{ "id": 8549367, "name": "WOODROW C. KING, Employee, Plaintiff Appellant v. FORSYTH COUNTY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendant Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "King v. Forsyth County", "decision_date": "1980-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 7910IC682", "first_page": "467", "last_page": "471", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 N.C. App. 467" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560621 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S.E. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600828 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.E. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624486 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575638 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564713 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0088-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 554, "char_count": 9799, "ocr_confidence": 0.829, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.13959479703866e-07, "percentile": 0.8619577820946318 }, "sha256": "e17ec5ef110469e789d76abd9f230c99983077b04fd96dc8f1a1f2c7c19f6664", "simhash": "1:3f11b60ff5d1a44e", "word_count": 1626 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:44:38.339487+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MARTIN (Robert M.) and ERWIN concur." ], "parties": [ "WOODROW C. KING, Employee, Plaintiff Appellant v. FORSYTH COUNTY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendant Appellees" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WELLS, Judge.\nWe first note that jurisdiction of appellate courts from an award of the Industrial Commission is limited to review of: (1) whether there was competent evidence before the Commission to support its findings; and (2) whether such findings support its legal conclusions. Perry v. Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E. 2d 397 (1978); McRae v. Wall, 260 N.C. 576, 133 S.E. 2d 220 (1963).\nThe full Commission found that on 9 May 1977, King was forty-nine years old, in good health, and had no prior indication of heart problems. His most recent physical examination was on 25 February 1977. The Commission determined that King suffered his heart attack as a result of physical exertion entailed in the chase on 9 May 1977, and that he became totally disabled as a result of the heart attack. The Commission then concluded that on 9 May 1977, King did not sustain an injury by \u201caccident\u201d arising out of and in the course of his employment, within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(6). To put the matter clearly in focus, we quote the following pertinent entry in the Commission\u2019s order:\nThe element of accident in this case turns on whether the activity of plaintiff\u2019s chasing on foot the suspect constituted a sufficient departure from plaintiff\u2019s normal or ordinary work routine. It is the plaintiff\u2019s burden to place in the record evidence of his normal work routine. This record does not supply information as to frequency with which plaintiff engaged in chase on foot of a suspect.\nTo the question: \u201cHow would you describe the foot chase that you engaged (sic) as being a part of your duties, normally?\u201d [h]is answer was: \u201cVery unusual.\u201d\nThis does not establish a variance from the ordinary work routine upon which can be found facts to support [a] conclusion of an accident within the meaning of that term as used in the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. This record does not contain evidence such as was present in GABRIEL v. NEWTON, 227 N.C. 314 (1941). [sic] [Brackets removed.]\nWe believe the Commission\u2019s ruling is based upon an erroneous interpretation of law. In Gabriel v. Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E. 2d 96 (1947), our Supreme Court clearly recognized that damage to heart tissue clearly precipitated or caused by \u201coverexertion\u201d constitutes an injury by accident. In Gabriel, the claimant was employed as a municipal policeman. On the night of his injury, he was called upon to arrest a man under the influence of liquor. The man violently resisted arrest and after great exertion and a prolonged struggle, he was subdued and carried to jail. There, Gabriel and another person carried him up three flights of stairs to the jail. On arrival at the top of the stairs, Gabriel collapsed. A physician was called, and he diagnosed Gabriel\u2019s condition as acute dilatation of the heart due to excessive exertion. In holding that the injury to Gabriel\u2019s heart was by accident within the meaning of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, our Supreme Court enunciated a number of standards from which an accident might be inferred under such circumstances:\nThe injury was not a natural and probable consequence of the work he was engaged in, but was due to an unusual and unexpected occurrence, connected with the employment. [Citations omitted.] It was an untoward event without design or expectation. [Citations omitted.] * * * The unusual circumstances and conditions under which said injury was produced constituted an accident .... It has very generally been held that a strain or rupture resulting from overexertion is an injury for which compensation should be allowed .... But the exertion must be exceptional to constitute an accident within the Act .... Sudden heart dilatation caused by a strain would, we think, in ordinary parlance be called accidental.\n227 N.C. at 318, 42 S.E. 2d at 98-99.\nIn Lewter v. Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 82 S.E. 2d 410 (1954) our Supreme Court reviewed its position on the compen-sability of heart attack claims under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice (later Chief Justice) Parker concluded, 240 N.C. at 404, 82 S.E. 2d at 415:\nFrom our cases cited above it is clear that in heart disease our decisions require a showing that the exertion was in some way unusual or extraordinary.\nThe question again came before our Supreme Court in Bellamy v. Stevedoring Co., 258 N.C. 327, 128 S.E. 2d 395 (1962). Bellamy was employed at the Sunny Point Army Terminal as a carpenter. At the time his heart attack occurred, he was helping to move a safety net weighing about 500 pounds. While lifting the net, he experienced pain in his chest and became ill. A diagnosis of coronary occlusion with myocardial infarction was made. It was unusual for Bellamy to do heavy lifting. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that Bellamy sustained any injury by accident. The medical evidence in Bellamy had shown that the work in which Bellamy was involved did not cause the attack. While Bellamy\u2019s expert medical witness testified that the exertion on the occasion might have been a precipitating or hastening factor, he concluded that \u201cactivity has nothing to do with production of a myocardial infarction.\u201d 258 N.C. at 329, 128 S.E. 2d at 397.\nIt is clear, therefore, that Bellamy must be distinguished from the position of the Supreme Court as articulated in Gabriel and Lewter on the grounds that the claimant in Bellamy failed to establish a causal link between the exertion and heart attack. We note that a substantial majority of other jurisdictions in the United States follow the spirit of Gabriel and allow compensation where work-related strain or exertion is the causing or precipitating factor of heart failure. IB Larson\u2019s Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a7 38.30, p. 7-48 (1979).\nDr. Spencer saw the plaintiff immediately after the onset of his symptoms. He diagnosed plaintiff\u2019s condition as acute myocardial infarction. A \u201cmyocardial infarct\u201d is a \u201cregion of dead or dying tissue in the muscle of the heart which is the result of a sudden obstruction of the blood circulation, usually by a clot lodged in a coronary artery.\u201d 2 Schmidt, Attorneys\u2019 Dictionary of Medicine, p. M-141 (1978). An infarction is defined as \u201cthe process which leads to the formation of an infarct . . . .\u201d Id., at 1-30. The medical term \u201cacute\u201d means \u201cof short and sharp course, not chronic . . . .\u201d Stedman\u2019s Medical Dictionary, p. 19 (22nd ed. 1972). The events show that the chase took place on a muggy, hot morning and was extremely vigorous. Deputy King testified:\nI jumped out of the car and started pursuing on foot. The subject took off down between two houses into the woods. He was running fast. I pursued him on foot. I was running as hard as I could. I chased the subject for about two or three blocks. For about two to four minutes I was running flat out as hard as I could.\nIt is clear from the evidence in this case that the injury to Deputy King\u2019s heart occurred suddenly and immediately after the foot chase, and that it was the overexertion experienced during the foot chase that caused the injury to his heart. The Commission\u2019s own findings are to that effect. We hold that under such circumstances, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the overexertion which was the cause of his injury occurred while he was engaged in some unusual activity. It was the extent and nature of the exertion that classifies the resulting injury to the plaintiff\u2019s heart as an injury by accident within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(6). The evidence and the findings of the Commission support no other legal conclusion.\nThe order of the Industrial Commission is reversed and this matter is remanded to the Commission for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded with instructions.\nJudges MARTIN (Robert M.) and ERWIN concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "WELLS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Yokley & Teeter, by D. Blake Yokley, for plaintiff appellant.", "Hutchins, Tyndall, Bell, Davis <6 Pitt, by Richard Tyndall, for defendant appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WOODROW C. KING, Employee, Plaintiff Appellant v. FORSYTH COUNTY, Employer, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendant Appellees\nNo. 7910IC682\n(Filed 4 March 1980)\nMaster and Servant \u00a7 67\u2014 workmen\u2019s compensation \u2014heart attack \u2014 overexertion shown \u2014 no showing of unusual activity required\nWhere it was clear from the evidence in a workmen\u2019s compensation case that the injury to plaintiff deputy sheriffs heart occurred suddenly and immediately after the foot chase of a suspect, and that it was the overexertion experienced during the foot chase that caused the injury to his heart, it was not necessary for plaintiff to show that the overexertion which was the cause of his injury occurred while he was engaged in some unusual activity, since it was the extent and nature of the exertion that classified the resulting injury to the plaintiff\u2019s heart as an injury by accident within the meaning of G.S. 97-2(6).\nAPPEAL by plaintiff from order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 27 March 1979. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 February 1980.\nClaimant (King) was employed as a Deputy Sheriff in Forsyth County. On 9 May 1977, while on duty, he engaged in a vigorous foot chase of a fleeing suspect. Immediately following the chase, King suffered difficulty in breathing. He was promptly taken to Forsyth Memorial Hospital where he was examined by Dr. William J. Spencer. Dr. Spencer diagnosed that King had experienced an acute myocardial infarction. King was totally disabled and has not worked since the heart attack. Following the hearing before Deputy Commissioner Denson, King was found to be totally and permanently disabled and was awarded compensation. On review, the full Commission reversed Deputy Denson\u2019s award.\nYokley & Teeter, by D. Blake Yokley, for plaintiff appellant.\nHutchins, Tyndall, Bell, Davis <6 Pitt, by Richard Tyndall, for defendant appellees." }, "file_name": "0467-01", "first_page_order": 495, "last_page_order": 499 }