2019s arrest of judgment on defendant\u2019s conviction of felonious larceny had no effect on defendant\u2019s conviction for felonious breaking or entering, since a conviction of breaking or entering under G.S. 14-64(a) did not require that a felony or larceny actually be committed in the building broken into but only that defendant have an intent at the time of breaking or entering to commit the larceny.\n3. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.2\u2014 indigent defendant \u2014 judgment for counsel fees \u2014 insufficient notice and hearing\nThe trial court erred in entering a judgment against the indigent defendant for attorney\u2019s fees without notice or an opportunity to be heard, and a statement printed on the \u201cAffidavit of Indigency\u201d which defendant was required to complete before counsel was appointed for him did not constitute sufficient notice.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Barbee, Judge. Judgment entered 15 March 1979 in Superior Court, RUTHERFORD County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 1980.\nDefendant was indicted for breaking and entering and felonious larceny for the theft of tools from Furniture Plastics, Inc. The State presented evidence that sometime between 12 May and 14 May 1978 the loading dock door of Furniture Plastics, Inc. was bent and opened, and a tool box and tools were taken. Curtis Forester, the plant manager, testified that the reasonable market value of the items was $1,070. Two days later he identified the tools and tool box at the jail. On 15 May Officer Price asked defendant to come to the county jail. There defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, and he signed the waiver of his rights. Lieutenant Epley then asked defendant a question, to which he replied, \u201cYou have got me, and I will tell you about it.\u201d He told the officers that he and Larry Downey had parked Downey\u2019s Mustang behind the Methodist Church and walked down the railroad track to the plastics plant. He knew the door had been hit with a hammer and would be very easy to open. He took the tools and put them down on the loading dock, and they went back and got the car, put the tools in it and left.\nDefendant took Officer Epley to defendant\u2019s brother\u2019s house, where he said he and Downey had put the tools in a barn. The tools were found there. Defendant\u2019s statement to the police was never reduced to writing. His motion to suppress the statement was denied. In spite of the statement the investigating officers at times during the investigation had doubts as to defendant\u2019s involvement in the crime.\nThe defendant presented no evidence, but moved to dismiss. His motion was denied. Defendant was found guilty of felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny. The court arrested judgment on the larceny conviction and sentenced defendant to 10 years for breaking or entering. Defendant appeals.\nAttorney General Edmisten, by Associate Attorney Grayson G. Kelley, for the State.\nJ. Christopher Callahan for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0297-01", "first_page_order": 325, "last_page_order": 329 }